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Section 118

Socrates. And since it is neither those who know, nor those among the ignorant who know that they do not know, are there any others left besides those who do not know, but think they know?

Alcibiades. No, only these.

Socrates. Is this ignorance then the cause of bad things, and the most reproachful stupidity?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And when it concerns the greatest things, is it then most harmful and most base?

Alcibiades. By far.

Socrates. What then? Can you name greater things than the just, the beautiful, the good, and the advantageous?

Alcibiades. No, indeed.

Socrates. Is it not concerning these that you say you are wandering?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And if you are wandering, is it not clear from what has preceded that not only are you ignorant of the greatest things, but also, not knowing them, you think you know them?

Alcibiades. It is likely.

Socrates. Alas then, Alcibiades, what a state you have suffered! I hesitate to name it, but nevertheless, since we are alone, it must be said. You are living with stupidity, my excellent friend, of the most extreme sort, as the argument accuses you and you accuse yourself. That is why you are rushing toward political affairs before being educated. And you are not the only one who has suffered this, but also the many who manage the affairs of this city, except a few and perhaps your guardian Pericles.

Alcibiades. It is said, at any rate, Socrates, that he did not become wise spontaneously, but by associating with many wise men, including Pythoclides and Anaxagoras; and even now at his age he associates with Damon for this very reason.

Socrates. What then? Have you ever seen anyone wise in anything who was unable to make someone else wise in the same things as himself? Just as the one who taught you your letters was himself wise and made you and anyone else he wished wise; isn't that so?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And you, having learned from him, will you also be able to teach another?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And the lyre-player and the physical trainer in the same way?

Alcibiades. Very much so.

Socrates. For this is surely a good proof of those who know anything that they know it, whenever they are also able to show another to be knowing.

Alcibiades. It seems so to me.

Socrates. What then? Can you say whom Pericles made wise, starting with his sons?

Alcibiades. What if the two sons of Pericles were foolish, Socrates?

Socrates. Then what about Clinias, your brother?

Alcibiades. Why would you mention Clinias, a madman?

Socrates. Well then, since Clinias is mad, and the two sons of Pericles were foolish, what cause shall we assign to him for overlooking you when you are in such a condition?

Alcibiades. I suppose I am the cause by not paying attention.