SOCRATES. I would not be surprised. You shall explain them to me at your leisure on another occasion. But for now, try to answer more clearly the question I asked you earlier. For you did not adequately teach me when I asked what the pious is. You just told me that what you are doing now—prosecuting your father for murder—happens to be a pious act.

EUTHYPHRO. And I spoke the truth, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Perhaps. But surely, Euthyphro, you would say that there are many other pious acts as well.

EUTHYPHRO. Indeed there are.

SOCRATES. Remember, I did not ask you to teach me one or two of the many pious acts, but rather the very form itself by which all pious things are pious. For you agreed that it is by one specific character that impious things are impious, and pious things are pious. Do you not remember?

EUTHYPHRO. I remember.

SOCRATES. Teach me, then, what this very form is, so that I may look upon it and use it as a standard. Then, if what you or anyone else does is of that kind, I may say it is pious; and if it is not, I may say it is not.

EUTHYPHRO. If that is what you want, Socrates, that is what I will tell you.

SOCRATES. That is exactly what I want.

EUTHYPHRO. Then what is dear to the gods is pious, and what is not dear to them is impious.

SOCRATES. Excellent, Euthyphro! Now you have given the sort of answer I was looking for. Whether it is true or not, I do not yet know, but clearly you will now go on to prove that what you say is true.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Come then, let us examine what we are saying. An action or a person dear to the gods is pious, and an action or person hated by the gods is impious. And they are not the same, but the pious is the exact opposite of the impious. Is that not what was said?

EUTHYPHRO. It was.

SOCRATES. And does it seem to be well said?

EUTHYPHRO. I think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Did we not also say that the gods quarrel, disagree, and feel enmity toward one another, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. We did.

SOCRATES. Now, my good friend, what sort of disagreements produce enmity and anger? Consider this: if you and I disagreed about which of two numbers is greater, would this disagreement make us angry and hostile toward each other? Or would we simply resort to counting and quickly settle our dispute?

EUTHYPHRO. We would settle it.

SOCRATES. And if we disagreed about the larger and smaller, we would turn to measurement and quickly stop our quarrel?

EUTHYPHRO. That is right.

SOCRATES. And if we disagreed about heavier and lighter, we would turn to weighing and be reconciled?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.