What we are investigating, however, is the Justice which is a part of Virtue, since we hold that there is such a thing as Justice in this sense; and similarly we are investigating Injustice in the particular sense.
The existence of the latter is proved by the following considerations: (1) When a man displays the other vices—for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive language, from Bad Temper, or refuses to assist a friend with money, from Meanness—though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of anything; whereas when a man takes more than his share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices, and certainly not to all of them, yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it; in fact it displays the vice of Injustice.
Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general, or illegal.
(2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is being done for profit that makes the action unjust.
(3) Again, whereas all other unjust acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice except Injustice.
Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice, the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its definition falls in the same genus, both sorts of Injustice being exhibited in a man’s relation to others; but whereas Injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honor or money or security, or whatever term we may employ to include all these things, its motive being the pleasure of gain, Injustice in the universal sense is concerned with all the things that are the sphere of Virtue.
Thus it is clear that there are more kinds of Justice than one, and that the term has another meaning besides Virtue as a whole. We have then to ascertain the nature and attributes of Justice in this special sense.
Now we have distinguished two meanings of the unjust,
namely the unlawful and the unequal or unfair, and two meanings of the just,
namely the lawful and the equal or fair. Injustice then, in the sense previously mentioned, corresponds to the meaning unlawful
;
but since the unfair is not the same as the unlawful, but different from it, and related to it as part to whole (for not everything unlawful is unfair, though everything unfair is unlawful), so also the unjust and Injustice in the particular sense are not the same as the unjust and Injustice in the universal sense, but different from them, and related to them as part to whole; for Injustice in this sense is a part of universal Injustice, and similarly the Justice we are now considering is a part of universal Justice. We have therefore to discuss Justice and Injustice, and the just and unjust, in the particular sense.
We may then set aside that Justice which is coextensive with virtue in general, being the practice of virtue in general towards someone else, and that Injustice which is the practice of vice in general towards someone else. It is also clear how we should define what is just and unjust in the corresponding senses. For the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the actions that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct displaying the various particular virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular vices. Also the regulations laid down for the education that fits a man for social life are the rules productive of virtue in general.
As for the education of the individual as such, that makes a man simply a good man, the question whether this is the business of Political Science or of some other science must be determined later: for it would seem that to be a good man is not in every case the same thing as to be a good citizen. Footnote 1This topic is discussed in Politics 3. Under certain forms of government the good man in the moral sense may not be a good citizen, that is, a citizen who will help to maintain the constitution.
Particular Justice on the other hand, and that which is just in the sense corresponding to it, is divided into two kinds. One kind is exercised in the distribution of honor, wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among its members in equal or unequal shares. The other kind is that which supplies a corrective principle in private transactions.
This Corrective Justice again has two sub-divisions, corresponding to the two classes of private transactions, those which are voluntary and those which are involuntary. Footnote 2Involuntary
here means lacking the consent of one of the parties. Examples of voluntary transactions are selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, letting for hire; these transactions being termed voluntary because they are voluntarily entered upon. Footnote 3In chap. 4 below, the writer gives no illustration of the operation of Corrective Justice in Voluntary Transactions, but he is clearly thinking of actions at law for damages resulting from breach of contract. See 4.13 note. Of involuntary transactions some are furtive, for instance, theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness; others are violent, for instance, assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, maiming, abusive language, contumelious treatment.