Phaedo. For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think
that the good
and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for
that is the case.
What do you
mean?
I mean just what I might
say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than
to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again,
one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white?
Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few,
and the examples between the extremes are very many?
To be sure,
said I.And don’t you think,
said he,
that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled
would be very few in that also?
Very
likely,
I replied.Yes, very
likely,
he said, But it is not in that respect that arguments are
like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity
lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has
confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false,
whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know,
those men especially who
have spent their
time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that
they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything,
whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide
in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time.
Certainly,
I said, that is very
true.
Then, Phaedo,
he
said, if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can
be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man,
because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes
true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of
skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the
arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be
deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality.
Yes, by Zeus,
I said, it would be
sad.
First, then,
said
he, let us be on our guard against this,
and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is
no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are
not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to
become so, you and the others for the sake of all your future life,
and I because of my
impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of
mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite
uncultured persons.