Section 130
Socrates. Does anything else use it but the soul?
Alcibiades. Nothing else.
Socrates. By ruling it?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. And indeed I think no one would think otherwise about this.
Alcibiades. About what?
Socrates. That man is nothing else but one of three things.
Alcibiades. What three?
Socrates. Soul or body or both together, this whole thing.
Alcibiades. Of course.
Socrates. But did we not agree that the thing ruling the body is the man?
Alcibiades. We agreed.
Socrates. Does the body then rule itself?
Alcibiades. By no means.
Socrates. For we said it is ruled.
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. Then this would not be what we are seeking.
Alcibiades. It seems not.
Socrates. But does the combination of both rule the body, and is this the man?
Alcibiades. Perhaps indeed.
Socrates. Least of all; for if one of the two does not share in ruling, there is surely no way that the combination rules.
Alcibiades. Correct.
Socrates. But since neither the body nor the combination is the man, it remains I think either that he is nothing, or if he is anything, the man happens to be nothing else than soul.
Alcibiades. Absolutely.
Socrates. Is it then necessary to demonstrate to you more clearly that the soul is the man?
Alcibiades. By Zeus, it seems to me to be sufficient.
Socrates. If it is not exact but moderate, it is sufficient for us; for we shall know it exactly then, whenever we find that which we just passed over because it required much consideration.
Alcibiades. What is that?
Socrates. That which was said somehow just now, that we must first consider itself
; but now instead of itself
we have considered what each thing itself is. And perhaps it will suffice; for we could hardly say that anything is more properly ourselves than the soul.
Alcibiades. Certainly not.
Socrates. Therefore is it well to believe thus, that you and I converse with one another using arguments, soul to soul?
Alcibiades. Very much so.
Socrates. This then was what we also said a little before, that Socrates converses with Alcibiades using speech, making arguments not to your face, as it seems, but to Alcibiades; and this is the soul.
Alcibiades. It seems so to me.
Socrates. Therefore the one enjoining to know oneself commands us to recognize the soul.
Τμῆμα 130
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρῆται αὐτῷ ἢ ψυχή;
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τόδε γʼ οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι.
ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἕν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
ΑΛ. τίνων;
ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.
ΑΛ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὡμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;
ΑΛ. ὡμολογήσαμεν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἄρχει;
ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἴπομεν.
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄρα τὸ συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;
ΑΛ. ἴσως δῆτα.
ΣΩ. πάντων γε ἥκιστα· μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.
ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δʼ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὔτʼ εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν.
ΑΛ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;
ΑΛ. μὰ Δία, ἀλλʼ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν· ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα, ὅταν εὕρωμεν ὃ νυνδὴ παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως.
ΑΛ. τί τοῦτο;
ΣΩ. ὃ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅτι ἐστί. καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει· οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχήν.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν;
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι ἑαυτόν.