Section 113
Socrates. Concerning these things, then, do I appear to be the one speaking, who asks the questions, or you, who answer?
Alcibiades. I do.
Socrates. And what if I ask what the letters of 'Socrates' are, and you say them, which is the one speaking?
Alcibiades. I am.
Socrates. Come then, say it in a word: whenever there is a question and an answer, which is the one speaking, the questioner or the answerer?
Alcibiades. The answerer, it seems to me, Socrates.
Socrates. Was I not the questioner continuously just now?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. And you the answerer?
Alcibiades. Very much so.
Socrates. What then? Which of us has spoken the things that were said?
Alcibiades. It appears, Socrates, from what has been agreed, that I have.
Socrates. Was it not said concerning just and unjust things that the beautiful Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, did not know them, but thought he did, and was intending to go to the assembly to advise the Athenians about things he knows nothing about? Was it not this?
Alcibiades. It appears so.
Socrates. The saying of Euripides then applies, Alcibiades: you run the risk of having heard these things from yourself, not from me, nor am I the one saying them, but you, and you blame me in vain. And indeed you speak well. For it is a mad undertaking that you have in mind to attempt, my excellent friend: to teach what you do not know, having neglected to learn.
Alcibiades. I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the other Greeks seldom deliberate about whether things are more just or more unjust; for they think such things are obvious, and so letting them go they consider which will be advantageous to do. For I think the just and the advantageous are not the same, but it has profited many to have committed great injustices, and for others, I suppose, who have done just things, it has brought no advantage.
Socrates. What then? Even if the just things happen to be as different as possible from the advantageous, surely you do not again think that you know these things that are advantageous to human beings, and why?
Alcibiades. What prevents it, Socrates? Unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learned it or how I discovered it myself.
Τμῆμα 113
ΣΩ. περὶ δὴ τούτων μῶν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, ἢ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
ΑΛ. ἐγώ.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρωμαι ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους, σὺ δʼ εἴπῃς, πότερος ὁ λέγων;
ΑΛ. ἐγώ.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἑνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ· ὅταν ἐρώτησίς τε καὶ ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
ΑΛ. ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς ἐγὼ μὲν ἦ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;
ΑΛ. ναί.
ΣΩ. σὺ δʼ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; τὰ λεχθέντα πότερος ἡμῶν εἴρηκεν;
ΑΛ. φαίνομαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐγώ.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίσταιτο, οἴοιτο δέ, καὶ μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλεύσειν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτʼ ἦν;
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· σοῦ τάδε κινδυνεύεις, οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὐδʼ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σύ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾷ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἃ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν.
ΑΛ. οἶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικώτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι, ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οἶμαι ἐστὶν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασαμένοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὔ τί που αὖ σὺ οἴει ταῦτʼ εἰδέναι ἃ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ διʼ ὅτι;
ΑΛ. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μή με αὖ ἐρήσῃ παρʼ ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ηὗρον.