Section 137
SOCRATES. "Now, what do we call the art by which people correctly punish the lawless and wicked in cities? Isn't it the art of judging, or justice?" "Yes, it is justice." "And is the art by which we distinguish the good from the bad anything other than justice?" "No, it is the same." "And we agreed that the same art that applies to one applies to many. So the art by which a man manages a city well—which we call the art of a statesman or a king—is the same art by which a man manages his own household well, which we call the art of a household manager or master." "It seems so." "Then the art of a king, a statesman, a master, a household manager, and a judge are all the same art?" "Yes." "So is it fitting for the philosopher to be second-rate in these matters? If a judge is passing a sentence, should the philosopher stand by and offer only second-best advice, or should he be the one to give the best advice?" "He should give the best advice." "And what if a king or a statesman is deliberating on matters of state? Is it appropriate for the philosopher to be second-best in these matters, or should he be the expert?" "He should be the expert, Socrates." "Therefore, my friend, philosophy is far from being a matter of knowing a little about everything or being a pentathlete who is second-best. In the most important matters—those concerning justice and the management of cities and households—the philosopher must not be second to anyone. He must be the true expert, the one who possesses the supreme art."
Τμῆμα 137
οὐδὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα. ἔχει δέ πως ὡδί. ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς ἀχρήστους· αὖθις δʼ αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἕως ἂν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὦσιν, ἀχρήστους εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὡμολόγηται;
πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
ὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀχρήστους, ἕως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέχναι ὦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι, μηδʼ ᾖ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακέναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ᾤμην καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα εἰ ἄρα ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνῃ· τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται κολάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι;
οἵπερ βελτίστους.
τί δέ; κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὗτοι καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται;
ναί.
ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς;
φαίνεταί μοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
τί δέ; πότερον ἥπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις;
ἡ αὐτή, ἔφη.
ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν κολάζουσαν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς;
πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα;
ναί.
καὶ καθʼ ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὕτως;
φημί.
τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει; οὐχ ἡ δικαστική;
ναί.
ἦ ἄλλην οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἢ ταύτην;
οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην.
οὐκοῦν ᾗπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτῃ καὶ γιγνώσκουσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηρούς;
ταύτῃ.
ὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται;
ναί.
καὶ ὅστις γε πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ ἕνα;
φημί.
εἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵππους, κἂν ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν;
φημί.
καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς βοῦς, κἂν αὑτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν;
ναί, ἔφη.
οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;
ὡμολόγει.