Section 115
Socrates. For you are prophetic. Tell me: do you say that some just things are advantageous, while some are not?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. What then? Are some of them beautiful, and some not?
Alcibiades. How do you mean this?
Socrates. Has anyone ever seemed to you to act basely, yet justly?
Alcibiades. Not to me.
Socrates. But are all just things also beautiful?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. What again about beautiful things? Are they all good, or some good and some not?
Alcibiades. I think, Socrates, that some beautiful things are bad.
Socrates. And also that some base things are good?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. Do you mean things such as this: many who have come to the aid of a comrade or relative in war have received wounds and died, while those who did not help, though they ought to have, came away healthy?
Alcibiades. Very much so.
Socrates. You say that such aid is beautiful in respect to the attempt to save those whom one ought to save, and this is courage, is it not?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. But it is bad in respect to the deaths and wounds, isn't it?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. Are not courage and death different things?
Alcibiades. Very much so.
Socrates. Therefore, helping one's friends is not beautiful and bad in the same respect?
Alcibiades. It appears not.
Socrates. See then if, insofar as it is beautiful, it is also good, just as it is here. For you agreed that the aid was beautiful in respect to courage; consider this itself, then: is courage good or bad? Consider it this way: which would you choose to have, good things or bad?
Alcibiades. Good things.
Socrates. And the greatest goods most of all?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. And you would least of all choose to be deprived of such things?
Alcibiades. How could I not?
Socrates. What then do you say about courage? For how much would you choose to be deprived of it?
Alcibiades. I would not even accept life if I were a coward.
Socrates. Cowardice, then, seems to you to be the extreme of evils.
Alcibiades. To me it does.
Socrates. On a par with dying, as it seems.
Alcibiades. I agree.
Socrates. Are not life and courage most opposed to death and cowardice?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. And would you most of all wish to have the former, and least of all the latter?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. Is this because you think the former are the best, and the latter the worst?
Alcibiades. Very much so.
Socrates. Then you consider courage to be among the best things, and death among the worst.
Τμῆμα 115
ΣΩ. μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ. καί μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῂς ἔνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἔνια δʼ οὔ;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ;
ΑΛ. πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;
ΣΩ. εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μέν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν;
ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ τὰ καλά; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθά, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δʼ οὔ;
ΑΛ. οἴομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἀγαθά;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἑταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δʼ οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον;
ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· ἢ οὔ;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἕλκη· ἦ γάρ;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος;
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτόν γʼ ἐστι καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν;
ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ᾗ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὡμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτʼ οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· σὺ πότερʼ ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι, ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά;
ΑΛ. ἀγαθά.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα.
ΑΛ.ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι;
ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο στέρεσθαι;
ΑΛ. οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὤν.
ΣΩ. ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ δειλία.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὡς ἔοικε.
ΑΛ. φημί.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωὴ καὶ ἀνδρεία;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστʼ ἂν εἶναι βούλοιό σοι, τὰ δὲ ἥκιστα;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγῇ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι κἀν τοῖς κακίστοις θάνατον.
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ᾗ μὲν καλόν, κατʼ ἀγαθοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖπας;
ΑΛ. φαίνομαί γε.
ΣΩ. κατὰ δέ γε κακοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν;
ΑΛ. ναί.