In regard to Justice Footnote 1In what follows δικαιοσύνη is found to possess both the wider meaning of Righteousness in general, covering all right conduct in relation to others, and the narrower sense of the virtue of right conduct in relation to others where gain or loss (whether to the agent or to other parties) is involved. δικαιοσύνη in this narrower sense is the special Moral Virtue which is the subject of Book 5; it would be described in English sometimes as Justice, sometimes as Honesty or uprightness. The related adjectives and verbs have various connotations connected with the various meanings of δικαιοσύνη both in its wider and in its narrower usage. For instance, τὰ δίκαια means sometimes just acts
in the English sense, sometimes any acts in conformity with the law, sometimes rights
or claims,
i.e., any consideration which by law, equity, or custom, certain persons have a right to expect from certain others. Or again ἀδικεῖν means not only to act unjustly, or dishonestly, but also to do, or have done, any wrongful injury to another, or any wrongful or illegal act, and so, as a legal term, to be guilty of a breach of the law. In translating however, if the connection of all these various meanings in the writer’s mind is to be represented, it seems necessary to keep the words justice,
injustice,
etc., throughout, in spite of their occasional unsuitability to the context. and Injustice, we have to enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense Justice is the observance of a mean, and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a mean.
Our enquiry may follow the same procedure as our preceding investigations.
Now we observe that everybody means by Justice that moral disposition which renders men apt to do just things, and which causes them to act justly and to wish what is just; and similarly by Injustice that disposition which makes men act unjustly and wish what is unjust. Let us then assume this definition to start with as broadly correct.
The fact is that it is not the same with dispositions as with sciences and faculties. It seems that the same faculty or science deals with opposite things Footnote 2For instance, medicine studies both health and disease. Cf. 9.16. ; but a disposition or condition which produces a certain result does not also produce the opposite results; for example, health does not give rise to unhealthy actions, but only to healthy ones: healthy walking means walking as a healthy man would walk. Footnote 3i.e., it does not also mean walking lame.
Hence Footnote 4Because a faculty or science is the same for opposite things. sometimes the nature of one of two opposite dispositions is inferred from the other, sometimes dispositions are known from the things in which they are found; for instance, if we know what good bodily condition is, we know from this what bad condition is as well, but we also know what good condition is from bodies in good condition, and know what bodies are in good condition from knowing what good condition is. Thus, supposing good condition is firmness of flesh, bad condition must be flabbiness of flesh, and a diet productive of good condition Footnote 5Literally that which has to do with good condition
: the word here slightly shifts its meaning, for just above it meant that which is in good condition.
must be a diet producing firmness of flesh.
Also, if one of two correlative groups of words is used in several senses, it follows as a rule that the other is used in several senses too: for example, if just
has more than one meaning, so also has unjust
and Injustice.
Now it appears that the terms Justice and Injustice are used in several senses, but as the equivocal uses are closely connected, the equivocation is not detected; whereas in the case of widely different things called by a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use of the word kleis (key) to denote both the bone Footnote 6The clavicle (clavis, a key), or collar-bone. at the base of the neck and the instrument with which we lock our doors.
Let us then ascertain in how many senses a man is said to be unjust.
Now the term unjust
is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the unfair Footnote 7The word ἴσος means both equal
and equitable
or fair.
man. Hence it is clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. The just
therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and the unjust
means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair.
Again, as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These though always good in the absolute sense, are not always good for a particular person. Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue, although they ought not to do so; they ought, while choosing the things that are good for them, to pray that what is good absolutely may also be good for them.
The unjust man does not however always choose the larger share: of things that, speaking absolutely, are bad he chooses the smaller share; but nevertheless he is thought to take more than his due, because the lesser of two evils seems in a sense to be a good, and taking more than one’s due means taking more than one’s due of good.
Let us call him unfair,
for that is a comprehensive term, and includes both taking too much of good things and too little of bad things. Footnote 8Here some mss. add Also a law-breaker, for this, law-breaking or else unfairness, includes all injustice and is a common term for all injustice.
Again, we saw that the law-breaker is unjust and the law-abiding man just. It is therefore clear that all lawful things are just in one sense of the word, for what is lawful is decided by legislature, and the several decisions of the legislature we call rules of justice.
Now all the various pronouncements of the law aim either at the common interest of all, or at the interest of a ruling class determined either by excellence or in some other similar way; so that in one of its senses the term just
is applied to anything that produces and preserves the happiness, or the component parts of the happiness, of the political community.
But the law also prescribes certain conduct: the conduct of a brave man, for example not to desert one’s post, not to run away, not to throw down one’s arms; that of a temperate man, for example not to commit adultery or outrage; that of a gentle man, for example not to strike, not to speak evil; and so with actions exemplifying the rest of the virtues and vices, commanding these and forbidding those—rightly if the law has been rightly enacted, not so well if it has been made at random.
Justice then in this sense is perfect Virtue, though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others. This is why Justice is often thought to be the chief of the virtues, and more sublime or than the evening or the morning star
Footnote 9According to a scholiast, this is a quotation, slightly altered, from the lost play Melanippe of Euripides (fr. 490 Dindorf). ; and we have the proverb—
And Justice is perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue; and perfect in a special degree, Footnote 11In the mss. the wordsIn Justice is all Virtue found in sum. Footnote 10Theog. 147.
in a special degreefollow
perfectin the line before. because its possessor can practise his virtue towards others and not merely by himself; for there are many who can practise virtue in their own private affairs but cannot do so in their relations with another.
This is why we approve the saying of Bias, Office will show a man
; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes a member of a community.
The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the view Footnote 12Put into the mouth of the sophist Thrasymachus in Plato’s Plat. Rep. 343c. that Justice alone of the virtues is the good of others,
because it does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate.
As then the worst man is he who practises vice towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the best is not he who practises virtue in regard to himself but he who practises it towards others; for that is a difficult task.
Justice in this sense then is not a part of Virtue, but the whole of Virtue; and its opposite Injustice is not a part of Vice but the whole of Vice
(the distinction between Virtue and Justice in this sense being clear from what has been said: they are the same quality of mind, but their essence is different Footnote 13Cf. 6.8.1. ; what as displayed in relation to others is Justice, as being simply a disposition of a certain kind is Virtue).