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Section 117

Alcibiades. I am already afraid for myself, but I suppose I would say the same things.

Socrates. Is this because you know? Is that the cause?

Alcibiades. I suppose so.

Socrates. Clearly then, concerning the things about which you involuntarily answer contrary things, you do not know about them.

Alcibiades. It is likely.

Socrates. And in answering about just and unjust things, beautiful and base things, bad and good things, advantageous and non-advantageous things, do you not say you are wandering? Is it not then clear that you wander because of not knowing about them?

Alcibiades. To me it is.

Socrates. Is it then like this: whenever someone does not know a thing, must his soul necessarily wander concerning this?

Alcibiades. How could it not?

Socrates. What then? Do you know the way in which you will ascend to heaven?

Alcibiades. By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates. Does your opinion wander concerning these things?

Alcibiades. No, indeed.

Socrates. Do you know the cause, or shall I tell you?

Alcibiades. Tell me.

Socrates. It is because, my friend, not knowing it, you do not think you know it.

Alcibiades. How do you mean this again?

Socrates. Consider it with me together. The things you do not know, but you recognize that you do not know them, do you wander about such things? Just as concerning the preparation of food you surely know that you do not know?

Alcibiades. Very much so.

Socrates. Do you then form opinions yourself concerning these things about how one must prepare them and so wander, or do you leave it to the one who knows?

Alcibiades. In that way.

Socrates. What if you were sailing in a ship, would you form opinions about whether one must draw the tiller inwards or outwards, and because you do not know, would you wander, or would you leave it to the pilot and keep quiet?

Alcibiades. To the pilot.

Socrates. Therefore concerning the things you do not know, you do not wander, provided you know that you do not know them?

Alcibiades. It seems I do not.

Socrates. Do you then perceive that errors in action are also because of this ignorance—the ignorance of one who does not know thinking that he knows?

Alcibiades. How do you mean this again?

Socrates. We attempt to act, do we not, whenever we think we know what we are doing?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. But whenever people do not think they know, do they hand it over to others?

Alcibiades. How could they not?

Socrates. Do not such people among the ignorant live without error because of leaving these things to others?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. Who then are those who err? For surely they are not those who know.

Alcibiades. No, indeed.