SOCRATES. Consider the implications of this. If we leave here without having persuaded the city, are we doing evil to anyone, and indeed to those whom we least ought to harm, or not? And are we abiding by the agreements we agreed were just, or not?

CRITO. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

SOCRATES. Think of it this way. Suppose the Laws and the Commonwealth of the city were to come and stand before us as we are about to run away from here—or whatever one ought to call it—and ask: "Tell us, Socrates, what are you intending to do? With this deed you are attempting, do you not think you are aiming to destroy us, the Laws, and the entire city, as far as it depends on you? Or do you think it is possible for a city to continue existing and not be overthrown, where the legal judgments rendered have no force, but are made invalid and corrupted by private individuals?" What shall we say, Crito, to these things and others like them? For one could say much, especially an orator, on behalf of this ruined law that decrees that judgments rendered must have sovereign authority. Or shall we say to them, "Yes, for the city wronged me and did not judge the case correctly"? Shall we say this, or what?

CRITO. This, by Zeus, Socrates!

SOCRATES. What if the Laws should then say: "Socrates, was this the agreement between us, or was it to abide by the judgments which the city renders?" If we were surprised by their words, perhaps they would say: "Do not be surprised by what we say, Socrates, but answer us, since you are accustomed to using questions and answers. Come then, what charge do you bring against us and the city, that you are attempting to destroy us? First of all, did we not bring you into being, and was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you? Tell us, do you have any fault to find with those of us Laws concerning marriage, that they are not good?" "I find no fault," I would say. "Well, what about the laws concerning the nurturing and education of children, in which you too were educated? Did those laws established for this purpose not instruct your father properly when they ordered him to educate you in music and gymnastics?" "They did so properly," I would say. "Well then. Since you have been born and nurtured and educated, could you deny, first of all, that you are our offspring and our slave, both you and your forebears? And if this is the case, do you think that justice is on equal terms between you and us, and that whatever we attempt to do to you, you have a just right to do back to us?"