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Section 48

SOCRATES. Come now, if we ruin that part of us which is improved by health and corrupted by disease by obeying the opinion of those who do not understand, is our life worth living once it is corrupted? That is the body, is it not?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Is life worth living for us with a wretched and corrupted body?

CRITO. Not at all.

SOCRATES. But is life worth living for us when that part which injustice mutilates and justice benefits is corrupted? Do we consider that part of us, whatever it is, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be less honorable than the body?

CRITO. By no means.

SOCRATES. But more honorable?

CRITO. Much more.

SOCRATES. Therefore, my good friend, we must not care at all what the multitude will say about us, but what the one who understands about justice and injustice will say, the one man, and truth itself. So your first proposal was wrong, when you introduced the idea that we should care about the opinion of the multitude concerning what is just, honorable, good, and their opposites. But someone might say, "The multitude can put us to death."

CRITO. That is clear enough; someone might indeed say that, Socrates. You are right.

SOCRATES. But my wonderful friend, the argument we just went through still seems to me the same as before. And consider this one as well, to see if it still holds true for us or not: the most important thing is not just living, but living well.

CRITO. It still holds true.

SOCRATES. And that living well, living honorably, and living justly are the same thing—does this hold true or not?

CRITO. It holds true.

SOCRATES. Therefore, based on what we have agreed, we must examine whether it is just for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or unjust. And if it appears just, let us attempt it, but if not, we must let it be. As for the considerations you bring up regarding expense, reputation, and the raising of children, these are truly, Crito, the reflections of the multitude, who would readily put men to death and bring them back to life if they could, with absolutely no reason. For us, however, since the argument requires it, there is nothing else to examine but what we just mentioned: whether we shall be acting justly in paying money and showing gratitude to those who will lead me out of here, and in doing the leading out ourselves, or whether we shall in truth be acting unjustly in doing all these things. And if it appears that we would be acting unjustly, then there is no need to weigh whether we must die by remaining here and taking no action, or suffer anything else whatsoever, rather than act unjustly.

CRITO. I think what you say is right, Socrates. See what we should do.

SOCRATES. Let us examine it together, good sir. And if you have any objections to raise while I am speaking, raise them, and I will listen to you. But if not, my blessed friend, stop repeating the same argument over and over to me, that I must leave here against the will of the Athenians. For I consider it very important to act with your persuasion, and not against your will.