Book II. An Account of the World and the Elements.

Chaps. 1-5.

[I have adopted the division of the chapters from Hardouin, as given in the editions of Valpy, Lemaire, Ajasson, and Sillig; the Roman figures, enclosed between brackets, are the numbers of the chapters in Dalechamps, De Laët, Gronovius, Holland, and Poinsinet. The titles of the chapters are nearly the same with those in Valpy, Lemaire, and Ajasson.]

Chap. 1. (1.)—Whether the World Be Finite, and Whether There Be More Than One World.

The world [“Mundus.” In translating from one language into another, it is proper, as a general principle, always to render the same word in the original by the same word in the translation. But to this rule there are two exceptions; where the languages do not possess words which precisely correspond, and where the original author does not always use the same word in the same sense. Both these circumstances, I apprehend, apply to the case in question. The term Mundus is used by Pliny, sometimes to mean the earth and its immediate appendages, the visible solar system; and at other times the universe; while I think we may venture to assert, that in some instances it is used in rather a vague manner, without any distinct reference to either one or other of the above designations. I have, in almost all cases, translated it by the term world, as approaching nearest to the sense of the original. The word mundus is frequently employed by Lucretius, especially in his fifth book, and seems to be almost always used in the more extended sense of universe. There are, indeed, a few passages where either meaning would be equally appropriate, and in one line it would appear to be equivalent to firmament or heavens; “et mundi speciem violare serenam,” iv. 138. Cicero, in his treatise De Natura Deorum, generally uses the term mundus in the sense of universe, as in ii. 22, 37, 58 and 154; while in one passage, ii. 132, it would appear to be employed in the more limited sense of the earth. It occasionally occurs in the Fasti of Ovid, but it is not easy to ascertain its precise import; as in the line “Post chaos, ut primum data sunt tria corpora mundo,” v. 41, where from the connexion it may be taken either in the more confined or in the more general sense. Manilius employs the word very frequently, and his commentators remark, that he uses it in two distinct senses, the visible firmament and the universe; and I am induced to think that he attaches still more meaning to the term. It occurs three times in the first eleven lines of his poem. In the third line, “deducere mundo aggredior,” mundus may be considered as equivalent to the celestial regions as opposed to the earth. In the ninth line, “concessumque patri mundo,” we may consider it as signifying the celestial regions generally; and in the eleventh, “Jamque favet mundus,” the whole of the earth, or rather its inhabitants. We meet with it again in the sixty-eighth line, “lumina mundi,” where it seems more properly to signify the visible firmament; again in the 139th, “Et mundi struxere globum,” it seems to refer especially to the earth, synonymous with the general sense of the English term world; while in the 153rd line, “per inania mundi,” it must be supposed to mean the universe. Hyginus, in his Poeticon Astronomicon, lib. i. p. 55, defines the term as follows: “Mundus appellatur is qui constat in sole et luna et terra et omnibus stellis;” and again, p. 57, “Terra mundi media regione collocata.” We may observe the different designations of the term mundus in Seneca; among other passages I may refer to his Nat. Quæst. vii. 27 & iii. 30; to his treatise De Consol. § 18 and De Benef. iv. 23, where I conceive the precise meanings are, respectively, the universe, the terrestrial globe, the firmament, and the heavenly bodies. The Greek term κόσμος, which corresponds to the Latin word mundus, was likewise employed to signify, either the visible firmament or the universe. In illustration of this, it will be sufficient to refer to the treatise of Aristotle Περὶ Κόσμου, cap. 2. p. 601. See also Stephens’s Thesaurus, in loco. In Apuleius’s treatise De Mundo, which is a free translation of Aristotle’s Περὶ Κόσμου, the term may be considered as synonymous with universe. It is used in the same sense in various parts of Apuleius’s writings: see Metam. ii. 23; De Deo Socratis, 665, 667; De Dogmate Platonis, 574, 575, et alibi.], and whatever that be which we otherwise call the heavens [Cicero, in his Timæus, uses the same phraseology; “Omne igitur cœlum, sive mundus, sive quovis alio vocabulo gaudet, hoc a nobis nuncupatum est,” § 2. Pomponius Mela’s work commences with a similar expression; “Omne igitur hoc, quidquid est, cui mundi cœlique nomen indideris, unum id est.” They were probably taken from a passage in Plato’s Timæus, “Universum igitur hoc, Cœlum, sive Mundum, sive quo alio vocabulo gaudet, cognominemus,” according to the translation of Ficinus; Platonis Op. ix. p. 302. The word cœlum, which is employed in the original, in its ordinary acceptation, signifies the heavens, the visible firmament; as in Ovid, Met. i. 5, “quod tegit omnia, cœlum.” It is, in most cases, employed in this sense by Lucretius and by Manilius, as in i. 2. of the former and in i. 14. of the latter. Occasionally, however, it is employed by both of these writers in the more general sense of celestial regions, in opposition to the earth, as by Lucretius, i. 65, and by Manilius, i. 352. In the line quoted by Cicero from Pacuvius, it would seem to mean the place in which the planets are situated; De Nat. Deor. ii. 91. The Greek word οὐρανὸς may be regarded as exactly corresponding to the Latin word cœlum, and employed with the same modifications; see Aristotle, De Mundo and De Cœlo, and Ptolemy, Mag. Const. lib. i. passim; see also Stephens’s Thesaurus, in loco. Aratus generally uses it to designate the visible firmament, as in l. 10, while in l. 32 it means the heavenly regions. Gesner defines cœlum, “Mundus exclusa terra,” and mundus, “Cœlum et quidquid cœli ambitu continetur.” In the passage from Plato, referred to above, the words which are translated by Ficinus cœlum and mundus, are in the original οὐρανὸς and κόσμος; Ficinus, however, in various parts of the Timæus, translates οὐρανὸς by the word mundus: see t. ix. p. 306, 311, et alibi.], by the vault of which all things are enclosed, we must conceive to be a Deity [The following passage from Cicero may serve to illustrate the doctrine of Pliny: “Novem tibi orbibus, vel potius globis, connexa sunt omnia: quorum unus est cœlestis, extimus, qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse Deus, arcens et continens cœlum;” Som. Scip. § 4. I may remark, however, that the term here employed by our author is not Deus but Numen.], to be eternal, without bounds, neither created, nor subject, at any time, to destruction [We have an interesting account of the opinions of Aristotle on this subject, in a note in M. Ajasson’s translation, ii. 234 et seq., which, as well as the greater part of the notes attached to the second book of the Natural History, were written by himself in conjunction with M. Marcus.]. To inquire what is beyond it is no concern of man, nor can the human mind form any conjecture respecting it. It is sacred, eternal, and without bounds, all in all; indeed including everything in itself; finite, yet like what is infinite; the most certain of all things, yet like what is uncertain, externally and internally embracing all things in itself; it is the work of nature, and itself constitutes nature [The philosophers of antiquity were divided in their opinions respecting the great question, whether the active properties of material bodies, which produce the phænomena of nature, are inherent in them, and necessarily attached to them, or whether they are bestowed upon them by some superior power or being. The Academics and Peripatetics generally adopted the latter opinion, the Stoics the former: Pliny adopts the doctrine of the Stoics; see Enfield’s Hist. of Phil. i. 229, 283, 331.].

It is madness to harass the mind, as some have done, with attempts to measure the world, and to publish these attempts; or, like others, to argue from what they have made out, that there are innumerable other worlds, and that we must believe there to be so many other natures, or that, if only one nature produced the whole, there will be so many suns and so many moons, and that each of them will have immense trains of other heavenly bodies. As if the same question would not recur at every step of our inquiry, anxious as we must be to arrive at some termination; or, as if this infinity, which we ascribe to nature, the former of all things, cannot be more easily comprehended by one single formation, especially when that is so extensive. It is madness, perfect madness, to go out of this world and to search for what is beyond it, as if one who is ignorant of his own dimensions could ascertain the measure of any thing else, or as if the human mind could see what the world itself cannot contain.

Chap. 2. (2.)—Of the Form of the World.

That it has the form of a perfect globe we learn from the name which has been uniformly given to it, as well as from numerous natural arguments. For not only does a figure of this kind return everywhere into itself [This doctrine was maintained by Plato in his Timæus, p. 310, and adopted by Aristotle, De Cœlo, lib. ii. cap. 14, and by Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 47. The spherical form of the world, οὐρανὸς, and its circular motion are insisted upon by Ptolemy, in the commencement of his astronomical treatise Μεγάλη Σύνταξις, Magna Constructio, frequently referred to by its Arabic title Almagestum, cap. 2. He is supposed to have made his observations at Alexandria, between the years 125 and 140 A.D. His great astronomical work was translated into Arabic in the year 827; the original Greek text was first printed in 1538 by Grynæus, with a commentary by Theon. George of Trebisond published a Latin version of it in 1541, and a second was published by Camerarius in 1551, along with Ptolemy’s other works. John Muller, usually called Regiomontanus, and Purback published an abridgement of the Almagest in 1541. For an account of Ptolemy I may refer to the article in the Biog. Univ. xxxv. 263 et seq., by Delambre, also to Hutton’s Math. Dict., in loco, and to the high character of him by Whewell, Hist. of the Inductive Sciences, p. 214.] and sustain itself, also including itself, requiring no adjustments, not sensible of either end or beginning in any of its parts, and is best fitted for that motion, with which, as will appear hereafter, it is continually turning round; but still more, because we perceive it, by the evidence of the sight, to be, in every part, convex and central, which could not be the case were it of any other figure.

Chap. 3. (3.)—Of Its Nature; Whence the Name Is Derived.

The rising and the setting of the sun clearly prove, that this globe is carried round in the space of twenty-four hours, in an eternal and never-ceasing circuit, and with incredible swiftness [See Ptolemy, ubi supra.]. I am not able to say, whether the sound caused by the whirling about of so great a mass be excessive, and, therefore, far beyond what our ears can perceive, nor, indeed, whether the resounding of so many stars, all carried along at the same time and revolving in their orbits, may not produce a kind of delightful harmony of incredible sweetness [This opinion, which was maintained by Pythagoras, is noticed and derided by Aristotle, De Cœlo, lib. ii. cap. 9. p. 462-3. A brief account of Pythagoras’s doctrine on this subject is contained in Enfield’s Philosophy, i. 386.]. To us, who are in the interior, the world appears to glide silently along, both by day and by night.

Various circumstances in nature prove to us, that there are impressed on the heavens innumerable figures of animals and of all kinds of objects, and that its surface is not perfectly polished like the eggs of birds, as some celebrated authors assert [Pliny probably here refers to the opinion which Cicero puts into the mouth of one of the interlocutors in his treatise De Nat. Deor. ii. 47, “Quid enim pulchrius ea figura, quæ sola omnes alias figuras complexa continet, quæque nihil asperitatis habere, nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum angulis, nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens, nihil lacunosum?”]. For we find that the seeds of all bodies fall down from it, principally into the ocean, and, being mixed together, that a variety of monstrous forms are in this way frequently produced. And, indeed, this is evident to the eye; for, in one part, we have the figure of a wain, in another of a bear, of a bull, and of a letter [The letter Δ, in the constellation of the triangle; it is named Δελτωτὸν by Aratus, l. 235; also by Manilius, i. 360. We may remark, that, except in this one case, the constellations have no visible resemblance to the objects of which they bear the name.]; while, in the middle of them, over our heads, there is a white circle [“Locum hunc Plinii de Galaxia, sive Lactea via, interpretantur omnes docti.” Alexandre, in Lemaire, i. 227. It may be remarked, that the word vertex is here used in the sense of the astronomical term zenith, not to signify the pole.].

(4.) With respect to the name, I am influenced by the unanimous opinions of all nations. For what the Greeks, from its being ornamented, have termed κόσμος, we, from its perfect and complete elegance, have termed mundus. The name cœlum, no doubt, refers to its being engraven, as it were, with the stars, as Varro suggests [De Ling. Lat. lib. iv. p. 7, 8. See also the remarks on the derivation of the word in Gesner, Thes., in loco.]. In confirmation of this idea we may adduce the Zodiac [“Signifer.” The English term is taken from the Greek word Ζωδιακὸς, derived from Ζῶον; see Aristotle, De Mundo, cap. 2. p. 602. The word Zodiacus does not occur in Pliny, nor is it employed by Ptolemy; he names it λοξὸς κύκλος, obliquus circulus; Magn. Const. i. 7, 13, et alibi. It is used by Cicero, but professedly as a Greek term; Divin. ii. 89, and Arati Phænom. l. 317. It occurs in Hyginus, p. 57 et alibi, and in A. Gellius, 13. 9. Neither signifer taken substantively, nor zodiacus occur in Lucretius or in Manilius.], in which are twelve figures of animals; through them it is that the sun has continued its course for so many ages.

Chap. 4. (5.)—Of the Elements and the Planets.

I do not find that any one has doubted that there are four elements. The highest of these is supposed to be fire, and hence proceed the eyes of so many glittering stars. The next is that spirit, which both the Greeks and ourselves call by the same name, air [“Aër.” “Circumfusa undique est (terra) hac animabili spirabilique natura, cui nomen est aër; Græcum illud quidem, sed perceptum jam tamen usu a nobis;” Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 91.]. It is by the force of this vital principle, pervading all things and mingling with all, that the earth, together with the fourth element, water, is balanced in the middle of space. These are mutually bound together, the lighter being restrained by the heavier, so that they cannot fly off; while, on the contrary, from the lighter tending upwards, the heavier are so suspended, that they cannot fall down. Thus, by an equal tendency in an opposite direction, each of them remains in its appropriate place, bound together by the never-ceasing revolution of the world, which always turning on itself, the earth falls to the lowest part and is in the middle of the whole, while it remains suspended in the centre [“universi cardine.” “Revolutionis, ut aiunt, centro. Idem Plinius, hoc ipso libro, cap. 64, terram cœli cardinem esse dicit;” Alexandre, in Lem. i. 228. On this subject I may refer to Ptolemy, Magn. Const, lib. i. cap. 3, 4, 6. See also Apuleius, near the commencement of his treatise De Mundo.], and, as it were, balancing this centre, in which it is suspended. So that it alone remains immoveable, whilst all things revolve round it, being connected with every other part, whilst they all rest upon it.

(6.) Between this body and the heavens there are suspended, in this aërial spirit, seven stars [“Sidera.” The word sidus is used, in most cases, for one of the heavenly bodies generally, sometimes for what we term a constellation, a particular assemblage of them, and sometimes specially for an individual star. Manilius employs the word in all these senses, as will appear by the three following passages respectively; the first taken from the opening of his poem, “Carmine divinas artes, et conscia fati Sidera....” The second, “Hæc igitur texunt æquali sidera tractu Ignibus in varias cœlum laqueantia formas.” i. 275, 276. The third “... pectus, fulgenti sidere clarius;” i. 356. In the Fasti of Ovid, we have examples of the two latter of these significations:— “Ex Ariadnæo sidere nosse potes;” v. 316. “Et canis (Icarium dicunt) quo sidere noto Tosta sitit tellus;” iv. 939, 940. Lucretius appears always to employ the term in the general sense. J. Obsequens applies the word sidus to a meteor; “sidus ingens cœlo demissum,” cap. 16. In a subsequent part of this book, chap. 18 et seq., our author more particularly restricts the term sidus to the planets.], separated by determinate spaces, which, on account of their motion, we call wandering, although, in reality, none are less so [Cicero remarks concerning them; “quæ (stellæ) falso vocantur errantes;” De Nat. Deor. ii. 51.]. The sun is carried along in the midst of these, a body of great size and power, the ruler, not only of the seasons and of the different climates, but also of the stars themselves and of the heavens [“... vices dierum alternat et noctium, quum sidera præsens occultat, illustrat absens;” Hard. in Lem. i. 230.]. When we consider his operations, we must regard him as the life, or rather the mind of the universe, the chief regulator and the God of nature; he also lends his light to the other stars [“ceteris sideribus.” According to Hardouin, ubi supra, “nimium stellis errantibus.” There is, however, nothing in the expression of our author which sanctions this limitation.]. He is most illustrious and excellent, beholding all things and hearing all things, which, I perceive, is ascribed to him exclusively by the prince of poets, Homer [See Iliad, iii. 277, and Od. xii. 323.].

Chap. 5. (7.)—Of God.

I consider it, therefore, an indication of human weakness to inquire into the figure and form of God. For whatever God be, if there be any other God [“Si alius est Deus quam sol,” Alexandre in Lem. i. 230. Or rather, if there be any God distinct from the world; for the latter part of the sentence can scarcely apply to the sun. Poinsinet and Ajasson, however, adopt the same opinion with M. Alexandre; they translate the passage, “s’il en est autre que le soleil,” i. 17 and ii. 11.], and wherever he exists, he is all sense, all sight, all hearing, all life, all mind [“totus animæ, totus animi;” “Anima est qua vivimus, animus quo sapimus.” Hard. in Lem. i. 230, 231. The distinction between these two words is accurately pointed out by Lucretius, iii. 137 et seq.], and all within himself. To believe that there are a number of Gods, derived from the virtues and vices of man [“fecerunt (Athenienses) Contumeliæ fanum et Impudentiæ.” Cicero, De Leg. ii. 28. See also Bossuet, Discours sur l’Histoire univ. i. 250.], as Chastity, Concord, Understanding, Hope, Honour, Clemency, and Fidelity; or, according to the opinion of Democritus, that there are only two, Punishment and Reward [The account which Cicero gives us of the opinions of Democritus scarcely agrees with the statement in the text; see De Nat. Deor. i. 120.], indicates still greater folly. Human nature, weak and frail as it is, mindful of its own infirmity, has made these divisions, so that every one might have recourse to that which he supposed himself to stand more particularly in need of [“In varios divisit Deos numen unicum, quod Plinio cœlum est aut mundus; ejusque singulas partes, aut, ut philosophi aiunt, attributa, separatim coluit;” Alexandre in Lemaire, i. 231.]. Hence we find different names employed by different nations; the inferior deities are arranged in classes, and diseases and plagues are deified, in consequence of our anxious wish to propitiate them. It was from this cause that a temple was dedicated to Fever, at the public expense, on the Palatine Hill [“Febrem autem ad minus nocendum, templis celebrant, quorum adhuc unum in Palatio....” Val. Max. ii. 6; see also Ælian, Var. Hist. xii. 11. It is not easy to ascertain the precise meaning of the terms Fanum, Ædes, and Templum, which are employed in this place by Pliny and Val. Maximus. Gesner defines Fanum “area templi et solium, templum vero ædificium;” but this distinction, as he informs us, is not always accurately observed; there appears to be still less distinction between Ædes and Templum; see his Thesaurus in loco, also Bailey’s Facciolati in loco.], and to Orbona [“Orbona est Orbitalis dea.” Hardouin in Lemaire, i. 231.], near the Temple of the Lares, and that an altar was elected to Good Fortune on the Esquiline. Hence we may understand how it comes to pass that there is a greater population of the Celestials than of human beings, since each individual makes a separate God for himself, adopting his own Juno and his own Genius [“Appositos sibi statim ab ortu custodes credebant, quos viri Genios, Junones fœminæ vocabant.” Hardouin in Lemaire, i. 232. See Tibullus, 4. 6. 1, and Seneca, Epist. 110, sub init.]. And there are nations who make Gods of certain animals, and even certain obscene things [We may suppose that our author here refers to the popular mythology of the Egyptians; the “fœtidi cibi” are mentioned by Juvenal; “Porrum et cæpe nefas violare et frangere morsu,” xv. 9; and Pliny, in a subsequent part of his work, xix. 32, remarks, “Allium cæpeque inter Deos in jurejurando habet Ægyptus.”], which are not to be spoken of, swearing by stinking meats and such like. To suppose that marriages are contracted between the Gods, and that, during so long a period, there should have been no issue from them, that some of them should be old and always grey-headed and others young and like children, some of a dark, complexion, winged, lame, produced from eggs, living and dying on alternate days, is sufficiently puerile and foolish. But it is the height of impudence to imagine, that adultery takes place between them, that they have contests and quarrels, and that there are Gods of theft and of various crimes [See Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 42 et alibi, for an illustration of these remarks of Pliny.]. To assist man is to be a God; this is the path to eternal glory. This is the path which the Roman nobles formerly pursued, and this is the path which is now pursued by the greatest ruler of our age, Vespasian Augustus, he who has come to the relief of an exhausted empire, as well as by his sons. This was the ancient mode of remunerating those who deserved it, to regard them as Gods [This sentiment is elegantly expressed by Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 62, and by Horace, Od. iii. 3. 9 et seq. It does not appear, however, that any of the Romans, except Romulus, were deified, previous to the adulatory period of the Empire.]. For the names of all the Gods, as well as of the stars that I have mentioned above [“Planetarum nempe, qui omnes nomina mutuantur a diis.” Alexandre in Lemaire, i. 234.], have been derived from their services to mankind. And with respect to Jupiter and Mercury, and the rest of the celestial nomenclature, who does not admit that they have reference to certain natural phenomena [This remark may be illustrated by the following passage from Cicero, in the first book of his treatise De Nat. Deor. Speaking of the doctrine of Zeno, he says, “neque enim Jovem, neque Junonem, neque Vestam, neque quemquam, qui ita appelletur, in deorum habet numero: sed rebus inanimis, atque mutis, per quandam significationem, hæc docet tributa nomina.” “Idemque (Chrysippus) disputat, æthera esse eum, quem homines Jovem appellant: quique aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum: terramque eam esse, quæ Ceres diceretur: similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum.”]?

But it is ridiculous to suppose, that the great head of all things, whatever it be, pays any regard to human affairs [The following remarks of Lucretius and of Cicero may serve to illustrate the opinion here expressed by our author:— “Omnis enim per se Divum natura necesse est Immortali ævo summa cum pace fruatur, Semota ab nostris rebus, sejunctaque longe;” Lucretius, i. 57-59. “Quod æternum beatumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quidquam, nec exhibere alteri; itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod, quæ talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia.” Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 45.]. Can we believe, or rather can there be any doubt, that it is not polluted by such a disagreeable and complicated office? It is not easy to determine which opinion would be most for the advantage of mankind, since we observe some who have no respect for the Gods, and others who carry it to a scandalous excess. They are slaves to foreign ceremonies; they carry on their fingers the Gods and the monsters whom they worship [The author here alludes to the figures of the Egyptian deities that were engraven on rings.]; they condemn and they lay great stress on certain kinds of food; they impose on themselves dreadful ordinances, not even sleeping quietly. They do not marry or adopt children, or indeed do anything else, without the sanction of their sacred rites. There are others, on the contrary, who will cheat in the very Capitol, and will forswear themselves even by Jupiter Tonans [His specific office was to execute vengeance on the impious.], and while these thrive in their crimes, the others torment themselves with their superstitions to no purpose.

Among these discordant opinions mankind have discovered for themselves a kind of intermediate deity, by which our scepticism concerning God is still increased. For all over the world, in all places, and at all times, Fortune is the only god whom every one invokes; she alone is spoken of, she alone is accused and is supposed to be guilty; she alone is in our thoughts, is praised and blamed, and is loaded with reproaches; wavering as she is, conceived by the generality of mankind to be blind, wandering, inconstant, uncertain, variable, and often favouring the unworthy. To her are referred all our losses and all our gains, and in casting up the accounts of mortals she alone balances the two pages of our sheet [“sola utramque paginam facit.” The words utraque pagina generally refer to the two sides of the same sheet, but, in this passage, they probably mean the contiguous portions of the same surface.]. We are so much in the power of chance, that chance itself is considered as a God, and the existence of God becomes doubtful.

But there are others who reject this principle and assign events to the influence of the stars [“astroque suo eventu assignat;” the word astrum appears to be synonymous with sidus, generally signifying a single star, and, occasionally, a constellation; as in Manilius, i. 541, 2. “... quantis bis sena ferantur Finibus astra....” It is also used by synecdoche for the heavens, as is the case with the English word stars. See Gesner’s Thesaurus.], and to the laws of our nativity; they suppose that God, once for all, issues his decrees and never afterwards interferes. This opinion begins to gain ground, and both the learned and the unlearned vulgar are falling into it. Hence we have the admonitions of thunder, the warnings of oracles, the predictions of soothsayers, and things too trifling to be mentioned, as sneezing and stumbling with the feet reckoned among omens [“Quæ si suscipiamus, pedis offensio nobis... et sternutamenta erunt observanda.” Cicero, De Nat. Deor. ii. 84.]. The late Emperor Augustus [“Divus Augustus.” The epithet divus may be regarded as merely a term of court etiquette, because all the Emperors after death were deified ex officio.] relates, that he put the left shoe on the wrong foot, the day when he was near being assaulted by his soldiers [We learn the exact nature of this ominous accident from Suetonius; “... si mane sibi calceus perperam, et sinister pro dextro induceretur;” Augustus, Cap. 92. From this passage it would appear, that the Roman sandals were made, as we term it, right and left.]. And such things as these so embarrass improvident mortals, that among all of them this alone is certain, that there is nothing certain, and that there is nothing more proud or more wretched than man. For other animals have no care but to provide for their subsistence, for which the spontaneous kindness of nature is all-sufficient; and this one circumstance renders their lot more especially preferable, that they never think about glory, or money, or ambition, and, above all, that they never reflect on death.

The belief, however, that on these points the Gods superintend human affairs is useful to us, as well as that the punishment of crimes, although sometimes tardy, from the Deity being occupied with such a mass of business, is never entirely remitted, and that the human race was not made the next in rank to himself, in order that they might be degraded like brutes. And indeed this constitutes the great comfort in this imperfect state of man, that even the Deity cannot do everything. For he cannot procure death for himself, even if he wished it, which, so numerous are the evils of life, has been granted to man as our chief good. Nor can he make mortals immortal, or recall to life those who are dead; nor can he effect, that he who has once lived shall not have lived, or that he who has enjoyed honours shall not have enjoyed them; nor has he any influence over past events but to cause them to be forgotten. And, if we illustrate the nature of our connexion with God by a less serious argument, he cannot make twice ten not to be twenty, and many other things of this kind. By these considerations the power of Nature is clearly proved, and is shown to be what we call God. It is not foreign to the subject to have digressed into these matters, familiar as they are to every one, from the continual discussions that take place respecting God [It is scarcely necessary to remark, that the opinions here stated respecting the Deity are taken partly from the tenets of the Epicureans, combined with the Stoical doctrine of Fate. The examples which are adduced to prove the power of fate over the Deity are, for the most part, rather verbal than essential.].