Phaedo. But this is impossible if
our soul did not
exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument
also it appears that the soul is immortal.
But, Cebes,
said Simmias, what were the proofs of this?
Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.
Briefly,
said Cebes, a very good proof is
this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer
correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them
some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is
shown most clearly if you take them
to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort.
And if you are not convinced in that way,
Simmias,
said Socrates, see if you don’t agree when you look at it
in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning
can be recollection?
I am not
incredulous,
said Simmias, but I want just what we are talking
about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to
recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear
what you were going to say.
It was this,
said he. We agree, I suppose,
that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous
time?
Certainly,
said
he.Then do we agree to this also, that
when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If
a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows
not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the
knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying
that
he recollects the thing of which he has
the perception?
What do you
mean?
Let me give an example.
Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.
Of course.
Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything
else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind
receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is
recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I
could cite countless such examples.
To be sure you could,
said Simmias.Now,
said he,
is that
sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard
to things which have already been forgotten through time and
inattention?
Certainly,
he replied.Well, then,
said
Socrates, can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be
reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of
Cebes?
Surely.