Again, ought we to assume the existence of something else besides particular things, or are they the objects of the science which we are seeking? Footnote 1Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.11, Aristot. Met. 3.4.1-8. It is true that they are infinite in number; but then the things which exist besides particulars are genera or species, and neither of these is the object of the science which we are now seeking. We have explained Footnote 2Aristot. Met. 11.1.11-13 why this is impossible.
Indeed, in general it is a difficult question whether we should suppose that there is some substance which exists separately besides sensible substances (i.e. the substances of our world), or that the latter constitute reality, and that it is with them that Wisdom is concerned. It seems that we are looking for some other kind of substance, and that this is the object of our undertaking: I mean, to see whether there is anything which exists separately and independently, and does not appertain to any sensible thing.
But again, if there is another kind of substance besides sensible substances, to what kind of sensible things are we to suppose that it corresponds? Why should we suppose that it corresponds to men or horses rather than to other animals, or even to inanimate objects in general? And yet to manufacture a set of eternal substances equal in number to those which are sensible and perishable would seem to fall outside the bounds of plausibility.
Yet if the principle which we are now seeking does not exist in separation from bodies, what can we suppose it to be if not matter? Yes, but matter does not exist actually, but only potentially. It might seem rather that a more appropriate principle would be form or shape; but this is perishable Footnote 3Forms which are induced in matter are perishable, although not subject to the process of destruction; they are at one time and are not at another (cf. Aristot. Met. 7.15.1). The only pure form (i.e., the only form which is independent of matter in any and every sense) is the prime mover (Aristot. Met. 12.7). ; and so in general there is no eternal substance which exists separately and independently.
But this is absurd, because it seems natural that there should be a substance and principle of this kind, and it is sought for as existing by nearly all the most enlightened thinkers. For how can there be any order in the universe if there is not something eternal and separate and permanent?
Again, if there is a substance and principle of such a nature as that which we are now seeking, and if it is one for all things, i.e. the same for both eternal and perishable things, it is a difficult question as to why, when the principle is the same, some of the things which come under that principle are eternal, and others not; for this is paradoxical. Footnote 4Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.12, Aristot. Met. 3.4.11-23.
But if there is one principle of perishable things, and another of eternal things, if the principle of perishable things is also eternal, we shall still have the same difficulty; because if the principle is eternal, why are not the things which come under that principle eternal? And if it is perishable, it must have another principle behind it, and that principle must have another behind it; and the process will go on to infinity.
On the other hand, if we posit the principles which seem most unchangeable, Being and Unity, Footnote 5Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.13, Aristot. Met. 3.4.24-34. (a) unless each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, how can they be separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking are of this nature.
(b) If, however, each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, then all existing things are substances; for Being is predicated of everything, and Unity also of some things.
But that all things are substances is false. (c) As for those who maintain that Unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number from Unity and matter as their first product, and assert that it is a substance, how can their theory be true? How are we to conceive of 2 and each of the other numbers thus composed, as one? On this point they give no explanation; nor is it easy to give one.
But if we posit lines or the things derived from them (I mean surfaces in the primary sense Footnote 6i.e., intelligible surfaces, etc. ) as principles, Footnote 7Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.15, Aristot. Met. 3.5. these at least are not separately existing substances, but sections and divisions, the former of surfaces and the latter of bodies (and points are sections and divisions of lines); and further they are limits of these same things. All these things are integral parts of something else, and not one of them exists separately.
Further, how are we to suppose that there is a substance of unity or a point? for in the case of every substance Footnote 8sc. which is liable to generation or destruction. there is a process of
generation, but in the case of the point there is not; for the point is a division.
It is a perplexing fact also that whereas every science treats of universals and types, substance is not a universal thing, but rather a particular and separable thing; so that if there is a science that deals with first principles, how can we suppose that substance is a first principle? Footnote 9Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.14, Aristot. Met. 3.6.7-9.
Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean the matter and the form in combination) or not? Footnote 10This section belongs to the problem discussed in 1-5 above. If not, all things in the nature of matter are perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not; for in some cases, e.g. that of a house, the form clearly does not exist in separation.
Again, are the first principles formally or numerically the same? Footnote 11Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.12, Aristot. Met. 3.4.8-10. If they are numerically one, all things will be the same.