Section 5

SOCRATES. But by Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think you possess such precise knowledge concerning the gods, and about what is pious and impious, that under these circumstances you are not afraid that by bringing your father to trial you might be committing an impious act yourself?

EUTHYPHRO. I would be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be no different from the majority of men, if I did not have precise knowledge of all these things.

SOCRATES. Then, my admirable Euthyphro, the best thing for me is to become your pupil! Before the trial against Meletus begins, I should challenge him on this very point. I should tell him that in the past I always considered knowledge of divine things to be of the utmost importance, and now, since he claims I am offending by improvising and innovating concerning the gods, I have become your pupil. "Meletus," I would say, "if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, you must also believe that I hold the correct beliefs, and you should drop the case. If you do not, you should indict my teacher, not me, for corrupting the elderly—both me and his own father, by teaching me and by correcting and punishing him." And if he refuses to drop the case or indict you instead of me, I will say the exact same thing in court that I challenged him with.

EUTHYPHRO. By Zeus, Socrates, if he tried to indict me, I think I would find his weak spot, and the discussion in court would be much more about him than about me.

SOCRATES. Knowing this, my dear friend, I am eager to become your pupil. I know that neither Meletus nor anyone else seems to even notice you, but he has seen through me so sharply and easily that he has indicted me for impiety. So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just maintained you know so clearly: what do you say the pious and the impious are, in relation to murder and everything else? Is not piety always the same as itself in every action? And conversely, is not impiety entirely the opposite of piety, always the same as itself, so that everything that is to be impious possesses one specific characteristic regarding its impiety?

EUTHYPHRO. Absolutely, Socrates.

Τμῆμα 5

ΕΥΘ. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτόν, λέγοντα ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδή με ἐκεῖνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σός — καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίην ἄν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι —καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθηται μηδὲ ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντʼ ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν;

ΕΥΘ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὕροιμʼ ἄν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγώ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων μαθητὴς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδὼς ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως ἀτεχνῶς καὶ ῥᾳδίως κατεῖδεν ὥστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι ὃ νυνδὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου, ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῂς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΥΘ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. λέγε δή, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον;