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Section 49

SOCRATES. See if the starting point of our inquiry is stated to your satisfaction, and try to answer what is asked exactly as you think.

CRITO. I will try.

SOCRATES. Do we say that one must never willingly do injustice, or that one may do injustice in some ways, but not in others? Or is doing injustice in no way good or honorable, just as we have often agreed in the past? Have all those former agreements of ours been poured away in these last few days? Could it be, Crito, that at our age, old men earnestly conversing with one another, we failed to notice all this time that we were no different from children? Or is it entirely as we were saying then: whether the multitude agrees or not, and whether we must suffer harsher things than these or milder, is doing injustice nonetheless essentially bad and disgraceful for the one doing it? Do we assert this or not?

CRITO. We assert it.

SOCRATES. Therefore, one must in no way do injustice.

CRITO. Certainly not.

SOCRATES. Not even when injured should one do injustice in return, as the multitude thinks, since one must in no way do injustice.

CRITO. It appears not.

SOCRATES. What about this: should one do evil, Crito, or not?

CRITO. One surely must not, Socrates.

SOCRATES. And what if someone does evil in return for suffering evil—is that just, as the multitude says, or unjust?

CRITO. It is not just in any way.

SOCRATES. For doing evil to people is no different from doing injustice.

CRITO. You speak the truth.

SOCRATES. Then one must not return injustice, nor do evil to any man, no matter what one suffers at their hands. Take care, Crito, that in agreeing to this you are not agreeing contrary to your true opinion. For I know that very few people believe this or will believe it. Those who hold this view and those who do not have no common ground of deliberation; they must necessarily despise each other when they see each other's counsel. Consider very carefully, then, if you share this view and agree with it, and let us start our deliberation from this principle: that it is never right to do injustice, nor to return injustice, nor for one who suffers evil to defend himself by returning evil. Or do you withdraw from this and not share my principle? For it seemed right to me long ago, and it still seems right now; but if you have formed some other opinion, speak up and teach me. But if you stand by our former agreement, hear the next point.

CRITO. I stand by it and share your view. Please go on.

SOCRATES. I will state the next point, then, or rather, I will ask it: whatever a person has agreed with someone to be just, should he do it, or cheat them of it?

CRITO. He should do it.