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Section 11

SOCRATES. Now, is not the thing loved either a thing becoming or a thing undergoing something by someone?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then it is the same as with the previous examples: it is not because it is a loved thing that those who love it love it; rather, it is a loved thing because they love it.

EUTHYPHRO. Necessarily.

SOCRATES. Now, what are we saying about the pious, Euthyphro? Is it loved by all the gods, as your argument claims?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Because it is pious, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, because it is pious.

SOCRATES. So it is loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved?

EUTHYPHRO. It seems so.

SOCRATES. On the other hand, the god-loved is god-loved because it is loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then the god-loved is not the pious, Euthyphro, nor is the pious the god-loved, as you claim. They are two different things.

EUTHYPHRO. How so, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Because we agreed that the pious is loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is loved. Is that right?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. But the god-loved, because it is loved by the gods, is god-loved by the very act of being loved. It is not loved because it is god-loved.

EUTHYPHRO. True.

SOCRATES. But if the god-loved and the pious were the same thing, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious were loved because it is pious, the god-loved would also be loved because it is god-loved. And if the god-loved were god-loved because it is loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it is loved by the gods. But as it is, you see that the two are completely opposite and entirely different from each other. For the one is of a nature to be loved because it is loved, while the other is loved because it is of a nature to be loved. It seems, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what the pious is, you did not wish to make its essence clear to me, but you merely stated an attribute belonging to it: that the pious has the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you have not yet told me what it actually is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me. Start from the beginning and tell me what the pious is, whether it is loved by the gods or has any other attribute—for we shall not quarrel about that. Speak up and tell me: what are the pious and the impious?

EUTHYPHRO. But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind. Whatever we put forward keeps moving around and refuses to stay where we set it down.

SOCRATES. Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to be the work of my ancestor, Daedalus. If I had made them and set them down, perhaps you would joke that my kinship with him is the reason my verbal creations run away and refuse to stay put. But since the hypotheses are yours, we need a different joke. For they refuse to remain stationary for you, as you yourself see.