Phaedo. And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be
reminded
of
Simmias himself?
Yes,
said
he.All these examples show, then, that
recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they
not?
Yes.
And when one has a recollection of anything
caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this
recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or
not?
Inevitably,
he
replied.Now see,
said he,
if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean
one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that
sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say
there is such a thing, or not?
We shall say that there is,
said Simmias, most
decidedly.
And do we know what
it is?
Certainly,
said
he.Whence did we derive the knowledge
of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing
equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of
abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another
thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood,
though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and
unequal in another?
Certainly.
Well, then,
did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or
equality inequality?
No, Socrates, never.
Then,
said he, those equals are not the same as equality
in the abstract.
Not at all, I
should say, Socrates.
But from those
equals,
said he, which are not the same as abstract equality, you
have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?
Very true,
he replied.And it is either like them or unlike
them?
Certainly.
It makes no
difference,
said he. Whenever the sight of one thing
brings you a perception of another, whether they be
like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.
Surely.
Now
then,
said he, do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of
which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be
equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like
abstract equality?
They fall very
far short of it,
said he.Do we
agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks,
This thing that I see
aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short
and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior
to it
, he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing
which he says the other resembles but falls short of?We must.
Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal
things and equality in the abstract?
It certainly is.