Section 135
SOCRATES. At this point, both of them were stumped. So I, wishing to help them out, said: "Since we cannot find the answer, let us look at it this way. What kinds of things should the philosopher learn, since he cannot learn everything?" The intellectual replied, "He should learn the most beautiful and fitting disciplines, those from which he will gain the greatest reputation for philosophy. And he will gain the greatest reputation if he appears to be experienced in all the arts, or at least the most respectable ones. Therefore, he should learn what is appropriate for a free man to know, which means understanding the theories of the arts, though not necessarily the practical execution." "I see," I said. "You mean that he should be like the pentathlete in the games. A pentathlete is second-best in each individual event—like running or wrestling—compared to the specialist, but he is better than all the other athletes in the combined events. Is this the sort of thing you mean by philosophy?" "Exactly," he said. "You have grasped my meaning perfectly. The philosopher is someone who understands the theories of the arts but is second to the experts in practical matters." "Let us see if you are right about this," I said. "Do you consider good men to be useful or useless?" "Useful, certainly," he replied. "And if the good are useful, are the bad useless?" "Yes." "And do you consider philosophers to be useful men?" "I consider them the most useful of all." "But let us see if what you say is true. How can they be useful to us if they are second-best in everything? If you were sick, would you call for a philosopher, who is second-best in medicine, or a doctor?" "I would call a doctor," he admitted.
Τμῆμα 135
τοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες· κἀγὼ προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς ἠρόμην, βούλεσθε, ἔφην, ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν, ἐρώμεθα ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια; ἢ ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος, μὴ ἀξιούντων εἶναί τινα ἄλλον ὅστις ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον;
ἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν, καὶ εἶπον, ποῖα δὲ μάλιστα ἄττα τοπάζομεν εἶναι τῶν μαθημάτων ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ οὐχὶ πάντα οὐδὲ πολλά;
ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος εἶπεν ὅτι κάλλιστα ταῦτʼ εἴη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ προσήκοντα ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν· πλείστην δʼ ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων γε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων, μαθὼν αὐτῶν ταῦτα ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.
ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ; καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίαιο πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν, ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν· ὀλίγοι γε μὴν κἂν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι γίγνοιντο. ἆρα μή τι τοιοῦτον λέγεις; καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας μου συνεχώρει καὶ αὐτὸς λέγειν τοιοῦτον.
ἠρόμην δʼ αὐτὸν εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἴη δύο μόνας τέχνας οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας· ὁ δέ, μὴ οὕτως μου, ἔφη, ὑπολάβῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγοντος ὅτι δεῖ ἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλʼ ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην, ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ πραττομένοις περὶ τὰς τέχνας.
κἀγώ, ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἠμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον ὅτι ἐβούλετο, ἆρʼ ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷοι ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.