Section 90
"It would be a pitiable state of affairs, Phaedo," he said, "if a true, secure argument exists that is capable of being understood, yet a man, because he encounters arguments that seem true at one time and false at another, does not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but because of his distress happily shifts the blame from himself to the arguments, and spends the rest of his life hating and reviling arguments, thus depriving himself of truth and knowledge of reality." "By Zeus," I said, "that would be pitiable indeed." "First of all, then," he said, "let us guard against this, and not let the thought enter our soul that there is perhaps nothing sound in arguments. Let us rather think that we ourselves are not yet sound, but must act like men and strive eagerly to become sound—you and the others for the sake of the rest of your lives, and I for the sake of death itself. For in my present situation, I run the risk of acting not like a philosopher regarding this matter, but like a contentious debater, exactly like those who lack all education. When they debate a point, they do not care how the facts actually stand; they only eagerly seek to persuade their audience to accept whatever they have proposed. In my present situation, I differ from them only in this: I will not eagerly seek to persuade the audience that what I say is true—except as a secondary effect—but I will eagerly seek to persuade myself above all else that it is true. I calculate it this way, my dear comrade—see how selfish I am: If what I say is actually true, it is an excellent thing to be persuaded of it. If there is nothing after death, I will at least avoid distressing those present with my lamentations during the time before my death. And my ignorance will not persist with me—that would be an evil—but will soon perish. Prepared like this, Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument. You, if you listen to me, will give little thought to Socrates, and much more to the truth. If I seem to say anything true, agree with me; if not, oppose me with every argument, taking care that in my eagerness I do not deceive both myself and you, departing like a bee leaving its stinger behind."
Τμῆμα 90
ΦΑΙΔ. εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ. ὥσπερ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐχὶ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; πάνυ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; εἰκός γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ’ οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· — καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ’ ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη. νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως.