Section 7

Nor indeed can there be any intermediate between contrary statements, but of one thing we must either assert or deny one thing, whatever it may be. This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood. To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore also he who says that a thing is or is not will say either what is true or what is false.

But neither what is nor what is not is said not to be or to be. Further, an intermediate between contraries will be intermediate either as grey is between black and white, or as neither man nor horse is between man and horse. If in the latter sense, it cannot change (for change is from not-good to good, or from good to not-good);

but in fact it is clearly always changing; for change can only be into the opposite and the intermediate. And if it is a true intermediate, in this case too there would be a kind of change into white not from not-white; but in fact this is not seen. 1 Further, the understanding either affirms or denies every object of understanding or thought (as is clear from the definition 2 )

whenever it is right or wrong. When, in asserting or denying, it combines the predicates in one way, it is right; when in the other, it is wrong.

Again, unless it is maintained merely for argument’s sake, the intermediate must exist beside all contrary terms; so that one will say what is neither true nor false. And it will exist beside what is and what is not; so that there will be a form of change beside generation and destruction.

Again, there will also be an intermediate in all classes in which the negation of a term implies the contrary assertion; e.g., among numbers there will be a number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is clear from the definition. 3

Again, there will be an infinite progression, and existing things will be not only half as many again, but even more.

For again it will be possible to deny the intermediate in reference both to its assertion and to its negation, and the result will be something 4 ; for its essence is something distinct.

Again, when a man is asked whether a thing is white and says no, he has denied nothing except that it is 〈white〉, and its not-being 〈white〉 is a negation.

Now this view has occurred to certain people in just the same way as other paradoxes have also occurred; for when they cannot find a way out from eristic arguments, they submit to the argument and admit that the conclusion is true. Some, then, hold the theory for this kind of reason, and others because they require an explanation for everything. In dealing with all such persons the starting-point is from definition;

and definition results from the necessity of their meaning something; because the formula, which their term implies, will be a definition. 5 The doctrine of Heraclitus, which says that everything is and is not, 6 seems to make all things true; and that of Anaxagoras 7 seems to imply an intermediate in contradiction, so that all things are false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good; and so no statement is true.