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Section 10

EUTHYPHRO. Well, it is perhaps no small task, Socrates, although I could prove it to you very clearly.

SOCRATES. I understand. You think I am a slower learner than the jurors, because you will certainly prove to them that those acts were unjust and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO. Very clearly, Socrates, provided they listen to me.

SOCRATES. They will listen, if they think you speak well. But here is a thought that occurred to me while you were speaking: Suppose Euthyphro were to teach me perfectly that all the gods think such a death is unjust. What more have I learned from Euthyphro about what the pious and the impious actually are? The action in question might be hateful to the gods, but we just saw that the pious and the impious are not defined by this, since we found that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to the gods. So I will let you off the hook on this point, Euthyphro. If you wish, let us suppose that all the gods consider it unjust and all of them hate it. Is this the correction we are now making in the definition: that what all the gods hate is impious, and what all the gods love is pious, and what some love and others hate is neither, or both? Is this how you would now have us define the pious and the impious?

EUTHYPHRO. What prevents it, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Nothing prevents me, Euthyphro. But you must consider for yourself whether, using this hypothesis, you will easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO. I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is impious.

SOCRATES. Shall we examine this to see if it is soundly spoken, Euthyphro? Or should we let it go and simply accept our own statements and those of others, conceding that something is true merely because someone says it is? Or must we examine what the speaker is saying?

EUTHYPHRO. We must examine it. However, I believe that what we have just said is soundly spoken.

SOCRATES. We shall soon know better, my good friend. Consider this: is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES. I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of something carried and something carrying, something led and something leading, something seen and something seeing. Do you understand that all these things are different from one another, and in what way they differ?

EUTHYPHRO. I think I understand.

SOCRATES. Is there not also a thing loved, and something different from it which is loving?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Tell me, then: is the thing carried a carried thing because someone carries it, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, for that reason.

SOCRATES. And the thing led is led because someone leads it, and the thing seen is seen because someone sees it?

EUTHYPHRO. Absolutely.

SOCRATES. So it is not because it is a seen thing that someone sees it, but the opposite: because someone sees it, it is a seen thing. It is not because it is a led thing that someone leads it, but because someone leads it, it is a led thing. And not because it is a carried thing does someone carry it, but because someone carries it, it is a carried thing. Is my meaning clear, Euthyphro? I mean this: if something becomes or undergoes something, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes. It does not undergo because it is an undergone thing, but it is an undergone thing because it undergoes. Do you agree with this?

EUTHYPHRO. I do.