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Section 114

Socrates. What a thing you do. If you say something incorrectly, and it happens to be possible to refute it by the very same argument as before, you think you must hear some new proofs and different arguments, as if the previous ones were worn-out little garments, and you would no longer put them on, unless someone brings you a clean and unsoiled proof. But I, letting go your sallies of speech, will ask you no less: from where did you learn to know the advantageous things, and who is the teacher, and all those things I asked before, I ask in a single question? But clearly you will arrive at the same point and will not be able to show either that you know the advantageous things by having discovered them or by having learned them. But since you are dainty and would no longer gladly taste the same argument, I will let this go, whether you know or not what is advantageous to the Athenians; but whether the just and the advantageous are the same or different, why have you not proven it? If you wish, ask me just as I asked you, or if you prefer, go through it yourself by yourself in a speech.

Alcibiades. But I do not know if I would be able, Socrates, to go through it with you.

Socrates. But, my good friend, consider me to be the assembly and the people; and even there you will have to persuade each one individually. Is it not so?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. Is it not the property of the same person to be able to persuade one individually and many together about whatever he knows, just as the schoolmaster persuades one individually about letters, and also many?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. Will not the same person also persuade one and many about number?

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. And this will be the one who knows, the arithmetician?

Alcibiades. Very much so.

Socrates. Therefore, those things which you are able to persuade many of, you can also persuade one of?

Alcibiades. It is likely.

Socrates. And these are clearly the things that you know.

Alcibiades. Yes.

Socrates. Does the orator in the assembly differ from the one in a gathering such as this only in this much: that the one persuades them all gathered together of the same things, while the other does so one by one?

Alcibiades. It is likely.

Socrates. Come now, since it appears to be the property of the same person to persuade many and one, practice on me and try to show that the just is sometimes not advantageous.

Alcibiades. You are arrogant, Socrates.

Socrates. Now at least, out of arrogance, I am going to persuade you of the very opposite of what you are unwilling to persuade me.

Alcibiades. Speak then.

Socrates. Only answer the questions asked.

Alcibiades. No, but you yourself speak.

Socrates. What? Do you not wish to be persuaded as much as possible?

Alcibiades. Assuredly, I suppose.

Socrates. If you say that these things are so, would you not be most persuaded?

Alcibiades. It seems so to me.

Socrates. Then answer; and if you do not hear from yourself that the just and the advantageous are the same, do not believe anyone else who says it.

Alcibiades. No, I must answer; for I think I shall suffer no harm.