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Section 313

SOCRATES. What is law? For us, how should we define it?

COMRADE. Which law are you asking about, Socrates?

SOCRATES. What do you mean? Is there a difference between one law and another in respect to being law? Just as gold does not differ from gold in being gold, or a stone from a stone in being a stone, does law differ from law in being law? Or is the nature of law the same everywhere? That is exactly what I am asking: what is law in general?

COMRADE. What else could law be, Socrates, but the things that are accepted by custom and convention?

SOCRATES. Do you think that speech is the things that are spoken, or that sight is the things that are seen, or that hearing is the things that are heard? Or is speech something different from the things spoken, sight different from the things seen, and hearing different from the things heard? In the same way, is law something different from the things accepted by custom, or is it the same?

COMRADE. I now think it is something different.

SOCRATES. Then what would law be? Let us examine it this way: when we see things, what is it that we see them by? By sight. And when we hear things, what do we hear them by? By hearing. Now, when we accept things by custom or convention, what do we accept them by? Is it by law?

COMRADE. Yes.

SOCRATES. But surely sight is not the same as the things seen, nor is hearing the same as the things heard. Therefore, law is not the same as the things accepted by custom. It must be something else, the principle or faculty by which these customs are established. Let us inquire further: what could this be?