Section 91

"Let us begin," he said. "First remind me of what you said, if I do not seem to remember. Simmias, I believe, is in doubt and fears that the soul, although more divine and beautiful than the body, perishes before it, being a kind of harmony. Cebes seemed to grant me this: that the soul is more durable than the body. But he argued that no one knows whether the soul, having worn out many bodies, perishes itself when it leaves its last body; and that death might be exactly this—the destruction of the soul, since the body never stops perishing continuously. Are these the things, Simmias and Cebes, that we must examine?" They both agreed that they were. "Now," he asked, "do you reject all the previous arguments, or only some of them?" They said they rejected some, but not others. "What do you say about the argument in which we said learning is recollection, and that since this is so, our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before being bound in the body?" "I was wondrously persuaded by it then," said Cebes, "and I still hold to it more firmly than any other." "And I hold the same," said Simmias. "I would be very surprised if I ever thought differently about it." Socrates replied, "But you must think differently about it, my Theban friend, if you maintain your opinion that a harmony is something composite, and that the soul is a harmony composed of the elements tensioned in the body. For you surely will not accept your own statement that a harmony was composed and existed before the things from which it was to be composed existed. Or will you accept that?" "Never, Socrates," he said. "Do you perceive," he said, "that this is exactly what happens to your argument when you say the soul exists before entering human form and body, and yet is composed of things that do not yet exist? A harmony is not what you are likening it to. The lyre, the strings, and the unharmonized sounds come first; the harmony is composed last of all, and perishes first. How will this argument harmonize with the other?" "Not at all," said Simmias.

Τμῆμα 91

ΦΑΙΔ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε — θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς — εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ’ οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ — κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν — ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἆρα ἄλλ’ ἢ ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ’ εἶναι ἄμφω. πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ’ οὔ; τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ’ οὔ.