That wisdom is a science of first principles is clear from our Introductory remarks, Footnote 1Aristot. Met. 1.3-10. in which we of raised objections to the statements of other thinkers about the first principles. It might be asked, however, whether we should regard Wisdom as one science or as more than one. Footnote 2Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.5, Aristot. Met. 3.2.1-10. If as one, it may be objected that the objects of one science are always contraries; but the first principles are not contraries. And if it is not one, what sort of sciences are we to suppose them to be?
Again, is it the province of one science, or of more than one, to study the principles of demonstration? Footnote 3Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.5, , Aristot. Met. 3.2.10-15, where the problem takes a slightly different form. If of one, why of it rather than of any other? And if of more than one, of what sort are we to suppose them to be?
Again, are we to suppose that Wisdom deals with all substances or not? Footnote 4Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.6, Aristot. Met. 3.2.15-17. If not with all, it is hard to lay down with what kind it does deal; while if there is one science of them all, it is not clear how the same science can deal with more than one subject.
Again, is this science concerned only with substances, or with attributes as well? Footnote 5Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.8-10, Aristot. Met. 3.2.18-19. For if it is a demonstration of attributes, it is not concerned with substances; and if there is a separate science of each, what is each of these sciences, and which of them is Wisdom? qua demonstrative, the science of attributes appears to be Wisdom; but qua concerned with that which is primary, the science of substances.
Nor must we suppose that the science which we are seeking is concerned with the causes described in the Physics. Footnote 6Aristot. Physics 2.3. It is not concerned with the final cause; for this is the Good, and this belongs to the sphere of action and to things which are in motion; and it is this which first causes motion (for the end is of this nature); but there is no Prime Mover in the sphere of immovable things.
And in general it is a difficult question whether the science which we are now seeking is concerned with sensible substances, or not with sensible substances, but with some other kind. Footnote 7Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.7, Aristot. Met.3.2.20-30. If with another kind, it must be concerned either with the Forms or with mathematical objects. Now clearly the Forms do not exist. (But nevertheless, even if we posit them, it is a difficult question as to why the same rule does not apply to the other things of which there are Forms as applies to the objects of mathematics.
I mean that they posit the objects of mathematics as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things, as a third class besides the Forms and the things of our world; but there is no third man
Footnote 8This phrase has no technical sense here; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.9.4. or horse
besides the Ideal one and the particulars. If on the other hand it is not as they make out, what sort of objects are we to suppose to be the concern of the mathematician? Not surely the things of our world; for none of these is of the kind which the mathematical sciences investigate.)
Nor indeed is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics; for none of them can exist separately. But it does not deal with sensible substances either; for they are perishable.
In general the question might be raised, to what science it pertains to discuss the problems concerned with the matter Footnote 9i.e., intelligible matter (cf. Aristot. Met. 7.10.18). This problem is not raised in Book 3. of mathematical objects.
It is not the province of physics, because the whole business of the physicist is with things which contain in themselves a principle of motion and rest; nor yet of the science which inquires into demonstration and
scientific knowledge, for it is simply this sort of thing which forms the subject of its inquiry. It remains, therefore, that it is the science which we have set ourselves to find that treats of these subjects.
One might consider the question whether we should regard the science which we are now seeking as dealing with the principles which by some are called elements. Footnote 10Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.10, Aristot. Met. 3.3. But everyone assumes that these are present in composite things; and it would seem rather that the science which we are seeking must be concerned with universals, since every formula and every science is of universals and not of ultimate species; so that in this case it must deal with the primary genera.
These would be Being and Unity; for these, if any, might best be supposed to embrace all existing things, and to be most of the nature of first principles, because they are by nature primary; for if they are destroyed, everything else is destroyed with them, since everything exists and is one.
But inasmuch as, if Being and Unity are to be regarded as genera, they must be predicable of their differentiae, whereas no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae, from this point of view it would seem that they should be regarded neither as genera nor as principles.
Further, since the more simple is more nearly a principle than the less simple, and the ultimate subdivisions of the genus are more simple than the genera (because they are indivisible), and the genera are divided into a number of different species, it would seem that species are more nearly a principle than genera.
On the other hand, inasmuch as species are destroyed together with their genera, it seems more likely that the genera are principles; because that which involves the destruction of something else is a principle. These and other similar points are those which cause us perplexity.