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Section 128

Socrates. Come then, what is it to take care of oneself—lest perhaps we escape notice not taking care of ourselves, but thinking we do—and when does a man do it? Does he take care of himself whenever he takes care of the things belonging to him?

Alcibiades. To me at least it seems so.

Socrates. What then? When does a man take care of his feet? Is it whenever he takes care of the things that belong to the feet?

Alcibiades. I do not understand.

Socrates. Do you call something belonging to the hand? Like a ring, would you say it belongs to any other part of a man than the finger?

Alcibiades. Certainly not.

Socrates. And a shoe belonging to the foot in the same way?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And clothes and coverings of the rest of the body similarly?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. So whenever we take care of shoes, do we then take care of feet?

Alcibiades. I do not quite understand, Socrates.

Socrates. What then, Alcibiades? Do you call it taking proper care of any thing whatsoever?

Alcibiades. I do.

Socrates. Therefore whenever someone makes something better, do you call that proper care?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. What art then makes shoes better?

Alcibiades. Shoemaking.

Socrates. So by shoemaking we take care of shoes?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And also of the foot by shoemaking? Or by that art with which we make feet better?

Alcibiades. By that one.

Socrates. And do we not make feet better by the same art as the rest of the body?

Alcibiades. It seems so to me.

Socrates. And is this not gymnastics?

Alcibiades. Especially so.

Socrates. By gymnastics then we take care of the foot, and by shoemaking we take care of the things belonging to the foot?

Alcibiades. Very much so.

Socrates. And by gymnastics of the hands, but by ring-engraving of the things belonging to the hand?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And by gymnastics of the body, but by weaving and the other arts of the things belonging to the body?

Alcibiades. Absolutely.

Socrates. Therefore by one art we take care of each thing itself, and by another of the things belonging to it.

Alcibiades. It appears so.

Socrates. Therefore whenever you take care of the things belonging to yourself, you are not taking care of yourself.

Alcibiades. By no means.

Socrates. For it is not the same art, as it seems, by which one would take care of himself and of the things belonging to himself.

Alcibiades. It appears not.

Socrates. Come then, by what art on earth could we take care of ourselves?

Alcibiades. I am unable to say.

Socrates. But this much at least has been agreed, that it is not by the art which would make any of our possessions better, but the one which makes ourselves better?

Alcibiades. You speak the truth.

Socrates. Would we then ever know what art makes a shoe better, not knowing a shoe?

Alcibiades. Impossible.

Socrates. Nor indeed what art makes rings better, being ignorant of a ring.

Alcibiades. True.

Socrates. What then? What art makes a man himself better, could we ever know it being ignorant of what on earth we ourselves are?