Section 314
COMRADE. I think law is a resolution or decree of the state.
SOCRATES. You are saying, it seems, that law is a political opinion.
COMRADE. I am.
SOCRATES. Perhaps you are right; but let us examine it this way. Do you call some people wise?
COMRADE. Yes.
SOCRATES. And the wise are wise by wisdom, just as the just are just by justice?
COMRADE. Certainly.
SOCRATES. And the lawful are lawful by law, while the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?
COMRADE. Yes.
SOCRATES. And the lawful are good, while the lawless are bad?
COMRADE. Very true.
SOCRATES. So law, and being lawful, is a good thing, while lawlessness is a bad thing?
COMRADE. That is so.
SOCRATES. Now, is a bad resolution a good thing or a bad thing?
COMRADE. A bad thing, surely.
SOCRATES. But we agreed that law is a good thing. Therefore, a bad resolution cannot be a law, even if it is a resolution of the state.
COMRADE. I agree.
SOCRATES. Therefore, it is incorrect to say simply that law is a resolution of the state, because a bad resolution is not a law. It must be a good resolution.
COMRADE. That seems right.
SOCRATES. And what is a good resolution? Is it not a true opinion?
COMRADE. Yes.
SOCRATES. And a true opinion is the discovery of what is, or reality.
COMRADE. It is.
SOCRATES. So law wishes to be the discovery of what is. When those who make resolutions fail to discover what is, they fail to make a true law, but only an imitation of law.
Τμῆμα 314
ΣΩ. τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη νόμος; ἐπισκεψώμεθʼ αὐτὸ ὧδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεγόμενα ἀνήρετο, ἐπειδὴ ὄψει φατὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται;
ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα· εἰ δʼ αὖ ἤρετο ἡμᾶς, τί δέ; ἐπειδὴ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα ἀκούεται, τίνι ὄντι τῇ ἀκοῇ;
ἀπεκρινάμεθʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι αἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ νόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίνι ὄντι τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται; πότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει, ὥσπερ τὰ μανθανόμενα μανθάνεται δηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἢ εὑρέσει τινί, ὥσπερ τὰ εὑρισκόμενα εὑρίσκεται, οἷον τὰ μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἰατρικῇ, ἃ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις, μαντικῇ; ἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων· ἦ γάρ;
ΕΤ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἂν τούτων ὑπολάβοιμεν μάλιστα τὸν νόμον εἶναι;
ΕΤ. τὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τις φαίη νόμον εἶναι; ὥστε κινδυνεύει, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι.
ΣΩ. δόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον.
ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἴσως καλῶς λέγεις· τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα. λέγεις τινὰς σοφούς;
ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ σοφοί εἰσιν σοφίᾳ σοφοί;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; οἱ δίκαιοι δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοι;
ΕΤ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἀνομίᾳ ἄνομοι;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οἱ δὲ νόμιμοι δίκαιοι;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. οἱ δὲ ἄνομοι ἄδικοι;
ΕΤ. ἄδικοι.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κάλλιστον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ὁ νόμος;
ΕΤ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. αἴσχιστον δὲ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ ἡ ἀνομία;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ μὲν σῴζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. ὡς περὶ καλοῦ ἄρα τινὸς ὄντος δεῖ τοῦ νόμου διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν.
ΕΤ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δόγμα ἔφαμεν εἶναι πόλεως τὸν νόμον;
ΕΤ. ἔφαμεν γάρ.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ μὲν χρηστὰ δόγματα, τὰ δὲ πονηρά;
ΕΤ. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἦν πονηρός.
ΕΤ. οὐ γάρ.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἀποκρίνεσθαι οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ἁρμόττοι ἂν τὸ πονηρὸν δόγμα νόμος εἶναι.
ΕΤ. οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν δόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐχ ἡ πονηρὰ δόξα, ἆρα οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο κατάδηλον, ὡς ἡ χρηστή, εἴπερ δόξα νόμος ἐστί;
ΕΤ. ναί.
ΣΩ. δόξα δὲ χρηστὴ τίς ἐστιν; οὐχ ἡ ἀληθής;