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Section 47

SOCRATES. It was, I think, always said by those who thought they were speaking seriously, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions men hold, one should highly value some, but not others. By the gods, Crito, doesn't this seem to you to be a sound statement? For you, humanly speaking, are not in danger of dying tomorrow, and the present misfortune should not distort your judgment. Consider it, then: does it not seem to you to be a sound statement that we should not respect all the opinions of men, but some, and not others? Nor the opinions of all men, but of some, and not of others? What do you say? Is this not soundly spoken?

CRITO. It is sound.

SOCRATES. We should respect the good opinions, and not the bad ones?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the good ones are those of the wise, and the bad ones those of the foolish?

CRITO. How could it be otherwise?

SOCRATES. Come then, how were such points settled? When a man is engaged in physical training, does he pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of just anyone, or only of one person—the doctor or trainer?

CRITO. Only of that one person.

SOCRATES. Then he should fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man, and not of the multitude.

CRITO. Clearly.

SOCRATES. Therefore he must act and exercise, and eat and drink, in the way that seems best to the one who presides and understands the matter, rather than to all the others.

CRITO. That is so.

SOCRATES. Well now. If he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praises, and instead honors the words of the many who understand nothing, will he not suffer evil?

CRITO. Of course he will.

SOCRATES. And what is this evil? Where does it tend, and what part of the disobedient man does it affect?

CRITO. Clearly it affects his body, for it ruins that.

SOCRATES. Well said. And isn't this the case with all other things, Crito, so we need not go through them all? And specifically regarding the just and unjust, the honorable and disgraceful, the good and bad, which are the subjects of our present deliberation—must we follow the opinion of the multitude and fear that, or the opinion of the one man, if there is an expert, whom we ought to reverence and fear more than all the rest combined? If we do not follow him, we shall corrupt and maim that part of us which is made better by justice and ruined by injustice. Or is there no such part?

CRITO. I believe there is, Socrates.