ISocrates narrates in the first person, as in the and ; see Introduction p. vii, Hirzel, , i. p. 84. Demetrius, , 205, cites this sentence as an example of trimeter members. Editors give references for the anecdote that it was found in Plato’s tablets with many variations. For Plato’s description of such painstaking Cf. 278 D. Cicero . 5. 13 scribens est mortuus. went down yesterday to the PeiraeusCf. 439 E; about a five-mile walk. with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotionsPlato and Xenophon represent Socrates as worshipping the gods, νόμῳ πόλεως. Athanasius, , 9, censures Plato for thus adoring an Artemis made with hands, and the fathers and medieval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato’s regrettable concessions to polytheism—persuasio civilis as Minucius Felix styles it. Cf. Eusebius . xiii. 13. 66. to the Goddess,Presumably Bendis (354 A), though, as the scholiast observes, Athena is ἡ θεός for an Athenian. For foreign cults at the Peiraeus see Holm, , iii. p. 189. and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.See Introduction. I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent. After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homewardHeaded homeward is more exact and perhaps better. and ordered his boyA Greek gentleman would always be so attended. Cf. 155 A, 82 B, 310 C, Demosthenes xlvii. 36. run and bid us to waitThe bounder in Theophrastus, . xi. (xvii.), if he sees persons in a hurry will ask them to wait. for him, and the boy caught hold 153 B, 126 A, 449 B. of my himation from behind and said, Polemarchus wants you to wait. And I turned around and asked where his masterIpse, Cf. 314 D; ipse dixit; Now you are not ipse, for I am he.—Shakes. was. There he is, he said, behind you, coming this way. Wait for him. So we will, said Glaucon, and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said, Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us. Not a bad guess, said I. But you see how many we are? he said. Surely. You must either then prove yourselves the better menCf. the playful threat in 16 A, 236 C, Horace, i. 4. 142. or stay here. Why, is there not left, said I, the alternative of our persuadingFor the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius vii. 24. you that you ought to let us go? But could you persuade us, said he, if we refused to listen? Nohow, said Glaucon. Well, we won’t listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.

Do you mean to say, interposed Adeimantus, that you haven’t heard that there is to be a torchlight raceSee Sterrett in xxii. p. 393. The torch was passed down the lines which competed as wholes. Cf. Swinburne, : Where the runners outwear each other, but running with lampless hands,No man takes light from his brother, till blind at the goal he stands. For the metaphorical transmission of the torch of life cf. Plato, , 776 B, Lucretius ii. 79. this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess? On horseback? said I. That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean? That’s the way of it, said Polemarchus, and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get upRise from the table. This is forgotten. and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask.In American, the colloquial Greek means be a sport. It looks as if we should have to stay, said Glaucon. Well, said I, if it so be, so be it. So we went with them to Polemarchus’s house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, andThe particles single out Thrasymachus for ironical emphasis. Proclus in 3 E preserves them in his enumeration of the dramatis personae. Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Kleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home. And I thought him much aged, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chapletA companion picture to the fair vision of the youthful Lysis (, 207 A). The wreath was worn at the sacrifice. on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.For the seats compare 317 D-E, Cicero 1. 2 in hemicyclio sedentem. As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said, You are not a very frequentThe language recalls the Homeric formula, πάρος γε μὲν οὔτι θαμίζεις, xviii. 386, v. 88, Jebb on 672. Cephalus’ friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of 181 C. visitor, Socrates. You don’t often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,Plato characteristically contrasts the transitory pleasures of the body with the enduring joys of the mind. 258 E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5. Pleasures are not strictly speaking of the body, but in or relating to it. See my , p. 45. in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don’t refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates. Why, yes, Cephalus, said I, and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarersMuch of this passage, including the comparison of old men to travellers, is copied by Cicero, . 3 ff. who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—whatCf. Horace, i. 11 Quid tibi visa Chios? The vague neuter and the slight anacoluthon give a colloquial turn to the sentence. it is like—is it roughHesiod, 290, says that the path of virtue is rough at first and then grows easy. and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call the thresholdThis, whatever its precise meaning, was a familiar phrase like our One foot in the grave. Cf. Leaf on xxii. 60, xxiv 487; Hyperides (i. xx. 13) employs it without apology in prose. of old age. Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?

Yes, indeed, Socrates, he said, I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verifyLit. preserving. For the reverse Cf. 174 B. Cicero renders, similes cum similibus veteri proverbio facile congregantur. The proverb is ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει 240 C, or, as in 214 A, 337 D, 195 B, the reference may be to Homer’s ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, xvii. 218. Milton, , x., The ancient proverb in Homer . . . entitles this work of leading each like person to his like, peculiarly to God, himself. the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.The sentiment of the sensualist from Mimnermus to Byron; cf. also Simonides fr. 71, Sophocles 1165, Antiphanes, in Stobaeus 63. 12. For the application to old age Cf. . ix. 127, Horace ii. 2. 55, and the ψόγος γήρως in Stobaeus, 116. And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litanyFor such a litany cf. Sophocles 1235. of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause.This suggests Aristotle’s fallacy of the false cause, 167 b 21. Cf. 28 A and Isocrates xv. 230. For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master.Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon, . ii. 66 (Spengel), turns to the anecdote in an edifying χρεία. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor Julian drew its inspiration hence. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, cf. Cicero 14, Plutarch, 5, p. 788, Athen. xii. p. 510, Philostr. . 1. 13. I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensionsCf. 86 C, 47 A, 645 B, 644 E σπῶσι. of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and madCf. Euripides 547 μαινομένων οἴστρων. masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerfulFor Sophocles as εὔκολος cf. Aristophanes 82, and on this quality, 791 C. even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions. And I was filled with admirationCephalus prefigures the old age of the righteous, infra 612-613. There is then no parody of Antisthenes as Joel fancies. for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. For the rich, they say, have many consolations.Cf. Teles. (Hense, pp.9-10), Philemon in Plutarch p. 358, Musonius, Stobaeus 117. 8. A fragment of Anaxandrides in Stobaeus . 68. 1 is almost a paraphrase of this passage. Thucydides ii. 44 says that honour, not money, is the consolation of old age.

You are right, he said. They don’t accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of SeriphusLit. the Seriphean of the anecdote, which, however, Herodotus (viii. 125) tells of another. Cicero 8 Seriphio cuidam. grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper. May I ask, Cephalus, said I, whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself? Acquired, eh? he said. As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesakeCephalus, Lysanias, Cephalus, and so frequently. inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance. The reason I asked, I said, is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves.Aristotle makes a similar observation, iv. 1.20, i. 11. 26, ii. 16. 4. For nouveaux riches, γενναῖοι ἐκ βαλλαντίου, see Starkie on Aristophanes , 1309. But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,Cf. 160 E, 209 C, 274 E, with Epaminondas’ saying, that Leuctra and Mantineia were his children. so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth. You are right, he replied. I assuredly am, said I. But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property? Something, he said, which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.Cf. Walter Scott’s Be a good man, my dear; nothing else will give you any comfort, when you come to lie here. Perhaps the earliest positive expression of faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar’s . See Rohde’s and Adam in . The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato’s appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Cf. 363 C-D, 386 B, 613 E ff., also 496 E, 498 D, 608 D. For let me tell you, Socrates, he said, that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,Cf. 498 C and Pindar ii. 64. But 500 D, there is the realm of Platonic ideas. though he may have laughed them downCf. 523 A, 527 A. hitherto, then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himselfThe conclusion logically expected, is more credulous, shifts to the alternative preferred by Plato. ὥσπερ marks the figurative sense of nearer. καθορᾷ is not takes a more careful view of it (Goodwin) but wins a glimpse, catches sight of those obscure things, as a sailor descries land. So often in Plato. Cf. . 985 C. Sir Thomas Browne, , iii. 22 And having been long tossed in the Ocean of the world, he will by that time feel the draught of another. Waller on the Divine Poems—The Soul's Dark Cottage, batter'd and decay'd,Lets in new light through chinks that time has made . . . Leaving the old, both worlds at once they viewThat stand upon the threshold of the new. Rabelais, iii. 21 Aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons demons (selon la doctrine des Platonicques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme deport très sceur et salutaire—les saluent les consolent, parlent avec eux et ja commencement leur communicquer art de divination. either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone.

Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts upPolyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, 127 A, iv. 13-14. Tennyson, ix.—Pain, that has crawl’d from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm which writhes all day, and at nightStirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light. even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hopeThe better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connection with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isocrates i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, , ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pindar . xi. in fine, Sophocles 615, Thuc. 2.62, Thuc. 3.45. ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as PindarPindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition. too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and pietysweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals. Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a godCf. the famous, We owe a cock to Aesculapius, 118 A. Cf. further, Browne, , i. 26 Well content if they be but rich enough to be honest, and to give every man his due. for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth. An admirable sentiment, Cephalus, said I. But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualificationIt is Platonic Doctrine that no act is per se good or bad. Plat. Sym. 181a. This opens the door to casuistry, Xen. Mem. 4.2.12, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the argument cf. Xen. Mem. 4.2.18, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the proverb, a knife to a child or a madman cf. Athen. 5.52, Iambl. Protrep. 18k, Jebb’s , p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley’s allusion to it. that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state. You are right, he replied. Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received. Nay, but it is, Socrates, said Polemarchus breaking in, if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides. Very well, said Cephalus, indeed I make over the whole argumentThe argument, or one side of it, is often treated as a thesis which may be thus transferred. Cf. 12 A, 162 E, 331 A. to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices. Well, said I, is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours? Certainly, said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.Cicero . iv. 16 Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset, Bagehot, , It (metaphysical debate) attracts the scorn of middle-aged men, who depart πρὸς τὰ ἱερά, etc. Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice. That it is just, he replied, to render to each his due.The defintion is not found in the fragments of Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists’ Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens. For the various meanings of the Greek word cf. my Articles Righteousness and Theognis in Hastings, . In saying this I think he speaks well.

I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. 22 A-B, 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the wise men must be true. 152 B, 260 A, 888 E, 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. 347 E, 71 D, 214-215, 365 D. But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a depositOwing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, . 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere, Cicero . iii. 18. to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not? Yes. But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind. True, said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due. Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. I see, said I; you mean thatAdam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because. he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means? Quite so. But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due? By all means, he said, what is dueIn the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker. and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil. It was a riddlingCf. 214 D, 162 A, 152 C, 194 C, . 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is inspired, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, . 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato. definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due. What else do you suppose? said he. In heaven’s name! said I, supposeSocrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, 451 B, 287 B ff., Thompson on 72 B. someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. 451 A, 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination: Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big? What do you take it would have been his answer? Obviously, he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks. And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art? Seasoning to meats. Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice. If we are to follow the previous examples,Similarly 312 A. Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies. To do good to friends and evil to enemies,Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the , 335 D-336 A, but in the 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon ( ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, , ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, . ii. 85, Aeschylus . 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles , p. xxxix, Thumser, , p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on 71 E. then, is justice in his meaning? I think so. Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health? The physician. And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea? The pilot. Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies? In making war and as an ally, I should say. Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. True. And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. Yes. Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

By no means. There is a use then even in peace for justice? Yes, it is useful. But so is agriculture, isn’t it? Yes. Namely, for the getting of a harvest? Yes. But likewise the cobbler’s art? Yes. Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes. Certainly. Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace? In engagements and dealings, Socrates. And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else? Associations, of course. Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player? The player. And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder? By no means. Then what is the associationJustice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the . Cf. , p. 14. in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords? For money-dealings,Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines. I think. Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so? Apparently. And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot. It would seem so. What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner? When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates. You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idleInterest is ignored. Aristotle, . 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.? Quite so. Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it? It looks that way. And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful? Apparently. And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music. Necessarily. And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful? It looks that way. Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worthA virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my , n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty (ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf , vi. 12. 6, . v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, . 1046 b, , n. 38. if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard againstThe shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against. a blow? Assuredly. Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection? I think so.

But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a marchThe play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare’s If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company, , III. iii. upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally. Certainly. Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief? It seems so. If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it. The argument certainly points that way.The qualified assent here marks the speaker’s perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E, etc. A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. 152 E. For he regards with complacency Autolycus,A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles (, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (Hom. Od. 19.395). The naivete of Homer’s amoral standpoint (Cf. xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato’s sense of humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule help friends and harm enemies is on the same ethical plane. So in the , popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of καπηλεία or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. . xi. 315 R., and modern laments over the Decay of Lying. the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury. Hom. Od. 19.395 So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn’t that what you meant? No, by Zeus, he replied. I no longer know what I did mean.For humorous bewilderment of Socrates’ interlocutors cf. Xenophon iv. 2. 19, 216 C, . 127 D, 80, 11 B, 201 B, 149 A, 169 C. Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies. May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seemThe antithesis of seeming and being is a common category of early Greek and Platonic thought. Cf. 361 A-B, 365 C, Aeschylus 788, and the fragments of Parmenides. This discussion of the true φίλος recalls the manner of the ; cf. Aristotle i. 8. 5. to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies? It is likely, he said, that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad. Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse? They do. For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends? Certainly. But all the same is then just for them to benefit the bad and injure the good? It would seem so. But again the good are just and incapable of injustice. True. On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice. Nay, nay, Socrates, he said, the reasoning can’t be right.Or, that is an immoral conclusion. Then, said I, it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just. That seems a better conclusion than the other. It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean. Most certainly, he said, it does work out so. But let us change our ground; for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy. What notion, Polemarchus? That the man who seems to us good is the friend. And to what shall we change it now? said I.

That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy. Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy. Yes. So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad? By all means, he said, that, I think, would be the right way to put it. Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm. Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horsesFor Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. 30 C, 13 B-C, and on 451 C. are harmed does it make them better or worse? Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily. And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man?The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf 41 D, 44 D. The ambiguity of ἀρετή is similarly used 353 and 609 B-D. That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the functionThe special work (Xenophon iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle . i. 7. 10, p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.. ii. 41, Courtney, p. 125, Spencer, 12. of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right, Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just manXenophon approves the doctrine ( ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides ( 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p. and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or BiasFor the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle 107. 30. or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.

Do you know, said I, to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies? To whom? he said. I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or IsmeniasCf. Thompson, xl. the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.It is a Socratic paradox that doing as one likes is not power or freedom unless one likes the good. Cf. 467 A, 577 D. That is most true, he replied. Very well, said I, since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?Cf. Introduction pp. ix-x. Now Thrasymachus,Cf. Introduction. even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn’t any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst, What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,Cf. 483 A, Aristotle . 183 b 7. Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know. For similar complaints cf. Xenophon i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, 150 C, passim. but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don’t you be telling meThrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf. 409 C). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books. that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any such drivel as that! And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.For the fancy that to be seen first by the wolf makes dumb see Virgil 9. 53, Theocr. 14. 22, Pliny, . viii. 34, Milton, 27 nisi me lupus ante videbit. But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor: Thrasymachus, don’t be harshFor similar irony Cf. 461 C-D, 489 D. with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that whileFor this type of a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 589 E, 600 C-D, 46 D, 647 C, 931 C, 325 B-C, 68 A, Thompson on 91 E. if our quest were for goldCf. Heracleitus fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, The physical type of wisdom, gold, xix. 10. we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered.

You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity. And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known ironyCf. 216 E, and Gomperz, iii. p. 277. of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you. That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him? Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn’t be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then, he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity,In American, nerve. Socrates’ statement that παθεῖν due him is μαθεῖν (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a fine. Plato constantly harps on the taking of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too. said he; but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

Why, how, I said, my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don’t be charyGrudging. Cf. 200 B. of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us. When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said, Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanksCf. 391 B. therefor. That I learn from others, I said, you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.Socrates’ poverty ( 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics. But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well. Hearken and hear then, said he. I affirm that the just is nothing else thanFor this dogmatic formulation of a definition Cf. 151 E. the advantage of the stronger.To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ διανομή, 714 A; her seat is in the bosom of God (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior. Whatsoever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force, 177 D. The formula justice is the advantage of the superior means, as explained in 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates’ affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, iv. 4, la commodite du souverain. Leibniz approves Thrasymachus’s definition: justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!). Well, why don’t you applaud? Nay, you’ll do anything but that. Provided only I first understand your meaning, said I; for I don’t yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don’t intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beevesThe unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato’s alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat. is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just. You’re a buffoon,The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristophanes 465, Theophrast.. xvii. (Jebb). Socrates, and take my statementCf. 392 C, 394 B, 424 C, 78 C, 295 C, 451 A δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις, you take my meaning fairly. For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 D, 166 C, 80 A, 167 E, 461 B-C, 482 E. in the most detrimental sense. Not at all, my dear fellow said I; I only want you to make your meaning plainer.This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in 451 E, 453 B, 489 D, 490 C, 714 C. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist. Don’t you know then, said he, that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, . ii. 86, Aeschines . 6. See 445 D, Whibley, , and , p. 62. Assuredly. And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. 238 D, Xenophon 1. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, 77 B, 215 B, where L. and S. miss the point. in each—the ruling party? Certainly. And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviatesOn this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (Xenophon iv. 4. 12; Cf. 504 D). This is the doctrine of the Old Oligarch, [Xenophon] . 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato ( 713 ff.) and Aristotle iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, , chap. ii.: We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government etc. from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer.

This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias ( 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 C-D) at first, understands the nature of a definition. the advantage of the stronger. Now, said I, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger. A trifling additionCf. 182 C. perhaps you think it, he said. It is not yet clearFor the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, 203 B, Sophocles . 327. whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, 203 B, Sophocles . 327. For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantageFor Plato’s so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, , pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, , i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know,This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument. we must pursue the inquiry. Inquire away, he said. I will do so, said I. Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just? I do. May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallibleThe argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 C. or capable sometimes of error? Surely, he said, they are liable to err. Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not? So I suppose. And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not? That. But whatever they enactCf. 338 E and 177 D. must be performed by their subjects and is justice? Of course. Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage. What’s that you’re saying? Τί λέγεις σύ; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristophanes 1174. The supspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasymachus rude again. But Cf. 290 E. he replied. What you yourself are saying,Cf. Berkeley, , 13: The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions. See on 334 D, . 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (, 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong. I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted? I think it was, he replied. Then you will have to think,Socrates is himself a little rude. I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapientCf. 495 D. Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very oppositeCf. 215 E, 62 E. of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, said Polemarchus, nothing could be more conclusive. Of course, said Cleitophon, breaking in, if you are his witness.It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. 472 A-B. What need is there of a witness? Polemarchus said. Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this. That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form it is just to do what rulers bid. Polemarchus retorts: And (I was right), for he (also) . . . of the rulers. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary. O well, said Cleitophon, by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position. That isn’t what he said, replied Polemarchus. Never mind, Polemarchus, said I, but if that is Thrasymachus’s present meaning, let us take it from himSocrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. 491 B, 499 B, 349 C, Xenophon iv. 2. 18. in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning? Not in the least, he said.Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician’s miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler qua ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler qua ruler, the artist qua artist has no sinister or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the economic man. Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs? I certainly did suppose that you meant that, I replied, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes. That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physicianFor the idea cf. Rousseau’s , i.: On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médicine en elle-même est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu’elle vienne donc sans le médecin. Lucian, 54, parodies this reasoning. erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,For the invidious associations of ἀκριβολογία (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristotle . 995 a 11, 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosthenes. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diogenes Laertius ii. 19. no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred.

It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger. So then, Thrasymachus, said I, my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging? It does, he said. You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question? I don’t think it, I know it, he said, and you won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth and , failing stealth, you are not of the forceCf. 365 D. to beat me in debate. Bless your soul, said I, I wouldn’t even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruleri.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι, Plat. Rep. 340d. or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act? I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word, he said. Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable. Why, do you suppose, I said, that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lionA rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. ad loc. and Aristides, . ii. p. 143. and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus? You did try it just now, he said, paltry fellow though you be. καὶ ταῦτα = idque, normally precedes (cf. 404 C, 419 E, etc.). But Thrasymachus is angry and the whole phrase is short. Commentators on Aristophanes 1184, 704, and . 168 allow this position. See my note in A.J.P. vol. xvi. p. 234. Others: though you failed in that too. Something too muchCf. 541 B, 11 E, 153 D. of this sort of thing, said I. But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such. A healer of the sick, he replied. And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor? A ruler of sailors. We don’t, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors. True, he said. Then for each of themPlato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedent can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 C τοῦτο, 373 C, 396 B, 598 C τεχνῶν, 327 C. is there not a something that is for his advantage? Quite so. And is it not also true, said I, that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage? Yes, for this. Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possiblePater, , p. 242, fancifully cites this for art for art’s sake. See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herodotus i. 32, 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on ad infinitum. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist qua artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.? What do you mean by that question? Just as if, I said, you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

Correct, he said. But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not? It appears to be so, he said. Then medicine, said I, does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body? Yes. Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art. So it seems, he replied. But surely,The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xenophon iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἄρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are of course scientific. Ruler is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle 244, 875 C. Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts. He conceded this but it went very hard. Then no art considers or enjoinsIt is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. 260 A, C. the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it. This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—Can we deny, then, said I, that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, precisely speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that? He assented. And so the precise pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor? That was admitted. Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is. He assented reluctantly. Then, said I, Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras ( 334), when pressed by Socrates’ dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the . Justice is another’s good which only the naive and innocent pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously. said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? What do you mean? said I. Why didn’t you answer me instead of asking such a question? Because, he said, she lets her little snotty run about drivelling κορυζῶντα L. and S., also s. v. κόυζα. Lucian, 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ’ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι. and doesn’t wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can’t get you to knowLiterally, if you don’t know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare , I. ii. 8 Knock me here soundly. Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. Shepherd of the people, like survival of the fittest, may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle p. 431, Xenophon iii. 2. 1, Suetonius . 32, and my note in . vol. i. p. 298. the difference between the shepherd and the sheep. And what, pray, makes you think that? said I. Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates’ true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton. differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man’s attitude towards his sheepCf. Aristophanes 1203 πρόβατ’ ἄλλως, Herrick, Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep. or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far outThis (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus. concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don’t know that justice and the just are literallyτῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, 187 B, 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes 507 τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. . v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, simple, which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning of good character. Cf. 348 C, 400 E, 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of silly with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi’s bitter comment on dabbenaggine ( xxvi.). the other fellow’s goodJustice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good. Cf. Aristotle 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, but one’s own harm, for which see 392 B, Euripides . 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as the other fellow’s good; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite limerick, and the definition of business as l’argent des autres.—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairsFor the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating graft cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle . v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, . 13) cited by Goodwin () in the form: God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies. Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely. falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue.

I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.The order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus’s excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant. For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessedThe European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides’ (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world. not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.Aristotle 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense. For it is not the fear of doingThe main issue of the . Cf. 360 D, 358 E and 469 B. but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage. After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathmanCf. Theophrastus, . xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, , p. 134. For the metaphor cf. 536 B, 204 D, Aristophanes 483. Sudden, lit. all at once. he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurlingCf. Euripides 680 οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἄπει. such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matterSocrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, 492 C, 500 C, 185 A. Cf. 377 B, 578 C, 608 B. that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Well, do I deny it?Plainly a protesting question, Why, do I think otherwise? Cf. 339 D. said Thrasymachus. You seem to, said I, or elseFor the impossibility of J. and C.’s or rather see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234. to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investmentκείσεται of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, 939 bonis quod bene fit, haud perit. for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitableIsocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato’s idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the that all true κέρδος is ἀγαθόν. than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. 438 A, 577 D, and 467 B. But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,Cf. 365 D. all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice. And how am I to persuade you?Thrasymachus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson he cannot supply brains to understand it. Cf. 489 C, 499 B, 75 D. he said. If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ramThe language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristophanes . 716, is rude. Cf. Shakespeare, He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense. it into your head? Heaven forbid! I said, don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,Cf. Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, 499 B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C. or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherdThe art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristotle . 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. 48 A. surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of ruleAristotle’s despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle p. 245.). But that too should be for the good of the slave; infra 590 D. in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulersSee on 343 B, Aristotle . 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.—willingly hold office and rule? I don’t think, he said, I know right well they do.

But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.Cf. 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the argument may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on 83 D, Campbell on . 246 D. Well, yes, he said, that is what renders it different. And does not each art also yield us benefitAs each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle. that is peculiar to itself and not general,Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art μισθωτική. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus’ original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on χρηματιστική, i. 3 (1253 b 14). as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly? Assuredly. And does not the wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if you please to discriminate precisely as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you? Of course not, he said. Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health. Surely not. But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages? No, he said. And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it? So be it, he said. Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing. It seems so, he said. And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art. He assented reluctantly. Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it precisely medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft? Apparently not, he said. Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing? I’ll say he does. Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?

That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people’s troublesκακά = troubles, miseres, 517 D. For the thought cf. 343 E, 345 E, Xen. Mem. 2.1.8, Hdt. 1.97. in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why payCf. 345 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1134b 6. must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse. What do you mean by that, Socrates? said Glaucon. The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don’t understand.Plato habitually explains metaphors, abstractions, and complicated defintions in this dramatic fashion. Cf. 352 E, 377 A, 413 A, 429 C, 438 B, 510 B. Then, said I, you don’t understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don’t you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach? I do, he said. Well, then, said I, that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worseCf. Aristotle 1318 b 36. In a good democracy the better classes will be content, for they will not be ruled by worse men. Cf. Cicero, . ii. 9 male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare; Democr. fr. 49 D.: It is hard to be ruled by a worse man; Spencer, , 77. if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing,The good and the necessary is a favorite Platonic antithesis, but the necessary is often the condicio sine qua non of the good. Cf. 358 C, 493 C, 540 B, 628 C-D, 858 A. Aristotle took over the idea, . 1072 b 12. but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good menThis suggests an ideal state, but not more strongly than 100 A, 89 B. only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,The paradox suggests Spencer’s altruistic competition and Archibald Marshall’s Upsidonia. Cf. 521 A, 586 C, Isocrates vii. 24, xii. 145; Mill, , p. 56: The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as conseting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils; ibid. p. 200: Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it. and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion.εἰσαῦθις lays the matter on the table. Cf. 430 C. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus’ defintion is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main theme of the raised by the contention that the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just. A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus’s present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon? said I, and which seems to you to be the truer statement? That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say, he replied.

Did you hear, said I, all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man? I heard, he said, but I am not convinced. Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true? Of course I wish it, he said. If then we opposeThis is done in 358 D ff. It is the favorite Greek method of balancing pros and cons in set speeches and antithetic enumerations. Cf. Herodotus viii. 83, the διαλέξεις (Diels, ii. pp. 334-345), the choice of Heracles (Xenophon ii. 1), and the set speeches in Euripides. With this method the short question and answer of the Socratic dialectic is often contrasted. Cf. 329 A, 334-335, 461-462, also 471 E, 437 D, 171 A. him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders. Quite so, he said. Which method do you like best? said I. This one, he said. Come then, Thrasymachus, I said, go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete. I affirm it, he said, and have told you my reasons. Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice? Of course. Justice the virtue and injustice the vice? It is likely,Thrasymachus’s Umwertung aller Werte reverses the normal application of the words, as Callicles does in 491 E. you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn’t pay. But what then, pray? The opposite, he replied. What! justice vice? No, but a most noble simplicityThrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates’ inference from the etymology of εὐήθεια (cf. 343 C) is repudiated. Injustice is not turpitude (bad character) but—discretion. εὐβουλία in a higher sense is what Protagoras teaches ( 318 E) and in the highest sense is the wisdom of Plato’s guardians (428 B). or goodness of heart. Then do you call injustice badness of heart? No, but goodness of judgement. Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good? Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice, he said, and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing, he said, if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described. I am not unaware of your meaning in that, I said; but this is what surprised me,Socrates understands the theory, and the distinction between wholesale injustice and the petty profits that are not worth mentioning, but is startled by the paradox that injustice will then fall in the category of virtue and wisdom. Thrasymachus affirms the paradox and is brought to self-contradiction by a subtle argument (349-350 C) which may pass as a dramatic illustration of the game of question and answer. Cf. Introduction p. x. that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class. Well, I do so class them, he said. That, said I, is a stiffer proposition, ἤδη marks the advance from the affirmation that injustice is profitable to the point of asserting that it is a virtue. This is a stiffer proposition, i.e. harder to refute, or possibly more stubborn. my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer.

For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some othere.g. Polus in 474 ff., 482 D-E. Cf. Isocrates 31. Thrasymachus is too wary to separate the κακόν and the αἰσχρόν and expose himself to a refutation based on conventional usage. Cf. 627 D, 306 A, 662 A. disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don’t shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom. You are a most veritable prophet, he replied. Well, said I, I mustn’t flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think.Cf. on 346 A. For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not mocking us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on 161 C, and Aristotle passim. What difference does it make to you, he said, whether I believe it or not? Why don’t you test the argument? No difference, said I, but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreachIn pursuance of the analogy between the virtues and the arts the moral idea πλεονεξία (overreaching, getting more than your share; see on 359 C) is generalized to include doing more than or differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett’s Shakespearian quotation (IV. ii. 28), When workmen strive to do better than well,They do confound their skill in covetousness, though apt, only illustrates the thought in part. or exceed another just man? By no means, he said; otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is. And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action? Not that either, he replied. But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not? He would, he said, but he wouldn’t be able to. That is not my question, I said, but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim and wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust? That is the case, he replied. How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action? Of course, he said, since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything. Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavor will be to get the most in everything for himself. That is so. Let us put it in this way, I said; the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both. Admirably put, he said. But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither. That, too, is right, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not? Of course, he said, being such he will be like to such and the other not. Excellent. Then each is suchThe assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus’s ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in ; Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like. But practical logic requires the qualification in respect of their likeness. Socrates, however, argues that since the good man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy. as that to which he is like. What else do you suppose? he said. Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musicianCf. 608 E, 463 E, 332 A, 358 D, 103 C, . 226 B, 34 E, 75 D, 88 A, . 128 B, 385 B. The formula, which is merely used to obtain formal recognition of a term or idea required in the argument, readily lends itself to modern parody. Socrates seems to have gone far afield. Thrasymachus answers quite confidently, ἔγωγε, but in δήπου there is a hint of bewilderment as to the object of it all. and another unmusical? I do. Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent? The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent. And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligentFamiliar Socratic doctrine. Cf. 194 D, 210 D, 504 D. and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent? Yes. And the same of the physician? The same. Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreachπλεονεκτεῖν is here a virtual synonym of πλέον ἔχειν. The two terms help the double meaning. Cf. 691 A πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν νόμων. another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him? I do not. But would the the unmusical man? Of necessity, he said.

And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure? Surely not. But he would the unmedical man? Yes. Consider then with regard to allGeneralizing from the inductive instances. forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action. Why, perhaps it must be so, he said, in such cases. But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant? It may be. But the one who knows is wise? I’ll say so. And the wise is good? I’ll say so. Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite. It seems so, he said. But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike? So it appears. And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that? I did, he replied. But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike? Yes. Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus. It seems likely. But furthermore we agreed that such is each as that to which he is like. Yes, we did. Then the just man has turned outCf. 334 A. on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant. Thrasymachus made all these admissions not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctanceCf. 333 B. and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.Cf. the blush of the sophist in 297 A. But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, Good, said I, let this be taken as established.The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets ἰσχυρόν, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in 510 A. But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don’t you remember, Thrasymachus? I remember, he said; but I don’t agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue.This is really a reminiscence of such passages as 162 D, 336 B, 482 C, 494 D, 513 A ff., 519 D. The only justification for it in the preceding conversation is 348 A-B. Either then allow me to speak at such length as I desire,So Polus in 527 A. or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wivesCf. 527 A. telling their tales, will say Very good and will nod assent and dissent. No, no, said I, not counter to your own belief. Yes, to please you, he said, since you don’t allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want? Nothing, indeed, said I; but if this is what you propose to do, do it and I will ask the questions. Ask on, then.

This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now, I said, if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simpleCf. 331 C, 386 B. Instead of the simple or absolute argument that justice, since it is wisdom and virtue, must be stronger, etc., then injustice, Socrates wishes to bring out the deeper thought that the unjust city or man is strong not because but in spite of his injustice and by virtue of some saving residue of justice. as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection. Certainly, he said; and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete. I understand, I said, that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice. If,Thrasymachus can foresee the implications of either theory. he replied, what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice. Admirable, Thrasymachus, I said; you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers. I am trying to please you, he replied. Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city,For the thought cf. Spencer, , 114: Joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society; Leslie Stephen, , Chapter. VIII. 31: It (the loyalty of a thief to his gang) is rather a spurious or class morality, etc.; Carlyle: Neither James Boswell’s good book, nor any other good thing . . . is or can be performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in spite thereof. Proclus, . Kroll i. 20 expands this idea. Dante ( I. xii.) attributes to the Philosopher in the fifth of the ethics the saying that even robbers and plunderers love justice. Locke ( i. 3) denies that this proves the principles of justice innate: They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities, etc. Cf. further Isocrates xii. 226 on the Spartans, and Plato 322 B, on the inconveniences of injustice in the state of nature, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους. an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another? Certainly not, said he. But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to? Assuredly. For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so? So be it, he replied, not to differ from you. That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common? By all means. Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just? They will, he said. And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in oneThe specific function must operate universally in bond or free, in many, two, or one. The application to the individual reminds us of the main argument of the . Cf. 369 A, 433 D, 441 C. For the argument many, few or two, one, Cf. 626 C. it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? Have it that it keeps it, he said.

And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itselfPlato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. Introduction p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 C, 416 C, 428 D, 626 E, 693 B, vii. 332 D, Antiphon 556.45 Diels ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Aritotle, . v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, . xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd. and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn’t that so? By all means. Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so? Yes. But, my friend, the gods tooThis is the conventional climax of the plea for any moral ideal. So Aristotle, . 1179 a 24, proves that the σοφός being likest God is θεοφιλέστατος. Cf. Democ. fr. 217 D. μοῦνοι θεοφιλέες ὅσοις ἐχθρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν; 382 E, 612 E, 39 E, 716 D. The enlightened Thrasymachus is disgusted at this dragging in of the gods. Cf. 162 D θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες. He is reported as saying (Diels p. 544.40) that the gods regard not human affairs, else they would not have overlooked the greatest of goods, justice, which men plainly do not use. are just. Have it that they are, he said. So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear. Revel in your discourse, he said, without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here. Fill up the measure of my feast,ἑστιάσεως keeps up the image of the feast of reason. Cf. 354 A-B, 211 C, 522 A, 227 B, and 17 A, from which perhaps it becomes a commonplace in Dante and the Middle Ages. then, and complete it for me, I said, by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corruptedFor the idea cf. the argument in 327 C-D, that Socrates would yearn for the wickedness of Athens if he found himself among wild men who knew no justice at all. by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also trueThe main ethical question of the , suggested in 347 E, now recurs. that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully.Similarly 578 C. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 A-B). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from ἔργον or specific function. For it is no ordinaryCf. on 344 D, ibid, pp. 71 f. matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life. Proceed with your inquiry, he said. I proceed, said I. Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific workSee on 335 D, and Aristotle . i. 7. 14. The virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of its specific function. See Schmidt, , i. p. 301, Newman, Introduction Aristotle p. 48. The following argument is in a sense a fallacy, since it relies on the double meaning of life, physical and moral (cf. 445 B and 399 D) and on the ambiguity of εὖ πράττειν, fare well and do well. The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, animadverts on the fallacy. For ἔργον cf. further Epictet. . i. 4. 11, Max. Tyr. . ii. 4, Musonius apud Stobaeus 117. 8, Thompson on 90 E, Plato, 896 D, 246 B. or function? I would. Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it? I don’t understand, he replied. Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes? Certainly not. Again, could you hear with anything but ears? By no means. Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)? By all means.

Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments. Certainly. But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose. That is true. Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that? We must. You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform. Well, he said, I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that. Very good, said I. Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function? They have. Is there also a virtue of the eyes? There is. And was there not a function of the ears? Yes. And so also a virtue? Also a virtue. And what of all other things? Is the case not the same? The same. Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect? How could they? he said; for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision. Whatever, said I, the excellence may be. For I have not yet comePlatonic dialectic asks and affirms only so much as is needed for the present purpose. to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect. That much, he said, you may affirm to be true. Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill? Assuredly. And do we then apply the same principle to all things? I think so. Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn’t accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work? Nothing else. And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul? Most certainly, he said. And do we not also say that there is an excellence virtue of the soul? We do. Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible? It is impossible. Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.For the equivocation Cf. 172 A, 507 C, Xenophon iii. 9. 14, Aristotle . 1098 b 21, Newman, Introduction Aristotle p. 401, Gomperz, (English ed.), ii. p. 70. It does not seriously affect the validity of the argument, for it is used only as a rhetorical confirmation of the implication that κακῶς ἄρχειν, etc. = misery and the reverse of happiness. Of necessity. And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice? Yes, we did. The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill? So it appears, he said, by your reasoning.

But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary. Of course. Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable. So be it, he said. But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy. Of course not. Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice. Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis. A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus, I said, now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.For similar irony cf. 489 D, 304 C. I have not dined well, however— by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttonsSimilarly Holmes (, p. 108) of the poet: He takes a bite out of the sunny side of this and the other, and ever stimulated and never satisfied, etc. Cf. Lucian, . 18, Julian . ii. p. 69 c, Polyb. iii. 57. 7. snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussionHirzel, , i. p. 4, n. 1, argues that διαλόγου here means inquiry (Erorterung), not the dialogue with Thrasymachus. is that I know nothing.For the profession of ignorance at the close of a Socratic dialogue Cf. 175 A-B, 222 D-E, 361 A-B, Xenophon iv. 2. 39. Cf. also Introduction p. x. For if I don’t know what the just is,Knowledge of the essence or definition must precede discussion of qualities and relations. Cf 71 B, 86 D-E, 190 B, 448 E. I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.

When I had said this I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus’s abandonmentSo in 11 C, Philebus cries off or throws up the sponge in the argument. of his case, but said, Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust? Really, I said, if the choice rested with me. Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me: do you agree that there is a kind of goodAristotle borrows this classification from Plato ( 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to preferables (Diogenes Laertius vii. 107). Cf. Hooker, i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body, and of possessions ( 697 B, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things. which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its after effects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures are harmlessPlato here speaks of harmless pleasures, from the point of view of common sense and prudential morality. Cf. . 59 D ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονήν, Milton’s Mirth that after no repenting draws. But the (583 D) like the (493 E-494 C) knows the more technical distinction of the (42 C ff., 53 C ff.) between pure pleasures and impure, which are conditioned by desire and pain. and nothing results from them afterwards save to have and to hold the enjoyment. I recognise that kind, said I. And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its consequences,Isocrates i. 47 has this distinction, as well as Aristotle. such as understanding,Some philosophers, as Aristippus (Diogenes Laertius x. 1. 138), said that intelligence is a good only for its consequences, but the opening sentences of Aritotle’s treat all forms of knowledge as goods in themselves. sight, and health?Plutarch (1040 C) says that Chrysippus censured Plato for recognizing health as a good, but elsewhere Plato explicitly says that even health is to be disregarded when the true interests of the soul require it. For these presume we welcome for both reasons. Yes, I said. And can you discern a third form of good under which falls exercise and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from them. Why yes, I said, I must admit this third class also. But what of it? In which of these classes do you place justice? he said.

In my opinion, I said, it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results. Yet the multitude, he said, do not think so, but that it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practised for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction. I am aware, said I, that that is the general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I, it seems, am somewhat slow to learn. Come now, he said, hear what I too have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too soon, as if he were a serpentFor Plato’s fondness for the idea of κηλεῖν cf. , note 500. that you had charmed, but I am not yet satisfied with the proof that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the soul,Cf. 366 E. but to dismiss their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do, with your concurrence. I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessaryCf. 347 C-D. and not as a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man—as they say; though I, Socrates, don’t believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of Thrasymachus and innumerable others.Cf. 66 E. Plato affirms that the immoralism of Thrasymachus and Callicles was widespread in Greece. Cf. Introduction x-xi, and 511 B, 333 C, 279 B, and my paper on the interpretation of the , A.J.P. vol. ix. pp. 403-404. But the case for justice, to prove that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard stated by any as I desire to hear it. What I desire is to hear an encomium on justice in and by itself. And I think I am most likely to get that from you. For which reason I will lay myself out in praise of the life of injustice, and in so speaking will give you an example of the manner in which I desire to hear from you in turn the dispraise of injustice and the praise of justice. Consider whether my proposal pleases you. Nothing could please me more, said I; for on what subject would a man of sense rather delight to hold and hear discourse again and again? That is excellent, he said; and now listen to what I said would be the first topic—the nature and origin of justice.

By nature,Glaucon employs the antithesis between nature and law and the theory of an original social contract to expound the doctrine of Thrasymachus and Callicles in the . His statement is more systematic than theirs, but the principle is the same; for, though Callicles does not explicitly speak of a social contract, he implies that conventional justice is an agreement of the weak devised to hold the strong in awe. ( 492 C), and Glaucon here affirms that no relally strong man would enter into any such agreement. The social contract without the immoral application is also suggested in 322 B. Cf. also 50 C, f. they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one’s revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality a man would never make a compact with anybody either to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory. But as for the second point, that those who practise it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice—we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as this in thought: if we grant to each, the just and the unjust, licence and power to do whatever he pleases, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither his desire will conduct each. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of lawThe antithesis of φύσις and νόμος, nature and law, custom or convention, is a commonplace of both Greek rhetoric and Greek ethics. Cf. the Chicago dissertation of John Walter Beardslee, , ch. x. p. 68. Cf. Herodotus iii. 38, Pindar, quoted by Plato, 484 B, 690 B, 715 A; Euripides or Critias, Frag. of Sisyphus, Aristophanes 755 ff., Plato 337 D, 483 E, 889 C and 890 D. It was misused by ancient as it is by modern radicals. Cf. my interpretation of the , A.J.P. vol. ix. p. 405. The ingenuity of modern philologians has tried to classify the Greek sophists as distinctly partisans of νόμος or φύσις. It cannot be done. Cf. my unsigned review of Alfred Benn in the , July 20, 1899, p. 57. it is forcibly diverted to paying honor to equality.Cf. 508 A. The licence that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power which men say once came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian.So manuscripts and Proclus. There are many emendations which the curious will find in Adam’s first appendix to the book. Herodotus i. 8-13 tells a similar but not identical story of Gyges himself, in which the magic ring and many other points of Plato’s tale are lacking. On the whole legend cf. the study of Kirby Flower Smith, A.J.P. vol. xxiii. pp. 261-282, 361-387, and Frazer’s . iii. p. 417. They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing; and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm; and the story goes that he beheld other marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature, and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the flocks, he also attended wearing the ring.

So as he sat there it chanced that he turned the collet of the ring towards himself, towards the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he became invisibleMr. H. G. Wells’ rests on a similar fancy. Cf. also the lawless fancies of Aristophanes 785 ff. to those who sat by him and they spoke of him as absent and that he was amazed, and again fumbling with the ring turned the collet outwards and so became visible. On noting this he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this virtue, and he found the result to be that when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, and when outwards visible; and becoming aware of this, he immediately managed things so that he became one of the messengers who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced the king’s wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom. If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamantineThe word is used of the firmness of moral faith in 509 A and 618 E. temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the marketplace, and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god.ἰσόθεος. The word is a leit-motif anticipating Plato’s rebuke of the tragedians for their praises of the tyraant. Cf. 568 A-B. It does not, as Adam suggests, foreshadow Plato’s attack on the popular theology. And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who had got such a licence within his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or lay his hands on others’ possessions, he would be regarded as most pitiableCf. 344 A, 492 B. and a great fool by all who took note of it,αἰσθανομένοις suggests men of discernment who are not taken in by phrases, the knowing ones. Cf. 317 A, and Aristophanes 1241 τοῖς εἰδόσιν. though they would praise himCf. 483 B, 492 A, 327 B, Aristotle . ii. 23. before one another’s faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this point. But to come now to the decisionCf. 580 B-C, 27 C. between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely just and the most completely unjust man, we shall be able to decide rightly, but if not, not. How, then, is this separation to be made? Thus: we must subtract nothing of his injustice from the unjust man or of his justice from the just, but assume the perfection of each in his own mode of conduct.

In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do: a first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilitiesCf. Quint. iv. 5. 17 recte enim Graeci praecipiunt non tentanda quae effici omnino non possint. and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others go; and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is caught as a bungler.Cf. Emerson, : Yet any swindlers we have known are novices and bunglers. . . . A greater power of face would accomplish anything and with the rest of the takings take away the bad name. For the height of injusticeCf, Cicero . i. 13. is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice; and if he does happen to trip,Cf. Thucydides vii. 24 on the miscalculation of the shrewd Chians. we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively if any of his misdeeds come to light, and when force is needed, to employ force by reason of his manly spirit and vigor and his provision of friends and money; and when we have set up an unjust man of this character, our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming.As Aristotle sententiously says,ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο (. 1365 b 1, iii. 3. 14). For if he is going to be thought just he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice’s sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart.For the thought cf. Euripides 270-271. Though doing no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, that so, both men attaining to the limit, the one of injustice, the other of justice, we may pass judgement which of the two is the happier. Bless me, my dear Glaucon, said I, how strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were a statue.Cf. 540 C. To the best of my ability, he replied, and if such is the nature of the two, it becomes an easy matter, I fancy, to unfold the tale of the sort of life that awaits each. We must tell it, then; and even if my language is somewhat rude and brutal,Cf. 613 E, 486 C, 509 A, 32 D. The Greeks were sensitive to rude or boastful speech. you must not suppose, Socrates, that it is I who speak thus, but those who commend injustice above justice.

What they will say is this: that such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding-iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified,Or strictly impaled. Cf. Cicero . iii. 27. Writers on Plato and Christianity have often compared the fate of Plato’s just man with the crucifixion. and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of AeschylusAesch. Seven 592-594 was, it seems, far more correctly applicable to the unjust man. For it is literally true, they will say, that the unjust man, as pursuing what clings closely to reality, to truth, and not regulating his life by opinion, desires not to seem but to be unjust, Exploiting the deep furrows of his wit From which there grows the fruit of counsels shrewd, Aesch. Seven 592-594 first office and rule in the state because of his reputation for justice, then a wife from any family he chooses, and the giving of his children in marriage to whomsoever he pleases, dealings and partnerships with whom he will, and in all these transactions advantage and profit for himself because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice; and so they say that if he enters into lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets the better of his opponents, and, getting the better,Cf. on 343 D, 349 B. is rich and benefits his friends and harms his enemiesCf. 332 D.; and he performs sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods adequately and magnificently,μεγαλοπρεπῶς. Usually a word of ironical connotation on Plato. and he serves and pays courtCf. 12 E ff. and 331 B, θεῷ θυσίας, where the respectable morality of the good Cephalus is virtually identical with this commercial view of religion. to men whom he favors and to the gods far better than the just man, so that he may reasonably expect the favor of heavenCf. 352 B and 613 A-B. also to fall rather to him than to the just. So much better they say, Socrates, is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men than that which awaits the just. When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind to make some reply thereto, but his brother Adeimantus said, You surely don’t suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the case is complete? Why, what else? I said. The very most essential point, said he, has not been mentioned. Then, said I, as the proverb has it, Let a brother help a manἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη. The rhythm perhaps indicates a proverb of which the scholiast found the source in xvi. 97.—and so, if Glaucon omits any word or deed, do you come to his aid. Though for my part what he has already said is quite enough to overthrow me and incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice. Nonsense, he said, but listen to this further point. We must set forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who commend justice and dispraise injustice, if what I conceive to be Glaucon’s meaning is to be made more clear.

Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all those who have others in their charge,Who, in Quaker language, have a concern for, who have charge of souls. Cf. the admonitions of the father of Horace, i. 4. 105 ff., 325 D, Xenophon . i. 5. 9, Isocrates iii. 2, Terence 414 f., Schmidt, , i. p. 187, and the letters of Lord Chesterfield, passim, as well as Plato himself, 662 E. urge the necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself, but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer declare, the one that the gods make the oaks bear for the just: Acorns on topmost branches and swarms of bees on their mid-trunks, and he tells how the Flocks of the fleece-bearing sheep are laden and weighted with soft wool, Hes. WD 232ff. and of many other blessings akin to these; and similarly the other poet: Even as when a good king, who rules in the fear of the high gods, Upholds justice and right, and the black earth yields him her foison, Barley and wheat, and his trees are laden and weighted with fair fruits, Increase comes to his flocks and the ocean is teeming with fishes. Hom. Od. 19.109 And Musaeus and his sonCf. Kern, , iv. p. 83. The son is possibly Eumolpus. haveFor the thought of the following cf. Emerson, : He (the preacher) assumed that judgement is not executed in this world; that the wicked are successful; that the good are miserable; and then urged from reason and scripture a compensation to be made to both parties in the next life. No offence appeared to be taken by the congregation at this doctrine. a more excellent songνεανικώτερα is in Plato often humorous and depreciative. Cf. 563 E νεανική. than these of the blessings that the gods bestow on the righteous. For they conduct them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the saints,συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων. Jowett’s notion that this is a jingle is due to the English pronunciation of Greek. where, reclined on couches crowned with wreaths, they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the fairest meed of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the children’s childrenKern, ibid., quotes Servius ad Virgil, iii. 98 et nati natorum and opines that Homer took xx. 308 from Orpheus. of the pious and oath-keeping man and his race thereafter never fail. Such and such-like are their praises of justice. But the impious and the unjust they bury in mudCf. Zeller, . i. pp. 56-57, 533 D, 69 C, commentators on Aristophanes 146. in the house of Hades and compel them to fetch water in a sieve,Cf. my note on Horace, iii. 11. 22, and, with an allegorical application, 493 B. and, while they still live, they bring them into evil repute, and all the sufferings that Glaucon enumerated as befalling just men who are thought to be unjust, these they recite about the unjust, but they have nothing else to say.Plato teaches elsewhere that the real punishment of sin is to be cut off from communion with the good. 176 D-E, 728 B, 367 A Such is the praise and the censure of the just and of the unjust.

Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honorable, to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by convention disgraceful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, for the most part, and they do not scruple to felicitate bad men who are rich or have other kinds of power to do them honor in public and private, and to dishonor and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even while admitting that they are better men than the others. But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the godsThe gnomic poets complain that bad men prosper for a time, but they have faith in the late punishment of the wicked and the final triumph of justice. and virtue, how so it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life but to their opposites a contrary lot; and begging priestsThere is a striking analogy between Plato’s language here and the description by Protestant historians of the sale of indulgences by Tetzel in Germany. Rich men’s doors is proverbial. Cf. 489 B. and soothsayers go to rich men’s doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the godsCf. Mill, Utility of Religion, , p. 90: All positive religions aid this self-delusion. Bad religions teach that divine vengeance may be bought off by offerings or personal abasement. Plato, 885 D, anticipates Mill. With the whole passage compare the scenes at the founding of Cloudcuckootown, Aristophanes 960-990, and more seriously the medieval doctrine of the treasure of the church and the Hindu tapas. that can expiate and cure with pleasurable festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will be enabled to injure just and unjust alike, since they are masters of spells and enchantmentsIn 933 D both are used of the victim with ἐπῳδαῖς, which primarily applies to the god. Cf. Lucan, . vi. 492 and 527. that constrain the gods to serve their end. And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting: Evil-doing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking; Smooth is the way and it lies near at hand and is easy to enter; But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from the first step, Hes. WD 287-289and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said: The gods themselves are moved by prayers, And men by sacrifice and soothing vows, And incense and libation turn their wills Praying, whenever they have sinned and made transgression. Hom. Il. 9.497

And they produce a bushelὅμαδον, lit. noise, hubbub, babel, here contemptuous. There is no need of the emendation ὁπμαθόν. Cf. 387 A, and Kern, , p. 82; cf. John Morley, , p. 184, A bushel of books. of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sportCf. 819 B. for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice. What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youthCf. , p. 25: His (Plato’s) imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his mind whether the best chance for happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature. To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main problem of moral philosophy. Cf. Introduction x-xi; also , p. 214. would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks, Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live my life out in fenced and guarded security? Pindar, Fr. The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets,φανερὰ ζημία is familiar and slightly humorous. Cf. Starkie on Aristoph. Ach. 737. they say, but liabilities, labor and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then since it is the seeming Simonides, Fr. 76 Bergk, and Eur. Orest. 236 as the wise men show me, that masters the reality and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve. For a front and a showA Pindaric mixture of metaphors beginning with a portico and garb, continuing with the illusory perspective of scene-painting, and concluding with the craftly fox trailed behind. I must draw about myself a shadow-line of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of most sage Archilochus,Cf. Fr. 86-89 Bergk, and Dio Chrysost. . 55. 285 R. κεπδαλέαν is a standing epithet of Reynard. Cf. Gildersleeve on Pindar . ii. 78. shifty and bent on gain. Nay, ’tis objected, it is not easy for a wrong-doer always to lie hid.Cf. my review of Jebb’s , 1907, vol. ii. p. 235. Neither is any other big thing facile, we shall reply. But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs,Cf. George Miller Calhoun, , University of Chicago Dissertation, 1911. and there are teachers of cajoleryLit. persuasion. Cf. the defintion of rhetoric, 453 A. who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the court-room. So that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to overreach with impunity. But against the gods, it may be said, neither secrecy nor force can avail. Well, if there are no gods, or they do not concern themselves with the doings of men, neither need we concern ourselves with eluding their observation.For the thought compare Tennyson, : But he that holdsThe gods are careless, wherefore need he careGreatly for them? Cf. also Euripides . 1034-1035, . x. 34. If they do exist and pay heed, we know and hear of them only from such discourses and from the poets who have described their pedigrees. But these same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by sacrifice and soothing vows and dedications. We must believe them in both or neither.

And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from fruits of our wrongdoing.Cf. Verres’ distribution of his three years’ spoliation of Sicily, Cicero 14 (40), and Plato 906 C-D, Lysias xxvii. 6. For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgement in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children’s children. Nay, my dear sir, our calculating friendHis morality is the hedonistic calculus of the or the commercial religion of other-wordliness. will say, here again the rites for the deadFor these τελεταί cf. 365 A. have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities, as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophetsOr rather mouthpieces. of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth. On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart’s desire, with gods and men in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honor justice and not rather laughAristophanes 1241. when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weaknessCf. 492 A. that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practise it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability. And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting-point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honors, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good.

For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another’s injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the greatest of evils.Cf. 363 E. This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I— for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance, nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is other man’s good,Cf. 343 C. the advantage of the other, and that injustice is advantageous and profitible to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too, and all other goods that are productiveAdam’s note on γόνιμα: i.q. γνήσια is, I think, wrong. by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honors that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed your entire lifeCf. 506 C. in the consideration of this very matter. Do not then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil.

While I had always admired the natural parts of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased by their words on this occasion, and said: It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know, Cf. my note in 1917, vol. xii. p. 436. It does not refer to Thrasymachus facetiously as Adam fancies, but is an honorific expression borrowed from the Pythagoreans. in the beginning of the elegy which the admirerPossibly Critias. of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara Probably the battle of 409 B.C., reported in Diodor. Sic. xiii. 65. Cf. Introduction p. viii.—Sons of Ariston,The implied pun on the name is made explicit in 580 C-D. Some have held that Glaucon and Adeimantus were uncles of Plato, but Zeller decides for the usual view that they wre brothers. Cf. . ii. 1, 4th ed. 1889, p. 392, and ., 1873, Hist.-Phil Kl. pp. 86 ff. whose race from a glorious sire is god-like. This, my friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the god-like in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion. And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general character since from your words alone I should have distrusted you. But the more I trust you the more I am at a loss what to make of the matter. I do not know how I can come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability by reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I fear lest it be actually impious to stand idly by when justice is reviled and be faint-hearted and not defend her so long as one has breath and can utter his voice. The best thing, then, is to aid her as best I can. Glaucon, then, and the rest besought me by all means to come to the rescue and not to drop the argument but to pursue to the end the investigation as to the nature of each and the truth about their respective advantages. I said then as I thought: The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and examine the smaller, if they are the same. Quite so, said Adeimantus; but what analogy to do you detect in the inquiry about justice? I will tell you, I said: there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city. Assuredly, said he. Is not the city largerSo Aristotle . i. 2. 8 (1094 b 10). than the man? It is larger, he said.

Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less. I think that is a good suggestion, he said. If, then, said I, our argument should observe the originLit., coming into being. Cf. Introduction p. xiv. So Aristotle i. 1, but iv. 4 he criticizes Plato. of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it. It may be, said he. And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking? Much more. Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then. We have reflected,C’est tout reflechi. said Adeimantus; proceed and don’t refuse. The origin of the city, then, said I, in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs,Often imitated, as e.g. Hooker, . i. 10: Forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with a competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire . . . therefore to supply these defects . . . we are naturally inclined to seek communion and fellowship with others; this was the cause of men uniting themselves at first in civil societies. but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state? No other, said he. As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not? By all means. And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself. Certainly. Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs. Obviously. Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life.Aristotle says that the city comes into being for the sake of life, but exists for the sake of the good life, which, of course, is also Plato’s view of the true raison d’etre of the state. Cf. 828 D and 48 B.Assuredly. The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing. That is so. Tell me, then, said I, how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of body? Certainly. The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or five men. Apparently.

What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs?It is characteristic of Plato’s drama of ideas to give this kind of rhetorical advantage to the expression of the view that he intends to reject. In what follows Plato anticipates the advantages of the division of labor as set forth in Adam Smith, with the characteristic exception of its stimulus to new inventions. Cf. Introduction xv. And Adeimantus said, But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier. It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange, said I; for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another. Don’t you think so? I do. Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one? One at one, he said. And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favorable moment in any task, the work is spoiled. Obvious. That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work. He must indeed. The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations. By all means. Then, Adeimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many; and similarly the weaver and cobbler. True. Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably. Certainly. Yet it still wouldn’t be very large even if we should add to them neat-herds and shepherds and other herders, so that the farmers might have cattle for ploughing,Butcher’s meat and pork appear first in the luxurious city, 373 C. We cannot infer that Plato was a vegetarian. and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use. It wouldn’t be a small city, either, if it had all these. But further, said I, it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not need imports. It is. There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires. There will.

And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those from whom they procure what they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not? I think so. Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need. It must. So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen. Yes, more. And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not? Yes. We shall also need traders, then. Assuredly. And if the trading is carried on by sea, we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business. Quite a number. But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labor? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state. Obviously, he said, by buying and selling. A market-place, then, and money as a tokenAristotle adds that the medium of exchange must of itself have value ( 1257 a 36). for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this. By all means. If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market-place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place and lose time from his own work? By no means, he said, but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakestSimilarly in 918-920. in body and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy. This need, then, said I, creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not shopkeepers the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants? Certainly. And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, wage-earners, are they not? Certainly. Wage-earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state.Aristotle ( 1254 b 18) says that those, the use of whose bodies is the best they have to offer, are by nature slaves. Cf xxxviii. 36 ἄνευ αὐτῶν οὐκ οἰκισθήσεται πόλις. So Carlyle, and Shakespeare on Caliban: We cannot miss him (, I. ii). I think so. Has our city, then, Adeimantus, reached its full growth and is it complete? Perhaps. Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered does it come into the state?

I cannot conceive, Socrates, he said, unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another. Perhaps that is a good suggestion, said I; we must examine it and not hold back. First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed and shod sufficiently? And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves, and, reclined on rustic beds strewn with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means lest they fall into poverty or war? Here Glaucon broke in: No relishesὄψον is anything eaten with bread, usually meat or fish, as Glaucon means; but Socrates gives it a different sense. apparently, he said, for the men you describe as feasting. True said I; I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese and onions and greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chickpeas and beans, and they will toast myrtle-berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations and so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their offspring. And he said, If you were founding a city of pigs,Cf. Introduction p. xiv. By the mouth of the fine gentleman, Glaucon, Plato expresses with humorous exaggeration his own recognition of the inadequacy for ethical and social philosophy of his idyllic ideal. Cf. Mandeville, Preface to : A golden age must be as free/ For acorns as for honesty. Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide? Why, what would you have, Glaucon? said I. What is customary, he replied; They must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use. Good, said I, I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn’t such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder.

For there are some, it appears, who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life; but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girlsOn flute-girls as the accompaniment of a banquet Cf. 176 E, Aristophanes . 1090-1092, Catullus 13. 4. But apart from this, the sudden mention of an incongruous item in a list is a device of Aristophanic humor which even the philosophic Emerson did not disdain: The love of little maids and berries. and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities,τὰ ἁναγκαῖα predicatively, in the measure prescribed by necessity. Cf. 369 D the indispensable minimum of a city. The historical order is: (1) arts of necessity, (2) arts of pleasure and luxury, (3) disinterested science. Cf. 110 A, Aristotle . 981 b 20. but we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not? Yes, he said. Then we shall have to enlarge the city again. For that healthy state is no longer sufficient, but we must proceed to swell out its bulk and fill it up with a multitude of things that exceed the requirements of necessity in states, as, for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators,θηρευταί and μιμηταί are generalized Platonic categories, including much not ordinarily signified by the words. For a list of such Platonic generalizations Cf. , note 500. many of them occupied with figures and colors and many with music—the poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractorsContractors generally, and especially theatrical managers.—and the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially those that have to do with women’s adornment. And so we shall also want more servitors. Don’t you think that we shall need tutors, nurses wetThe mothers of the idyllic state nursed their own children, but in the ideal state the wives of the guardians are relieved of this burden by special provision. Cf. 460 D. and dry, beauty-shop ladies, barbersThe rhetoricians of the empire liked to repeat that no barber was known at Rome in the first 200 or 300 years of the city. and yet again cooks and chefs? And we shall have need, further, of swineherds; there were none of these creaturesIllogical idiom referring to the swine. Cf. 598 C. in our former city, for we had no need of them, but in this city there will be this further need; and we shall also require other cattle in great numbers if they are to be eaten, shall we not? Yes. Doctors, too, are something whose servicesχρείαις: Greek idiom could use either singular or plural. Cf. 410 A; 87 C; 630 E. The plural here avoids hiatus. we shall be much more likely to require if we live thus than as before? Much. And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not? It is. Then we shall have to cut out a cantleCf. Isocrates iii. 34. of our neighbor’s land if we are to have enough for pasture and ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimitedCf. 591 D. Natural desires are limited. Luxury and unnatural forms of wealth are limitless, as the Greek moralists repeat from Solon down. acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants. Inevitably, Socrates. We shall go to warThe unnecessary desires are the ultimate causes of wars. 66 C. The simple life once abandoned, war is inevitable. My lord, said St. Francis to the Bishop of Assisi, if we possessed property we should have need of arms for its defense (Sabatier, p. 81). Similarly that very dissimilar thinker, Mandeville. Cf. on 372 C. Plato recognizes the struggle for existence (Spencer, , 6), and the bellum omnium contra omnes, 625 E. Cf. Sidgwick, , i, 2: The Republic of Plato seems in many respects divergent from the reality. And yet he contemplates war as a permanent, unalterable fact to be provided for in the ideal state. Spencer on the contrary contemplates a completely evolved society in which the ethics of militarism will disappear. as the next step, Glaucon—or what will happen? What you say, he said. And we are not yet to speak, said I, of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have furtheri.e. as well as the genesis of society. 369 B. discovered the origin of war, namely, from those things from whichἐξ ὧν: i.e. ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ὧν, namely the appetites and the love of money. the greatest disasters, public and private, come to states when they come. Certainly.

Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defence of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described. How so? he said; are the citizens themselvesCf. 567 E τί δέ; αὐτόθεν. In the fourth century it was found that amateur soldiers could not compete with professionals, and war became a trade (Butcher, p. 17). Plato arrives at the same result by his principle one man one task (370 A-B). He is not here making citizens synonymous with soldiers nor laconizing as Adam says. not sufficient for it? Not if you, said I, and we all were right in the admission we made when we were molding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well. True, he said. Well, then, said I, don’t you think that the business of fighting is an art and a profession? It is indeed, he said. Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler’s art than for the art of war? By no means. Can we suppose,For the thought of this a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 421 A. then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end thatἵνα δή ironical. we might have the cobbler’s business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisureCf. 370 B-C. from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easyThe ironical argument ex contrario is continued with fresh illustrations to the end of the chapter. that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practise that and nothing else from childhoodCf. on 467 A. but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the scienceFor the three requisites, science, practice, and natural ability Cf. , note 596, and my paper on Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη, . vol. xl., 1910. of it nor sufficiently practised themselves in its use? Great indeed, he said, would be the value of tools in that case.Cf. Thucydides ii. 40. Then, said I, in the same degree that the task of our guardiansFirst mention. Cf. 428 D note, 414 B. is the greatest of all, it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training. I think so, said he. Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit? Of course. It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state. Yes, ours. Upon my word, said I, it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows.

No, we mustn’t. Do you think, said I, that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watch-dog’s work and of a well-born lad? What point have you in mind? I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended,αἰσθανόμενον: present. There is no pause between perception and pursuit. and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive. Why, yes, said he, there is need of all these qualities. And it must, further, be braveIn common parlance. Philosophically speaking, no brute is brave. 196 D, 430 B. if it is to fight well. Of course. And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit,Anger (or the heart’s desire?) buys its will at the price of life, as Heracleitus says (fr. 105 Bywater). Cf. Aristotle . 1105 a 9, 1116 b 23. the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable? I have. The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious. Yes. And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit. Yes, this too. How then, Glaucon, said I, will they escape being savage to one anotherCf. Spencer, 511: Men cannot be kept unsympathetic towards external enemies without being kept unsympathetic towards internal enemies. For what follows cf. Dio Chrys. . i. 44 R., Julian, . ii. 86 D. and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature? Not easily, by Zeus, said he. And yet we must have them gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about. True, he said. What, then, are we to do? said I. Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an oppositionThe contrast of the strenuous and gentle temperamnets is a chief point in Platonic ethics and education. Cf. , nn. 59, 70, 481. between the spirited type and the gentle nature. There does. But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible. It seems likely, he said. And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, I said, We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves.Plato never really deduces his argument from the imagery which he uses to illustrate it. What do you mean? We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities. Where? It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know. I am aware of that. The thing is possible, then, said I, and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian. It seems not. And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?

How so? he said; I don’t apprehend your meaning. This too, said I, is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature. What? That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marvelled at that? I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious. But surely that is an exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.φιλόσοφον: etymologically here, as ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates. Your dog now is your only philosopher, says Plato, not more seriously than Rabelais (Prologue): Mais vistes vous oncques chien rencontrant quelque os medullaire: c’est comme dit Platon, lib. ii. de Rep., la beste du monde plus philosophe. Cf. Huxley, , p. 104: The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not a general idea of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion? Dummler and others assume that Plato is satirizing the Cynics, but who were the Cynics in 380-370 B.C.? In what respect, pray? In respect, said I, that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you,καίτοι πῶς: humorous oratorical appeal. Cf. 360 C καίτοι. can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance? It certainly cannot, he said. But you will admit, said I, that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same? The same, he said. Then may we not confidently lay it down in the case of man too, that if he is to be in some sort gentle to friends and familiars he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning? Let us so assume, he replied. The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state. By all means, he said. Such, then, I said, would be the basisCf. 343 E. ὑπάρχοι marks the basis of nature as opposed to teaching. of his character. But the rearing of these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the consideration of this topic advance us in any way towards discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length? And Glaucon’s brother replied, Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end. Certainly, then, my dear Adeimantus, said I, we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long. No, we must not. Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fablesCf. Introduction pp. xxi-xxii, and 276 E. and had ample leisure,Plato likes to contrast the leisure of philosophy with the hurry of business and law. Cf. 172 C-D. let us educate these men in our discourse. So we must. What, then, is our education?For the abrupt question cf. 360 E. Plato here prescribes for all the guardians, or military class, the normal Greek education in music and gymnastics, purged of what he considers its errors. A higher philosophic education will prepare a selected few for the office of guardians par excellence or rulers. Quite unwarranted is the supposition that the higher education was not in Plato’s mind when he described the lower. Cf. 412 A, 429 D-430 C, 497 C-D, , n. 650. Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered?For this conservative argument Cf. 300 B, 844 A. Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the bodyQualified in 410 C. μουσική is playing the lyre, music, poetry, letters, culture, philosophy, according to context. and for the soul music. It is. And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics? Of course. And under music you include tales, do you not? I do. And tales are of two species, the one true and the other falseA slight paradox to surprise attention.? Yes.

And education must make use of both, but first of the false? I don’t understand your meaning. Don’t you understand, I said, that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before gymnastics. That is so. That, then, is what I meant by saying that we must take up music before gymnastics. You were right, he said. Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief thing,Cf. 753 E, 765 E, Antiphon, fr. 134 Blass. especially for any creature that is young and tenderCf. 664 B, and Shelley’s Specious names,Learned in soft childhood’s unsuspecting hour, perhaps derived from the educational philosophy of Rousseau.? For it is then that it is best molded and takes the impressionThe image became a commonplace. Cf. 191 D, Horace ii. 32. 8, the Stoic τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, and Byron’s Wax to receive and marble to retain. that one wishes to stamp upon it. Quite so. Shall we, then, thus lightly sufferCf. the censorship proposed in 656 C. Plato’s criticism of the mythology is anticipated in part by Euripides, Xenophanes, Heracleitus, and Pythagoras. Cf. Decharme, , translated by James Loeb, chap. ii. Many of the Christian Fathers repeated his criticism almost verbatim. our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up? By no manner of means will we allow it. We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our storymakers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject. What sort of stories? he said. The example of the greater stories, I said, will show us the lesser also. For surely the pattern must be the same and the greater and the less must have a like tendency. Don’t you think so? I do, he said; but I don’t apprehend which you mean by the greater, either. Those, I said, that Hesiod 154-181. and Homer and the other poets related. These, methinks, composed false stories which they told and still tell to mankind. Of what sort? he said; and what in them do you find fault? With that, I said, which one ought first and chiefly to blame, especially if the lie is not a pretty one. What is that? When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models. It is certainly right to condemn things like that, he said; but just what do we mean and what particular things?

There is, first of all, I said, the greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge; and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronos at the hands of his son. Even if they were true I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessityConservative feeling or caution prevents Plato from proscribing absolutely what may be a necccessary part of traditional or mystical religion. for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig,The ordinary sacrifice at the Eleusinian mysteries. Cf. Aristophanes . 747, 374-375; Walter Pater, . but some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales. Why, yes, said he, such stories are hard sayings. Yes, and they are not to be told, Adeimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the hearing of a young man, that in doing the utmost wrong he would do nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father’sPlato does not sympathize with the Samuel Butlers of his day. wrong-doings to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods.The argument, whether used in jest or earnest, was a commonplace. Cf. Schmidt, , i. 137, 941 B, Aeschylus 640-641, Terence 590 At quem deum! . . . ego homuncio hoc non facerem. The Neoplatonists met the criticism of Plato and the Christian Fathers by allegorizing or refining away the immoral parts of the mythology, but St. Augustine cleverly retorts (, ii. 7): Omnes enim . . . cultores talium deorum . . . magis intuentur quid Iupiter fecerit quam quid docuerit Plato. No, by heaven, said he, I do not myself think that they are fit to be told. Neither must we admit at all, said I, that gods war with godsCf. the protest in the 6 B, beautifully translated by Ruskin, 107: And think you that there is verily war with each other among the gods? And dreadful enmities and battles, such as the poets have told, and such as our painters set forth in graven sculpture to adorn all our sacred rites and holy places. Yes, and in the great Panathenaia themselves the Peplus full of such wild picturing, is carried up into the Acropolis—shall we say that these things are true, oh Euthyphron, right-minded friend? and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either— if we wish our future guardians to deem nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another; still less must we make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries,On the Panathenaic πέπλος of Athena. and other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin. But if there is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarrelled with his fellow-citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety, that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. But Hera’s fetteringsThe title of a play by Epicharmus. The hurling of Hephaestus, i. 586-594. by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods xx. 1-74; xxi. 385-513. in Homer’s verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegoryὑπόνοια: the older word for allegory; Plutarch, . 19 E. For the allegorical interpretation of Homer in Plato’s time cf. Jebb, , p. 89, and Mrs. Anne Bates Hersman’s Chicago Dissertation: . or without allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to prove indelible and unalterable. For which reason, maybe, we should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears. Yes, that is reasonable, he said; but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?

And I replied, Adeimantus, we are not poets,The poet, like the rhetorician ( 304 D), is a ministerial agent of the royal or political art. So virtually Aristotle, 1336 b. you and I at present, but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate; but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables. Right, he said; but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods, what would they be? Something like this, I said. The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse. We must. And is not God of courseThe γε implies that God is good ex vi termini. good in reality and always to be spoken ofIt is charcteristic of Plato to distinguish the fact and the desirability of proclaiming it. The argument proceeds by the minute links which tempt to parody. Below τὸ ἀγαθόν, followed by οὐδ’ ἄρα . . . ὁ θεός, is in itself a refutation of the ontological identification in Plato of God and the Idea of Good. But the essential goodness of God is a commonplace of liberal and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier’s hymn, The Eternal Goodness. as such? Certainly. But further, no good thing is harmful, is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful harm? By no means. Can that which does not harm do any evil? Not that either. But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either? How could it? Once more, is the good beneficent? Yes. It is the cause, then, of welfare? Yes. Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless. Entirely so, he said. Neither, then, could God, said I, since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause.Anticipates the proclamation of the prophet in the final myth, 617 E: αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. The idea, elaborated in Cleanthes’ hymn to Zeus, may be traced back to the speech of the Homeric Zeus in i. 33 ἐξ ἡμεῶν γάπ φασι κάκ’ ἔμμεναι. St. Thomas distinguishes: Deus est auctor mali quod est poena, non autem mali quod est culpa. For good things are far fewerA pessimistic commoplace more emphasized in the than in the . Cf. 896 E, where the Manichean hypothesis of an evil world-soul is suggested. with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God. What you say seems to me most true, he replied. Then, said I, we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods when he says Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and are filled with Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts that are evil, Hom. Il. 24.527-8 and to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled— Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his portion, Hom. Il. 24.530 but the man for whom he does not blend the lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil— Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world, Hom. Il. 24.532 nor will we tolerate the saying that Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals. The line is not found in Homer, nor does Plato explicitly say that it is. Zeus is dispenser of war in Hom. Il. 4.84.

But as to the violation of the oaths 4.69 ff. and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contentionἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν is used in 237 C of the contest of the gods for Attica. Here it is generally taken of the Theomachy, xx. 1074, which begins with the summons of the gods to a council by Themis at the command of Zeus. It has also been understood, rather improbably, of the judgement of Paris. of the gods was the doing of Themis and Zeus; nor again must we permit our youth to hear what Aeschylus says— A god implants the guilty cause in men When he would utterly destroy a house, Aesch. For the idea, quem deus vult perdere dementat prius, cf. Theognis 405, Schmidt, , i. pp. 235 and 247, and Jebb on Sophocles 620-624. but if any poets compose a Sorrows of Niobe, the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of the Pelopidae or of Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God did was righteous and good, and they were benefitedPlato’s doctrine that punishment is remedial must apply to punishments inflicted by the gods. Cf. 324 B, 478 E, 480 A, 505 B, 525 B, 590 A-B. Yet there are some incurables. Cf. 615 E. by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God, is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say; if on the other hand he should say that for needing chastisement the wicked were miserable and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, that we must allow. But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it, neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in meter or without meter; for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves. I cast my vote with yours for this law, he said, and am well pleased with it. This, then, said I, will be one of the laws and patterns concerning the godsMinucius Felix says of Plato’s theology, . chap. xix: Platoni apertior de deo et rebus ipsis et nominibus oratio est et quae tota esset caelestis nisi persuasionis civilis nonnunquam admixtione sordesceret. to which speakers and poets will be required to conform, that God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good. And an entirely satisfactory one, he said. And what of this, the second. Do you think that God is a wizard and capable of manifesting himself by design, now in one aspect, now in another, at one timeThe two methods, (1) self-transformation, and (2) production of illusions in our minds, answer broadly to the two methods of deception distinguished in the 236 C. himself changing and altering his shape in many transformations and at another deceiving us and causing us to believe such things about him; or that he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form? I cannot say offhand, he replied. But what of this: If anything went out fromCf. 50 B, 439 E. Aristotle, . i. 1. 32, applies it to biology: τὸ γενναῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως. Plato’s proof from the idea of perfection that God is changeless has little in common with the Eleatic argument that pure being cannot change. its own form, would it not be displaced and changed, either by itself or by something else? Necessarily. Is it not true that to be altered and movedThe explicitly distinguishes two kinds of motion, qualitative change and motion proper (181 C-D), but the distinction is in Plato’s mind here and in 439 E. by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition,

as, for example, a body by food and drink and toil, and plantsCf. 765 E. by the heat of the sun and winds and similar influences—is it not true that the healthiest and strongest is least altered? Certainly. And is it not the soul that is bravest and most intelligent, that would be least disturbedταράξειε suggests the ἀταραξία of the sage in the later schools. and altered by any external affection? Yes. And, again, it is surely true of all composite implements, edifices, and habiliments, by parity of reasoning, that those which are well made and in good condition are least liable to be changed by time and other influences. That is so. It is universallyπᾶν δή generalizes from the preceding exhaustive enumeration of cases. Cf. 382 E, 139 A. true, then, that that which is in the best state by nature or art or both admits least alteration by something else. So it seems. But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God is in every way in the best possible state. Of course. From this point of view, then, it would be least of all likely that there would be many forms in God. Least indeed. But would he transform and alter himself? Obviously, he said, if he is altered. Then does he change himself for the better and to something fairer, or for the worseSo Aristotle . 1074 b 26. and to something uglier than himself? It must necessarily, said he, be for the worse if he is changed. For we surely will not say that God is deficient in either beauty or excellence. Most rightly spoken, said I. And if that were his condition, do you think, Adeimantus, that any one god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way? Impossible, he replied. It is impossible then, said I, even for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it appears, each of them being the fairest and best possible abidesCf. . 42 E ἔμενεν, which suggested the Neoplatonic and Miltonic paradox that the divine abides even when it goes forth. for ever simply in his own form. An absolutely necessary conclusion to my thinking. No poet then, I said, my good friend, must be allowed to tell us that The gods, in the likeness of strangers, Many disguises assume as they visit the cities of mortals. Hom. Od. 17.485-486 xvii. 485-486, quoted again in 216 B-C. Cf. . 41 A. Nor must anyone tell falsehoods about ProteusCf. iv. 456-8. Thetis transformed herself to avoid the wooing of Peleus. Cf. Pindar, . 4 and Thetis, nor in any tragedy or in other poems bring in Hera disguised as a priestess collecting alms for the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive stream. Aesch. From the of Aeschylus. And many similar falsehoods they must not tell. Nor again must mothers under the influence of such poets terrify their childrenRousseau also deprecates this. with harmful tales, how that there are certain gods whose apparitions haunt the night in the likeness of many strangers from all manner of lands, lest while they speak evil of the gods they at the same time make cowards of children. They must not, he said. But, said I, may we suppose that while the gods themselves are incapable of change they cause us to fancy that they appear in many shapes deceiving and practising magic upon us? Perhaps, said he.

Consider, said I; would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by presenting in either word or action what is only appearance? I don’t know, said he. Don’t you know, said I, that the veritable lie, if the expression is permissible, is a thing that all gods and men abhor? What do you mean? he said. This, said I, that falsehood in the most vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that everyone fears it. I don’t understand yet either. That is because you suspect me of some grand meaning, I said; but what I mean is, that deception in the soul about realities, to have been deceived and to be blindly ignorant and to have and hold the falsehood there, is what all men would least of all accept, and it is in that case that they loathe it most of all. Quite so, he said. But surely it would be most wholly right, as I was just now saying, to describe this as in very truth falsehood—ignorance namely in the soul of the man deceived. For the falsehood in words is a copyCf. Aristotle . 1. 12 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. Cf. also 428 D, 535 E, 730 C, Bacon, : But it is not the lie that passes through the mind but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it that doth the hurt. of the affection in the soul, an after-rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed falsehood. Is not that so? By all means. Essential falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods but by men. I agree. But what of the falsehood in words, when and for whom is it serviceable so as not to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong, does it not then become useful to avert the evil—as a medicine? And also in the fables of which we were just now speaking owing to our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so make it edifying.Cf. 245 A μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει, Isocrates xii. 149 and Livy’s Preface. For χρήσιμον Cf. 274 E. We must not infer that Plato is trying to sophisticate away the moral virtue of truth-telling. We most certainly do, he said. Tell me, then, on which of these grounds falsehood would be serviceable to God. Would he because of his ignorance of antiquity make false likenesses of it? An absurd supposition, that, he said. Then there is no lying poet in God. I think not. Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would lie? Far from it. Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends? Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God. Then there is no motive for God to deceive. None. From every point of viewGeneralizing from the exhaustive classification that precedes. the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood. By all means.

Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs in waking or in dreams. I myself think so, he said, when I hear you say it. You concur then, I said, this as our second norm or canon for speech and poetry about the gods,—that they are neither wizards in shape-shifting nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deed? I concur. Then, though there are many other things that we praise in Homer, this we will not applaud, the sending of the dream by ZeusHom. Il. 2.1-34. This apparent attribution of falsehood to Zeus was an Homeric problem which some solved by a change of accent from δίδομεν to διδόμεν. Cf. Aristotle 1462 a 22. to Agamemnon, nor shall we approve of Aeschylus when his ThetisCf. Aeschylus . 350. Possibly from the Ὅπλων κπίσις. avers that Apollo singing at her wedding, foretold the happy fortunes of her issue Hom. Il. 2.1 — Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness free, And rounding out the tale of heaven’s blessings, Raised the proud paean, making glad my heart. And I believed that Phoebus’ mouth divine, Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie. But he himself, the singer, himself who sat At meat with us, himself who promised all, Is now himself the slayer of my son. Aesch. Frag. 350 When anyone says that sort of thing about the gods, we shall be wroth with him, we will refuse him a chorus, neither will we allow teachers to use him for the education of the young if our guardians are to be god-fearing men and god-like in so far as that is possible for humanity. By all means, he said, I accept these norms and would use them as canons and laws.

Concerning the gods then, said I, this is the sort of thing that we must allow or not allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honor the godsWe may, if we choose, see here a reference to the virtue of piety, which some critics fancifully suppose was eliminated by the . Cf. , note 58. and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem. That was our view and I believe it right. What then of this? If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely to fear death? Or do you suppose that anyone could ever become brave who had that dread in his heart? No indeed, I do not, he replied. And again if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors,For the idea that death is no evil Cf. , in fine, 727 D, 828 D, and 881 A, where, however, the fear of hell is approved as a deterrent. do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery? By no means. Then it seems we must exercise supervisionCf. 377 B. also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this undiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors. Yes, we must, he said. Then, said I, beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind: Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty subsistence, Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have perished, Aesch. Frag. 350 Spoken by Achilles when Odysseus sought to console him for his death. Lucian, . 18, develops the idea. Proclus comments on it for a page. and this: Lest unto men and immortals the homes of the dead be uncovered Horrible, noisome, dank, that the gods too hold in abhorrence, Hom. Il. 20.64 δείσας μὴ precedes. and: Ah me! so it is true that e’en in the dwellings of Hades Spirit there is and wraith, but within there is no understanding, Hom. Il. 10.495 The exclamation and inference (ῥά) of Achilles when the shade of Patroclus eludes his embrace in the dream. The text is endlessly quoted by writers on religious origins and dream and ghost theories of the origin of the belief in the soul. and this: Sole to have wisdom and wit, but the others are shadowy phantoms, Hom. Il. 23.103 Said of the prophet Teiresias. The preceding line is, Unto him even in death was it granted by Persephoneia. The line is quoted also in 100 A. and: Forth from his limbs unwilling his spirit flitted to Hades, Wailing its doom and its lustihood lost and the May of its manhood, Hom. Il. 16.856 Said of the death of Patroclus, and Hector, Hom. Il. 22.382; imitated in the last line of the Vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras. Cf. Bacchyl. v. 153-4: πύματον δὲ πνέων δάκρυσα τλάμων ἀγλαὰν ἥβαν προλείπων.

and: Under the earth like a vapor vanished the gibbering soul, Hom. Il. 23.100 and: Even as bats in the hollow of some mysterious grotto Fly with a flittermouse shriek when one of them falls from the cluster Whereby they hold to the rock and are clinging the one to the other, Flitted their gibbering ghosts. Hom. Od. 24.6-10 Said of the souls of the suitors slain by Odysseus. Cf. Tennyson, : Thin as the bat-like shrillings of the dead. We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we cancel those and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasingCf. 177 C οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν. to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free and to be more afraid of slavery than of death. By all means. Then we must further taboo in these matters the entire vocabulary of terror and fear, CocytusMilton’s words, which I have borrowed, are the best expression of Plato’s thought. named of lamentation loud, abhorred Styx, the flood of deadly hate, the people of the infernal pit and of the charnel-house, and all other terms of this type, whose very names send a shudderφρίττειν and φρίκη are often used of the thrill or terror of tragedy. Cf. Sophocles 1402, 1306, Aeschylus 540. through all the hearers every year. And they may be excellent for other purposes,Some say, to frighten the wicked, but more probably for their aesthetic effect. Cf. 390 A εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, 886 C. but we are in fear for our guardians lest the habit of such thrills make them more sensitiveθερμότεροι contains a playful suggestion of the fever following the chill; Cf. 251 A. With μαλακώτεροι the image passes into that of softened metal; cf. 411 B, 666 B-C, 671 B. and soft than we would have them. And we are right in so fearing. We must remove those things then? Yes. And the opposite type to them is what we must require in speech and in verse? Obviously. And shall we also do away with the wailings and lamentations of men of repute? That necessarily follows, he said, from the other. Consider, said I, whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good manThat only the good can be truly friends was a favorite doctrine of the ancient moralists. Cf. 214 C, Xenophon ii. 6. 9, 20. will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing. Yes, we say that. Then it would not be for his friend’sCf. 117 C I wept for myself, for surely not for him. sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make lament. Certainly not. But we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himselfαὐτάρκης is the equivalent of ἱκανὸς αὑτῷ in 215 A. For the idea cf. 247 E. Self-sufficiency is the mark of a good man, of God, of the universe ( 33 D), of happiness in Aristotle, and of the Stoic sage. for a good life and is distinguished from other men in having least need of anybody else. True, he replied. Least of all then to him is it a terrible thing to lose sonCf. the anecdotes of Pericles and Xenophon and the comment of Pater on Marcus Aurelius in . Plato qualifies the Stoic extreme in 603 E. The Platonic ideal is μετριοπάθεια, the Stoic ἀπάθεια, or brother or his wealth or anything of the sort. Least of all. Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him. Certainly.

Then we should be right in doing away with the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women,Cf. Plat. Rep. 398e. and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these. We should be right, said he. Again then we shall request Homer and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as, Lying now on his side, and then again on his back, And again on his face, Hom. Il. 24.10-12 The descripition of Achilles mourning for Patroclus, Hom. Il. 24.10-12. Cf. Juv. 3.279-280: Noctem patitur lugentis amicum Pelidae, cubat in faciem mox deinde supinus. and then rising up and Drifting distraught on the shore of the waste unharvested ocean, Hom. Il. 24.10-12 Our text of Homer reads δινεύεσκ’ ἀλύων παρὰ θίν’ ἀλός, οὐδέ μιν ἠώς. Plato’s text may be intentional burlesque or it may be corrupt. nor clutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head, When he heard of Patroclus’s death. nor as weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet; nor yet Priam, Hom. Il. 22.414-415. near kinsman of the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung, Calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing. Hom. Il. 22.414-415 And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying, Ah, woe is me, woeful mother who bore to my sorrow the bravest, Hom. Il. 18.54 Thetis. and if they will so picture the gods at least not to have the effrontery to present so unlikely a likenessCf. 377 E. of the supreme god as to make him say: Out on it, dear to my heart is the man whose pursuit around Troy-town I must behold with my eyes while my spirit is grieving within me, Hom. Il. 22.168 Zeus of Hector. and: Ah, woe is me! of all men to me is Sarpedon the dearest, Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoitius’ offspring. Hom. Il. 16.433-434 Cf. Virgil’s imitation, 10.465 ff., Cicero, . ii. ch. 10. For if, dear Adeimantus, our young men should seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as unworthy utterances, still less surely would any man be to think such conduct unworthy of himself and to rebuke himself if it occurred to him to do or say anything of that kind, but without shame or restraint full many a dirge for trifles would he chant I have imitated the suggestion of rhythm in the original which with its Ionic dative is perhaps a latent quotation from tragedy. Cf. Chairemon, οὐδεὶς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι λυπεῖται σοφός, N fr. 37. and many a lament. You say most truly, he replied. But that must not be, as our reasoning but now showed us, in which we must put our trust until someone convinces with a better reason. No, it must not be. Again, they must not be prone to laughter.The ancients generally thought violent laughter undignified. Cf. Isocrates . 15, Plato 732 C, 935 B, Epictetus . xxxiii. 4, Dio Chrys. . 33. 703 R. Diogenes Laertius iii. 26, reports that Plato never laughed excessively in his youth. Aristotle’s great-souled man would presumably have eschewed laughter (. iv. 8, . 1389 b 10), as Lord Chesterfield advises his son to do. For ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction.In 563 E Plato generalizes this psychological principle. I think so, he said.

Then if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must accept it, much less if gods. Much indeed, he replied. Then we must not accept from Homer such sayings as these either about the gods: Quenchless then was the laughterThis laughter of the Homeric gods has been endlessly commented upon. Hegel allegorizes it. Mrs. Browning (Aurora Leigh) says: And all true poets laugh unquenchably Like Shakespeare and the gods. Proclus, In Rempub. i. 127 Kroll says that it is an expression of the abundance of divine energy. It is a commonplace that the primitive sense of humor of the Homeric gods laughs at the personal deformity of Hephaestus, but they really laugh at his officiousness and the contrast he presents to Hebe. Cf. my note in . xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223. that rose from the blessed immortals When they beheld Hephaestus officiously puffing and panting. Hom. Il. 1.599-600 — we must not accept it on your view. If it pleases you to call it mine,Cf. on 334 D. he said; at any rate we must not accept it. But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine,Cf. 382 D. it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians and laymen should have nothing to do with it. Obviously, he replied. The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefitCf. 334 B, 459 D. A cynic might compare Cleon’s plea in Aristophanes 1226 ἐγὼ δ’ ἔκλεπτον ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ γε τῇ πόλει. Cf. Xenophon ii. 6. 37, Bolingbroke, , p. 172. of the state; no others may have anything to do with it, but for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell physician or an athlete his trainer the truth about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare. Most true, he replied. If then the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying, any of the craftsmen Whether a prophet or healer of sickness or joiner of timbers, Hom. Od. 17.383-384 he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversiveThe word is chosen to fit both the ship and the state. Cf. 422 E, 442 B; and Alcaeus apud Aristophanes 1235, Euripides . 888, Aeschines iii. 158, Epictetus iii. 7. 20. and destructive of a state as it is of a ship. He will, he said, if deed follows upon word.That is, probably, if our Utopia is realized. Cf. 452 A εἰ πράξεται ᾗ λέγεται. Cf. the imitation in 357 A εἴπερ ἔργα ἐπὶ νῷ ἐγίγνετο. Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control? Of course. And for the multitudeFor the mass of men, as distinguished from the higher philosophical virtue. Often misunderstood. For the meanings of σωγροσύνη cf. my review of Jowett’s , A.J.P. vol. xiii. (1892) p. 361. Cf. , p. 15 and n. 77. are not the main points of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and themselves to be rulersIn 491 D-E, Callicles does not understand what Socrates means by a similar expression. over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest? I think so. Then, I take it, we will think well said such sayings as that of Homer’s Diomede: Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the word of my bidding, Hom. Il. 4.412 Diomede to Sthenelos. and what follows: Breathing high spirit the Greeks marched silently fearing their captains, Hom. Il. 3.8 In our Homer this is Hom. Il. 3.8 and σιγῇ κτλ. 4.431. See Howes in , vi. pp. 153-237. and all similar passages.

Yes, well said. But what of this sort of thing? Heavy with wine with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a fleet deer, Hom. Il. 1.225 Achilles to the commander-in-chief, Agamemon. Several lines of insult follow. and the lines that follow,Cf. 42 C. are these well—and other impertinencesCf. 482 C. in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers? They are not well. They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised, or what is your view of it? This, he said. Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world, When the bounteous tables are standing Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles the sweet wine Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the beakers. Hom. Od. 9.8-10 Odysseus in ix. 8-10. For παραπλεῖαι the Homeric text has παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι. Plato’s treatment of the quotation is hardly fair to Homer. Aristotle, 1338 a 28, cites it more fairly to illustrate the use of music for entertainment (διαγωγή). The passage, however, was liable to abuse. See the use made of it by Lucian, 10.—do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man’s temperance or self-control? or this: Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer. Hom. Od. 12.342 Hom. Od. 12.342. Or to hear how ZeusHom. Il. 14.294-341. lightly forgot all the designs which he devised, watching while the other gods slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another, Deceiving their dear parents. Hom. Il. 14.296 Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus’s fettering Ares and Aphrodite viii. 266 ff. for a like motive. No, by Zeus, he said, I don’t think it will. But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all oddsMay include on Platonic principles the temptations of pleasure. Cf. 191 D-E. attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as: He smote his breast and chided thus his heart, Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured. Hom. Od. 20.17-18 Quoted also in 94 D-E. By all means, he said. It is certain that we cannot allow our men to be acceptors of bribes or greedy for gain. By no means. Then they must not chant: Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings. unknown Suidas s. v. δῶρα says that some attributed the line to Hesiod. Cf. Euripides 964, Ovid, iii. 653, Otto, . 233. Nor should we approve Achilles’ attendant PhoenixSee his speech, ix. 515 ff. as speaking fairly when he counselled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath;

nor shall we think it proper nor admit that AchillesCf. xix. 278 ff. But Achilles in Homer is indifferent to the gifts. himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment xxiv. 502, 555, 594. But in 560 he does not explicitly mention the ransom. but otherwise to refuse. It is not right, he said, to commend such conduct. But, for Homer’s sake, said I, I hesitate to say that it is positively impiousCf. 368 B. to affirm such things of Achilles and to believe them when told by others; or again to believe that he said to Apollo Me thou hast baulked, Far-darter, the most pernicious of all gods, Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the power. Hom. Il. 22.15 Professor Wilamowitz uses ὀλοώτατε to prove that Apollo was a god of destruction. But Menelaus says the same of Zeus in iii. 365. Cf. . vol. iv. (1909) p. 329. And how he was disobedient to the river,Scamander. Il. 21. 130-132. who was a god and was ready to fight with him, and again that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to her river Spercheius: This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero, Patroclus, Hom. Il. 23.151 Cf. Proclus, p. 146 Kroll. Plato exaggerates to make his case. The locks were vowed to Spercheius on the condition of Achilles’ return. In their context the words are innocent enough. who was a dead body, and that he did so we must believe. And again the trailings xxiv. 14 ff. of Hector’s body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter xxiii. 175-176. of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we will affirm to be lies, nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus the most chasteProverbially. Cf. Pindar . iv. 56, v. 26, Aristophanes 1063, and my note on Horace iii. 7. 17. of men, grandsonZeus, Aeacus, Peleus. For the education of Achilles by Cheiron Cf. xi. 832, Pindar . iii., Euripides, . 926-927, Plato, 371 D. of Zeus, and himself bred under the care of the most sage Cheiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected with two contradictory maladies, the greed that becomes no free man and at the same time overweening arrogance towards gods and men. You are right, he said. Neither, then, said I, must we believe this or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, attempted such dreadful rapes,Theseus was assisted by Perithous in the rape of Helen and joined Perithous in the attempt to abduct Persephone. Theseus was the theme of epics and of lost plays by Sophocles and Euripides. nor that any other child of a god and hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of him. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men. For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility. Certainly. And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of The near-sown seed of gods, Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida’s top Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven, Nor in their life-blood failsPlato was probably thinking of this passage when he wrote the last paragraph of the . the fire divine. Aesch. Niobe Fr.

For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed in our youth great laxityCf. my note in . vol. xii. (1910) p. 308. in turpitude. Most assuredly. What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions? We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world. We have. Speech, then, about men would be the remainder. Obviously. It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.Or possibly determine this at present. The prohibition which it would beg the question to place here is made explicit in 660 E. Cf. 899 D, and 364 B. Why? Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man’s good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don’t you think so? Nay, I well know it, he said. Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry? Rightly apprehended, he said. Then, as regards men that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just. Most true, he replied. So this concludes the topic of tales.λόγων here practically means the matter, and λέξεως, which became a technical term for diction, the manner, as Socrates explains when Adeimantus fails to understand. That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech. And Adeimantus said, I don’t understand what you mean by this. Well, said I, we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things? What else could it be? he said. Do not they proceedCf. Aristotle 1449 b 27. either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation,All art is essentially imitation for Plato and Aristotle. But imitation means for them not only the portrayal or description of visible and tangible things, but more especially the expression of a mood or feeling, hence the (to a modern) paradox that music is the most imitative of the arts. But Plato here complicates the matter further by sometimes using imitation in the narrower sense of dramatic dialogue as opposed to narration. An attentive reader will easily observe these distinctions. Aristotle’s makes much use of the ideas and the terminology of the following pages. or by both? This too, he said, I still need to have made plainer. I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher,Socratic urbanity professes that the speaker, not the hearer, is at fault. Cf. 340 E, 23 D. I said; so like men who are unable to express themselves I won’t try to speak in wholesPlato and Aristotle often contrast the universal and the particular as whole and part. Cf. , p. 52. Though a good style is concrete, it is a mark of linguistic helplessness not to be able to state an idea in general terms. Cf. Locke, , ii. 10. 27: This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them. and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning.

Tell me. Do you know the first lines if the Iliad in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and that Chryses, failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god? I do. You know then that as far as these verses, And prayed unto all the Achaeans, Chiefly to Atreus’ sons, twin leaders who marshalled the people, Hom. Il. 1.15 the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking. But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried in nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilion, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire . Quite so, he said. Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches? Of course. But when he delivers a speech as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction is far as possible to that of the person whom he announces as about to speak? We shall obviously. And is not likening one’s self to another speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens one’s self? Surely. In such case then it appears he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation. Certainly. But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been accomplished without imitation.In the narrower sense. And lest you may say again that you don’t understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being ChrysesCf. Hazlitt, : Shakespeare does not stand reasoning on what his characters would do or say, but at once becomes them and speaks and acts for them. but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without meter for I am not a poet:From here to 394 B, Plato gives a prose paraphrase of i. 12-42. Roger Ascham in his quotes it as a perfect example of the best form of exercise for learning a language. the priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god;

and when he had thus spoken the others were of reverent mind and approved, but Agamemnon was angry and bade him depart and not come again lest the scepter and the fillets of the god should not avail him. And ere his daughter should be released, he said, she would grow old in Argos with himself, and he ordered him to be off and not vex him if he wished to get home safe. And the old man on hearing this was frightened and departed in silence, and having gone apart from the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the appellations of the god, and reminding him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that had found favor whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god’s shafts. It is in this way, my dear fellow, I said, that without imitation simple narration results. I understand, he said. Understand then, said I, that the opposite of this arises when one removes the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches. This too I understand, he said, —it is what happens in tragedy. You have conceived me most rightly, I said, and now I think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imitation, as you remarked, tragedy and comedy; and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in the dithyrambThe dithyramb was technically a poem in honor of Bacchus. For its more or less conjectural history cf. Pickard-Cambridge, . Here, however, it is used broadly to designate the type of elaborate Greek lyric which like the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides narrates a myth or legend with little if any dialogue.; and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me. I understand now, he said, what you then meant. Recall then also the preceding statement that we were done with the what of speech and still had to consider the ’how.’ I remember. What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a decision whether we are to suffer our poets to narrate as imitators or in part as imitators and in part not, and what sort of things in each case, or not allow them to imitateAgain in the special limited sense. at all. I divine, he said, that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not. Perhaps, said I, and perhaps even more than that.This seems to imply that Plato already had in mind the extension of the discussion in the tenth book to the whole question of the moral effect of poetry and art. For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument blows,Cf. 172 D. But it is very naive to suppose that the sequence of Plato’s argument is not carefully planned in his own mind. Cf. , p. 5. there lies our course. Well said, he replied. This then, Adeimantus, is the point we must keep in view, do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not? Or is this also a consequence of what we said before, that each one could practise well only one pursuit and not many, but if he attempted the latter, dabbling in many things, he would fail of distinction in all? Of course it is. And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one? No, he is not.

Still less, then, will he be able to combine the practice of any worthy pursuit with the imitation of many things and the quality of a mimic; since, unless I mistake, the same men cannot practise well at once even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin, as the writing of tragedy and comedyAt the close of the Socrates constrains Agathon and Aristophanes to admit that one who has the science (τέχνη) of writing tragedy will also be able to write comedy. There is for Plato no contradiction, since poetry is for him not a science or art, but an inspiration.? Did you not just now call these two imitations? I did, and you are right in saying that the same men are not able to succeed in both, nor yet to be at once good rhapsodistsThe rhapsode Ion is a Homeric specialist who cannot interpret other poets. Cf. 533 C. and actors. True. But neither can the same men be actors for tragedies and comediesCf. , vol. xiv. (1900), pp. 201 ff.—and all these are imitations, are they not? Yes, imitations. And to still smaller coinageCf. 846 E, Montaigne, Nostre suffisance est detaillée à menues pièces, Pope, , 60: One science only will one genius fit, So vast is art, so narrow human wit. than this, in my opinion, Adeimantus, proceeds the fractioning of human faculty, so as to be incapable of imitating many things or of doing the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses. Most true, he replied. If, then, we are to maintain our original principle, that our guardians, released from all other crafts, are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty,Cf. the fine passage in 817 B ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταί, [Pindar] apud Plut. 807 C δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης. and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if they imitate they should from childhood upCf. 386 A. imitate what is appropriate to themi.e., δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας —men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality.Cf. 606 B, 656 B, 669 B-C, and Burke, iv. 4, anticipating James, ii. pp. 449, 451, and anticipated by Shakespeare’s (. III. ii. 123) By my body’s action teach my mind A most inherent baseness. Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) natureCf. my paper on Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη, T.A.P.A. vol. xl. (1910) pp. 185 ff. in the body, the speech, and the thought? Yes, indeed, said he. We will not then allow our charges, whom we expect to prove good men, being men, to play the parts of women and imitate a woman young or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting, fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune and possessed by grief and lamentation—still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in labor. Most certainly not, he replied. Nor may they imitate slaves, female and male, doing the offices of slaves. No, not that either.

Nor yet, as it seems, bad men who are cowards and who do the opposite of the things we just now spoke of, reviling and lampooning one another, speaking foul words in their cups or when sober and in other ways sinning against themselves and others in word and deed after the fashion of such men. And I take it they must not form the habit of likening themselves to madmen either in words nor yet in deeds. For while knowledge they must haveCf. 816 D-E. both of mad and bad men and women, they must do and imitate nothing of this kind. Most true, he said. What of this? I said, —are they to imitate smiths and other craftsmen or the rowers of triremes and those who call the time to them or other things connected therewith? How could they, he said, since it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things? Well, then, neighing horsesFor this rejection of violent realism Cf. 669 C-D. Plato describes exactly what Verhaeren’s admirers approve: often in his rhythm can be heard the beat of hammers, the hard, edged, regular whizzing of wheels, the whirring of looms, the hissing of locomotives; often the wild, restless tumult of the streets, the humming and rumbling of dense masses of people. (Stefan Zweig). So another modern critic celebrates the cry of a baby in a Strauss symphony, the sneers and snarls of his critics in his , the contortions of the Dragon in Wagner’s . and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they imitate these? Nay, they have been forbidden, he said, to be mad or liken themselves to madmen. If, then, I understand your meaning, said I, there is a form of diction and narrative in which the really good and true man would narrate anything that he had to say, and another form unlike this to which the man of the opposite birth and breeding would cleave and which he would tell his story. What are these forms? he said. A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by sickness or love or drunkenness or any other mishap. But when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior,Chaucer drew from a misapplication of 29 B or Boethius the opposite moral: Who shall telle a tale after a man, He most reherse, as neighe as ever he can, Everich word, if it be in his charge, All speke he never so rudely and so large; Eke Plato sayeth, who so can him rede, The words most ben cosin to the dede. except in the few cases where he is doing something good, but will be embarrassed both because he is unpractised in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste from molding and fitting himself the types of baser things. His mind disdains them, unless it be for jest.Plato, like Howells and some other modern novelists, would have thought somewhat gross comedy less harmful than the tragedy or romance that insidiously instils false ideals. Naturally, he said. Then the narrative that he will employ will be the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that partakes of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say? Yes, indeed,The respondent plays on the double meaning of οὐδὲν λέγεις and replies, Yes indeed you do say something, namely the type and pattern, etc. he said, that is the type and pattern of such a speaker.

Then, said I, the other kind speaker, the more debased he is the less will he shrink from imitating anything and everything. He will think nothing unworthy of himself, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many,Cf. 487 B, 305 B, 323 B. to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned—claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and pan-pipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds; and so his style will depend wholly on imitation in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration. That too follows of necessity, he said. These, then, said I, were the two types of diction of which I was aking. There are those two, he replied. Now does not one of the two involve slight variations,Besides its suggestion of change and reaction the word is technical in music for the transition from one harmony to another. and if we assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction, is not the result that the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one cadence—for the changes are slight— and similarly in a rhythm of nearly the same kind? Quite so. But what of the other type? Does it not require the opposite, every kind of pitch and all rhythms, if it too is to have appropriate expression, since it involves manifold forms of variation? Emphatically so. And do all poets and speakers hit upon one type or the other of diction or some blend which they combine of both? They must, he said. What, then, said I, are we to do? Shall we admit all of these into the city, or one of the unmixed types, or the mixed type? If my vote prevails, he said, the unmixed imitator of the good. Nay, but the mixed type also is pleasing, Adeimantus, and far most pleasing to boys and their tutors and the great mob is the opposite of your choice. Most pleasing it is. But perhaps, said I, you would affirm it to be ill-suited to our polity, because there is no twofold or manifold manThe reverse of the Periclean ideal. Cf. Thucydides ii. 41. among us, since every man does one thing. It is not suited. And is this not the reason why such a city is the only one in which we shall find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiery, and so of all the rest? True, he said.The famous banishment of Homer, regarded as the prototype of the tragedian. Cf. 568 A-C, 595 B, 605 C, 607 D, 656 C, 817 B

If a man, then, it seems, who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himselfGreek idiom achieves an effect impossible to English here, by the shift from the co-ordination of ποιήματα with αὐτός to the treatmnt of it as the object of ἐπιδείξασθαι and the possible double use of the latter as middle with αὐτός and transitive with ποιήματα. Cf. for a less striking example 427 D, 250 B-C. the poems which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy and wondrous and delightful creature, but should say to him that there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls’ good, should continue to employ the more austereCf. from a different point of view Arnold’s . and less delightful poet and tale-teller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning,Cf. 379 A ff. when we set out to educate our soldiers. We certainly should do that if it rested with us. And now, my friend, said I, we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said. I think so too, he replied. After this, then, said I, comes the manner of song and tunes? Obviously. And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said? I am afraid that everybody does not include me, laughed GlauconHe laughs at his own mild joke, which Professor Wilamowitz ( ii. p. 192) does not understand. Cf. 859 E, 293 A ἢ οὐχ εἷς τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν; and in a recent novel, I am afraid everybody does not include me, she smiled.; I cannot sufficiently divine off-hand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion. You certainly, I presume, said I, have sufficient a understanding of this—that the songThe complete song includes words, rhythms, and harmony, that is, a pitch system of high and low notes. Harmony is also used technically of the peculiar Greek system of scales or modes. Cf. Monro, . is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm? Yes, said he, that much. And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed? True, he said. And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech.The poets at first composed their own music to fit the words. When, with the further development of music, there arose the practice of distorting the words, as in a mere libretto, it provoked a storm of protest from conservatives in aesthetics and morals. Of course. But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words. We do not. What, then, are the dirge-like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician. The mixed Lydian,The modes of Greek music are known to the English reader only from Milton’s allusions, his Lap me in soft Lydian airs and, . i. 549 f., his Anon they move in perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood Of flutes and soft recorders; such as rasied To highth of noblest temper heroes old. The adaptation of particualr modes, harmonies, or scales to the expression of particular feelings is something that we are obliged to accept on faith. Plato’s statements here were challenged by some later critics, but the majority believed that there was a connection between modes of music and modes of feeling, as Ruskin and many others have in our day. The hard-headed Epicureans and sceptics denied it, as well as the moral significance of music generally. he said, and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes. These, then, said I, we must do away with. For they are useless even to womenCf. 387 E. who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men. Assuredly. But again, drunkenness is a thing most unbefitting guardians, and so is softness and sloth. Yes. What, then, are the soft and convivial modes? There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax.

Will you make any use of them for warriors? None at all, he said; but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian. I don’t knowPlato, like a lawyer or popular essayist, affects ignorance of the technical details; or perhaps rather he wishes to disengage his main principle from the specialists’ controversy about particular modes of music and their names. the musical modes, I said, but leave us that modeἐκείνην may mean, but does not say, Dorian, which the (188 D) pronounces the only true Greek harmony. This long anacoluthic sentence sums up the whole matter with impressive repetition and explicit enumeration of all types of conduct in peace and war, and implied reference to Plato’s doctrine of the two fundamental temperaments, the swift and the slow, the energetic and the mild. Cf. , nn. 59, 70, 481. that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary,Cf. 814 E. either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to another who petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the forced and the voluntary—that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave—leave us these. Well, said he, you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of. Then, said I, we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies. Not in my opinion, said he. Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all other many stringed and poly-harmonicMetaphorically. The many-toned instrumentation of the flutes, as Pindar calls it, . vii. 12, can vie with the most complex and many-stringed lyre of musical innovation. instruments. Apparently not. Well, will you admit to the city flute-makers and flute-players? Or is not the flute the most many-stringed of instruments and do not the pan-harmonicsCf. 404 D, the only other occurrence of the word in Plato. themselves imitate it? Clearly, he said. You have left, said I, the lyre and the cither. These are usefulCf. my note on 47 C, in A.J.P. vol. x. p. 61. in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to pipe on.Ancient critics noted this sentence as an adaptation of sound to sense. Cf. Demetr. 185. The sigmas and iotas may be fancied to suggest the whistling notes of the syrinx. So Lucretius v. 1385 tibia quas fundit digitis pulsata canentum. Cf. on Catullus 61. 13 voce carmina tinnula. So our argument indicates, he said. We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments. No, by heaven! he said, I think not. And by the dog,The so-called Rhadamanthine oath to avoid taking the names of the gods in vain. Cf. 592 A, 21 E, Blaydes on Aristophanes 83. said I, we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was wanton.Cf. 372 E. Dummler, . p. 62, strangely affirms that this is an express retraction of the ἀληθινὴ πόλις. This is to misapprehend Plato’s method. He starts with the indispensable minimum of a simple society, develops it by Herbert Spencer’s multiplication of effects into an ordinary Greek city, then reforms it by a reform of education and finally transforms it into his ideal state by the rule of the philosopher kings. Cf. Introduction p. xiv. In that we show our good sense, he said. Come then, let us complete the purification.

For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms: we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements,Practically the feet. but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing them require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man’s speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes. Nay, in faith, he said, I cannot tell. For that there are some three formsAccording to the ancient musicians these are the equal as e.g. in dactyls (–⏑⏑), spondees (––) and anapests (⏑⏑–), where the foot divides into two equal quantities; the 3/2 ratio, as in the so-called cretic (⏑–⏑); the 2/1 as in the iamb (⏑–) and trochee (–⏑). Cf. Aristid. Quint. i. pp. 34-35. from which the feet are combined, just as there are fourPossibly the four notes of the tetrachord, but there is no agreement among experts. Cf. Monro, . in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say.Modern psychologists are still debating the question. Well, said I, on this point we will take counsel with Damon,The Platonic Socrates frequently refers to Damon as his musical expert. Cf. 200 B, 424 C, . 118 C. too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites; and I believe I have heard him obscurely speakingThere is a hint of satire in this disclaimer of expert knowledge. Cf. 399 A. There is no agreement among modern experts with regard to the precise form of the so-called enoplios. Cf. my review of Herkenrath’s Der Enoplios, . vol. iii. p. 360, Goodell, , pp. 185 and 189, Blaydes on Aristophanes 651. of a foot that he called the enoplios, a composite foot, and a dactyl and an heroicPossibly foot, possibly rhythm. δάκτυλον seems to mean the foot, while ἡρῷος is the measure based on dactyls but admitting spondees. foot, which he arranged, I know not how, to be equal up and downἄνω καὶ κάτω is an untranslatable gibe meaning literally and technically the upper and lower half of the foot, the arsis and thesis, but idiomatically meaning topsy-turvy. There is a similar play on the idiom in 43 A and 43 B. in the interchange of long and short,Literally becoming or issuing in long and short, long, that is, when a spondee is used, short when a dactyl. and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot that he called the trochaic, and he added the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two; I can’t say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon’s consideration. For to determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise? No, by heaven, I do not. But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad. Of course. And, further,Plato, as often, employs the forms of an argument proceeding by minute links to accumulate synonyms in illustration of a moral or aesthetic analogy. He is working up to the Wordsworthian thought that order, harmony, and beauty in nature and art are akin to these qualities in the soul. that good rhythm and bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto, and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these. They certainly must follow the speech, he said. And what of the manner of the diction, and the speech? said I. Do they not follow and conform to the disposition of the soul? Of course. And all the rest to the diction? Yes. Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm wait upon good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the character and the mind.Plato recurs to the etymological meaning of εὐήθεια. Cf. on 343 C. By all means, he said. And must not our youth pursue these everywhereThe Ruskinian and Wordsworthian generalization is extended from music to all the fine arts, including, by the way, architecture (οἰκοδομία), which Butcher (, p. 138) says is ignored by Plato and Aristotle. if they are to do what it is truly theirs to doTheir special task is to cultivate true εὐήθεια in their souls. For τὸ αὑτῶν πράττειν here Cf. 443 C-D.? They must indeed.

And there is surely much of these qualities in painting and in all similar craftsmanshipThe following page is Plato’s most eloquent statement of Wordsworth’s, Ruskin’s, and Tennyson’s gospel of beauty for the education of the young. He repeats it in 668 B. Cf. my paper on , , vol. ii. (1907-1908) pp. 215 ff.—weaving is full of them and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper but the opposites are the symbols and the kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition. Entirely so, he said. Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden to practise their art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls. But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason. Yes, he said, that would be far the best education for them. And is it not for this reason, Glaucon, said I, that education in music is most sovereign,Schopenhauer, following Plato, adds the further metaphysical reason that while the other arts imitate the external manifestations of the universal Will, music represents the Will itself. because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary?

And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distasteCf. 362 B, 366 C, 388 A, 391 E, and Ruskin’s paradox that taste is the only morality. rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason cameCf. 653 B-C, where Plato defines education by this principle. Aristotle virtually accepts it ( ii. 3. 2). The Stoics somewhat pedantically laid it down that reason entered into the youth at the age of fourteen. the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her. I certainly think, he said, that such is the cause of education in music. It is, then, said I, as it was when we learned our letters and felt that we knew them sufficiently only when the separate letters did not elude us, appearing as few elements in all the combinations that convey them, and when we did not disregard them in small things or greatPlato often employs letters or elements (στοιχεῖα) to illustrate the acquisition of knowledge ( 206 A), the relation of elements to compounds, the principles of classification ( 18 C, 393 D), and the theory of ideas ( 278 A. Cf. Isocrates xiii. 13, Xenophon iv. 4. 7, Blass, , ii. pp. 23 f., 348 f., Cicero . ii. 130). and think it unnecessary to recognize them, but were eager to distinguish them everywhere, in the belief that we should never be literate and letter-perfect till we could do this. True. And is it not also true that if there are any likenessesIt is of course possible to contrast images with the things themselves, and to speak of forms or species without explicit allusion to the metaphysical doctrine of ideas. But on the other hand there is not the slightest reason to assume that the doctrine and its terminology were not familiar to Plato at the time when this part of the was written. Cf. , pp. 31 ff., 35. Statistics of the use of εἶδος and ἰδέα (Peiper’s , Taylor, , Wilamowitz, , ii. pp. 249-253), whatever their philological interest, contribute nothing to the interpretation of Plato’s thought. Cf. my , pp. 1, 30, and . vol. vi. pp. 363-364. There is for common sense no contradiction or problem in the fact that Plato here says that we cannot be true musicians till we recognize both the forms and all copies of, or approximations to, them in art or nature, while in Book X (601) he argues that the poet and artist copy not the idea but its copy in the material world. of letters reflected in water or mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, but such knowledge belongs to the same art and disciplinePlato, like all intellectuals, habitually assumes that knowledge of principles helps practice. Cf. 259 E, 262 B, and 484 D, 520 C, 540 A.? By all means. Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true musicians, either— neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality,Liberality and high-mindedness, or rather, perhaps, magnificence, are among the virtues defined in Aristotle’s list (. 1107 b 17), but are not among the four cardinal virtues which the will use in Book IV. in the comparison of the indivdual with the state. and high-mindedness and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline? The conclusion is inevitable, he said. Then, said I, when there is a coincidence 209 B τὸ συναμφότερον, 210 C, Wilamowitz, vol. ii. p. 192. of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form—is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplationMusic and beauty lead to the philosophy of love, more fully set forth in the and , and here dismissed in a page. Plato’s practical conclusion here may be summed up in the Virgilian line ( v. 344): Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus.? Far the fairest. And surely the fairest is the most lovable. Of course. The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort; but if there were disharmony he would not love this. No, he said, not if there was a defect in the soul; but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love. I understand, I said, that you have or have had favorites of this sort and I grant your distinction. But tell me this—can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasureExtravagant pleasure is akin to madness. Cf. 47 A-C, 83 C-D.? How could there be, he said, since such pleasure puts a man beside himself no less than pain? Or between it and virtue generally?

By no means. But is there between pleasure and insolence and licence? Most assuredly. Do you know of greater or keener pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite? I don’t, he said, nor yet of any more insane. But is not the right love a sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful? It is indeed, said he. Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to licence, must be allowed to come nigh the right love? No. Then this kind of pleasure may not come nigh, nor may lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved have anything to do with it? No, by heaven, Socrates, he said, it must not come nigh them. Thus, then, as it seems, you will lay down the law in the city that we are founding, that the lover may kissCf. 468 B-C. and pass the time with and touch the beloved as a father would a son, for honorable ends, if he persuade him. But otherwise he must so associate with the objects of his care that there should never be any suspicion of anything further, on penalty of being stigmatized for want of taste and true musical culture. Even so, he said. Do you not agree, then, that our discourse on music has come to an end? It has certainly made a fitting end, for surely the end and consummation of culture be love of the beautiful. I concur, he said. After music our youth are to be educated by gymnastics? Certainly. In this too they must be carefully trained from boyhood through life, and the way of it is this, I believe; but consider it yourself too. For I, for my part, do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible.The dependence of body on soul, whether in a mystical, a moral, or a medical sense, is a favorite doctrine of Plato and the Platonists. Cf. 156-157, Spenser, : For of the soul the body form doth take, For soul is form, and doth the body make, and Shelley, : A lady, the wonder of her kind, Whose form was upborne by a lovely mind, Which dilating had moulded her mien and her motion Like a sea-flower unfolded beneath the ocean. Cf. also Democr. fr. B. 187 Diels. What is your opinion? I think so too. Then if we should sufficiently train the mind and turn over to it the minutiae of the care of the body, and content ourselves with merely indicating the norms or patterns, not to make a long story of it, we should acting rightly? By all means. From intoxicationCf. 398 E. There is no contradiction between this and the half-serious proposal of the to use supervised drinking-bouts as a safe test of character ( 641). we said that they must abstain. For a guardian is surely the last person in the world to whom it is allowable to get drunk and not know where on earth he is. Yes, he said, it would absurd that a guardianγε emphasizes what follows from the very meaning of the word. Cf. 379 B, 389 B, 435 A. should need a guard. What next about their food? These men are athletes in the greatest of contests,Cf. 543 B, 621 D, 182 A, 830 A, Demosthenes xxv. 97 ἀθληταὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων. are they not? Yes.

Is, then, the bodily habit of the athletes we see about us suitable for such? Perhaps. Nay, said I, that is a drowsy habit and precarious for health. Don’t you observe that they sleep away their lives,Cf. Ἐράσται 132 C καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον. Xenophanes, Euripides, Aristotle, and the medical writers, like Plato, protest against the exaggerated honor paid to athletes and the heavy sluggishness induced by overfeeeding and overtraining. and that if they depart ever so little from their prescribed regimen these athletes are liable to great and violent diseases? I do. Then, said I, we need some more ingenious form of training for our athletes of war, since these must be as it were sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changes 797 D. Cf. 380 E. Aristotle’s comment on μεταβολή, . 1154 b 28 ff., is curiously reminiscent of Plato, including the phrase ἁπλῆ οὐδ’ ἐπιεικής. in their drinking water, their food, and in exposure to the heat of the sun and to storms,Perhaps in the context cold. without disturbance of their health. I think so. Would not, then, the best gymnastics be akin to the music that we were just now describing? What do you mean? It would be a simple and flexibleLiterally equitable, if we translate ἐπιεικής by its later meaning, that is, not over-precise or rigid in conformity to rule. Adam is mistaken in saying that ἐπιεικής is practically synonymous with ἀγαθή. It sometimes is, but not here. Cf. Plutarch, . 13 ἀκριβὴς . . . καὶ δι’ ὄνυχος. gymnastic, and especially so in the training for war. In what way? One could learn that, said I, even from Homer.So 706 D. The καί is perhaps merely idiomatic in quotation. For you are aware that in the banqueting of the heroes on campaign he does not feast them on fish,Homer’s ignoring of fish diet, except in stress of starvation, has been much and idly discussed both in antiquity and by modern scholars. Modern pseudo-science has even inferred from this passage that Plato placed a taboo on fish, though they are at the sea-side on the Hellespont, which Homer calls fish-teeming, ix. 360. nor on boiled meat, but only on roast, which is what soldiers could most easily procure. For everywhere, one may say, it is of easier provision to use the bare fire than to convey pots and pansCf. Green, , Book II. chap. ii., an old description of the Scotch army: They have therefore no occasion for pots and pans, for they dress the flesh of the cattle in their skins after they have flayed them, etc. But cf. Athenaeus, i. 8-9 (vol. i. p. 36 L.C.L.), Diogenes Laertius viii. 13 ὥστε εὐπορίστους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰς τροφάς. along. Indeed it is. Neither, as I believe, does Homer ever make mention of sweet meats. Is not that something which all men in training understand—that if one is to keep his body in good condition he must abstain from such things altogether? They are right, he said, in that they know it and do abstain. Then, my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not approve of a Syracusan tableProverbial, like the Corinthian maid and the Attic pastry. Cf. Otto, . p. 321, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s , p. 302. Cf. also 240 B. and Sicilian variety of made dishes. I think not. You would frown, then, on a little Corinthian maid as the chère amie of men who were to keep themselves fit? Most certainly. And also on the seeming delights of Attic pastry? Inevitably. In general, I take it, if we likened that kind of food and regimen to music and song expressed in the pan-harmonic mode and in every variety of rhythm it would be a fair comparison. Quite so. And here variety engendered licentiousness, did it not, but here disease? While simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies. Most true, he said.

And when licentiousness and disease multiply in a city, are not many courts of law and dispensaries opened, and the arts of chicaneδικανική: more contemptuous than δικαστική. and medicine give themselves airs when even free men in great numbers take them very seriously? How can they help it? he said. Will you be able to find a surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men? Do you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourselfI have given the sense. The contruction is debated accordingly as we read ἀπορία or ἀπορίᾳ. Cf. 239 D, of the use of cosmetics, χήτει οἰκείων. The καί with ἀπορίᾳ is awkward or expresses the carelessness of conversation.? The most shameful thing in the world. Is it? said I, or is this still more shamefulPlato likes to emphasize by pointing to a lower depth or a higher height beyond the superlative.—when a man only wears out the better part of his days in the courts of law as defendant or accuser, but from the lack of all true sense of valuesThere is no exact English equivalent for ἀπειροκαλία, the insensitiveness to the καλόν of the banausic, the nouveau riche and the Philistine. is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to put over an unjust act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice,The phrasing of this passage recalls passages of Aristophanes’ , and the description of the pettifogging lawyer and politician in the 172 E. Cf. 519, also 302 B, and Porphyry, , i. 34. The metaphors are partly from wrestling. every evasion, and wriggleCf. Blaydes on Aristophanes 263. out of every hold in defeating justice, and that too for trifles and worthless things, because he does not know how much nobler and better it is to arrange his life so as to have no needCf. 507 D, Thucydides iii. 82, Isocrates 238, Antiphanes, fr. 288 Kock ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικῶν οὐδενὸς δεῖται νόμου. of a nodding juryman? That is, said he, still more shameful than the other. And to require medicine, said I, not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies, but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we described, to fill one’s body up with winds and humors like a marsh and compel the ingenious sons of Aesculapius to invent for diseases such names as fluxes and flatulences—don’t you think that disgraceful?Plato ridicules the unsavory metaphors required to describe the effects of auto-intoxication. There is a similar bit of somewhat heavier satire in Spencer’s , 1868, p. 32: Carbuncled noses, cadaverous faces, foetid breaths, and plethoric bodies meet us at every turn; and our condolences are prepetually asked for headaches, flatulences, nightmare, heartburn, and endless other dyspeptic symptoms. Those surely are, he said, new-fangled and monstrous strange names of diseases. There was nothing of the kind, I fancy, said I, in the days of Aesculapius. I infer this from the fact that at Troy his sons did not find fault with the damsel who gave to the wounded EurypylusPlato is probably quoting from memory. In our text, xi. 624, Hecamede gives the draught to Machaon and Nestor as the (538 B) correctly states. to drink a posset of Pramnian wine plentifully sprinkled with barley and gratings of cheese, inflammatory ingredients of a surety, nor did they censure Patroclus, who was in charge of the case.

It was indeed, said he, a strange potion for a man in that condition. Not strange, said I, if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern coddlingThis coddling treatment of disease, which Plato affects to reprobate here, he recommends from the point of view of science in the (89 C): διὸ παιδαγωγεῖν δεῖ διαίταις, etc. Cf. Euripides 883; and even in the 459 C. medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But HerodicusCf. 316 E, 227 D. To be distinguished from his namesake, the brother of Gorgias in 448 B. Cf. Cope on Aristotle . i. 5, Wilamowitz-Kiessling, . xv. p. 220, Juthner, , p. 10. was a trainer and became a valetudinarian, and blended gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors. How so? he said. By lingering out his death, said I; for living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit from his fixed regimen, and struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age.Cf. Macaulay on Mitford’s : It (oligarchical government) has a sort of valetudinarian longevity; it lives in the balance of Sanctorius; it takes no exercise; it exposes itself to no accident; it is seized with a hypochondriac alarm at every new sensation; it trembles at every breath; it lets blood for every inflammation; and this, without ever enjoying a day of health or pleasure, drags out its existence to a doting and debilitated old age. That Macaulay here is consciously paraphrasing Plato is apparent from his unfair use of the Platonic passage in his essay on Bacon. Cf. further Euripides . 1109-1113; Seneca on early medicine, xv. 3 (95) 14 ff., overdoes both Spencer and Macaulay. Cf. Rousseau, , Book I.: Je ne sais point apprendre à vivre à qui ne songe qu’à s’empêcher de mourir; La Rochefoucauld (. 282): C’est une ennuyeuse maladie que de conserver sa santé par un trop grand régime. A noble prizeThe pun γήρας and γέρας is hardly translatable. Cf. Pherecydes apud Diogenes Laertius i. 119 χθονίῃ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζὰς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ (vol. i. p. 124 L.C.L.). For the ironical use of καλόν cf. Euripides 551, Sappho, fr. 53 (58). indeed for his science, he said. The appropriate one, said I, for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sickCf. Plutarch, 23, Sophocles, fr. 88. 11 (?), Lucian, 22, differently; Hotspur’s, Zounds! how has he the leisure to be sick? and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don’t see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate. How so? he said. A carpenter, said I, when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purgingFor ἢ κάτω cf. Chaucer, Ne upward purgative ne downward laxative. or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathingsCf. Blaydes on Aristophanes 439. about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick and that such a life of preoccupation with his illess and neglect of the work that lies before him isn’t worth living. And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician, enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.This alone marks the humor of the whole passage, which Macaulay’s seems to miss. Cf. Aristophanes 757; 41 D. For such a man, he said, that appears to be the right use of medicine.

And is not the reason, I said, that he had a task and that life wasn’t worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work? Obviously, he said. But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable. I haven’t heard of any. Why, haven’t you heard that saying of Phocylides,The line of Phocylides is toyed with merely to vary the expression of the thought. Bergk restores it δίζησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ’ ὅταν ᾖ βίος ἤδη, which is Horace’s ( i. 1. 53 f.): Quaerenda pecunia primum est; Virtus post nummos! that after a man has made his pile he ought to practice virtue? Before, too, I fancy, he said. Let us not quarrel with him on that point, I said, but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practise, and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides’ exhortation. Yes, indeed, he said, this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnasticsIn the (464 B) ἰατρική is recognized as co-ordinate in the care of the body with γυμναστική. Here, whatever goes beyond the training and care that will preserve the health of a normal body is austerely rejected. Cf. 410 B. is the greatest of all obstacles. For it is troublesome in household affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city. And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of instruction, thinking, or private meditation, forever imagining headachesAs Macaulay, puts it: That a valetudinarian . . . who enjoyed a hearty laugh over the Queen of Navarre’s tales should be treated as a caput lupinum because he could not read the without a headache, was a notion which the humane spirit of the English schools of wisdom altogether rejected. For the thought cf. Xenophon iii. 12. 6-7. and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practicedLiterally virtue is practiced in this way. Cf. 503 D for a similar contrast between mental and other labors. And for the meaning of virtue cf. the Elizabethan: Virtue is ever sowing of her seeds. and tested it is in every way a hindrance.There is a suggestion of Stoic terminology in Plato’s use of ἐμπόδιος and similar words. Cf. Xenophon i. 2. 4. On the whole passage cf. again Macaulay’s , Maximus of Tyre (Duebn.) 10, and the diatribe on modern medicine and valetudinarianism in Edward Carpenter’s . For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body. Naturally, he said. Then, shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring? But if a man was incapable of living in the established roundCf. Thucydides i. 130. and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state. A most politic Asclepius you’re telling us of,There is a touch of comedy in the Greek. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 94 Kock ταχὺν λέγεις μέν. he said.

Obviously, said I, that was his character. And his sons too, don’t you in see that at Troy they approved themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as I described it? Don’t you rememberCf. the Homeric ἦ οὐ μέμνῃ; that in the case of Menelaus too from the wound that Pandarus inflicted They sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled? Hom. Il. 4.218 Plato is quoting loosely or adapting Hom. Il. 4.218. αἷμ’ ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ’ ἄρ’ ἤπια φάρμακα εἰδὼς πάσσε is said of Machaon, not of Menelaus. But what he was to eat or drink thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylus, taking it for granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds were healthy and temperate in diet even if they did happen for the nonce to drink a posset; but they thought that the life of a man constitutionally sickly and intemperate was of no use to himself or others, and that the art of medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even if they were richer than Midas.Proverbial and suggests Tyrtaeus. Cf. 660 E. Very ingenious fellows, he said, you make out these sons of Asclepius to be. ’Tis fitting, said I; and yet in disregard of our principles the tragedians and PindarCf. Aeschylus 1022 ff., Euripides 3-4, Pindar, . iii. 53. affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of Apollo, was bribed by gold to heal a man already at the point of death, and that for this cause he was struck by the lightning. But we in accordance with the aforesaid principlesCf. 379 ff., also 365 E. refuse to believe both statements, but if he was the son of a god he was not avaricious, we will insist, and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god. That much, said he, is most certainly true. But what have you to say to this, Socrates, must we not have good physicians in our city? And they would be the most likely to be good who had treated the greatest number of healthy and diseased men, and so good judges would be those who had associated with all sorts and conditions of men. Most assuredly I want them good, I said; but do you know whom I regard as such? I’ll know if you tell,Slight colloquial jest. Cf. Aristophanes . 1158, 1061. he said. Well, I will try, said I. You, however, have put unlike cases in one question. How so? said he. Physicians, it is true, I said, would prove most skilled if, from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies, and if they themselves had suffered all diseases and were not of very healthy constitution. For you see they do not treat the body by the body.Cf. 465 C-D. If they did, it would not be allowable for their bodies to be or to have been in evil condition. But they treat the body with the mind—and it is not competent for a mind that is or has been evil to treat anything well. Right, he said.

But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simple-minded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked, since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad. That is indeed their experience, he said. Therefore it is, said I, that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learnerὀψιμαθῆ: here in a favorable sense, but usually an untranslatable Greek word for a type portrayed in a charater of Theophrastus. of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own. That at any rate, he said, appears to be the noblest kind of judge. And what is more, a good one, I said, which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil,For this type of character cf. Thucydides iii. 83, and my comments in T.A.P.A. vol. xxiv. p. 79. Cf. Burke, : They who raise suspicions on the good on account of the behavior of ill men, are of the party of the latter; Stobaeus ii. p. 46 Βίας ἔφη, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ εὐαπάτητοι, Menander, fr. 845 Kock χρηστοῦ παρ’ ἀνδρὸς μηδὲν ὑπονόει κακόν. and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself. But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders, then on the contrary he appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish. That is quite true, he said. Well then, said I, such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education will at last acquire the science both of itself and badness.Cf. George Eliot, , chap. xiv.: It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn this comprehension by a good deal of hard experience. This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man.Cf. 176 D It is far best not to concede to the unjust that they are clever knaves, for they glory in the taunt. Cf. , n. 21. And I concur, he said.

Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurableOnly the incurable suffer a purely exemplary and deterrent punishment in this world or the next. Cf. 615 E, 325 A, 525 C, 113 E. in soul they will themselvesultro, as opposed to ἐάσουσιν. put to death. This certainly, he said, has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state. And so your youths, said I, employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room. Yes, he said. And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensableCf. 405 C. Plato always allows for the limitation of the ideal by necessity.? I think so. And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his natureThe welfare of the soul is always the prime object for Plato. (Cf. 591 C) But he cannot always delay to correct ordinary speech in this sense. The correction of 376 E here is of course not a change of opinion, and it is no more a criticism of Isocrates, 180-185, than it is of Gorgias 464 B, or . 228 E, or 521 E. to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treatμεταχειρίζονται: this reading of Galen is more idiomatic than the MS. μεταχειριεῖται. Where English says he is not covetous of honor as other men are, Greek says he (is) not as other men are covetous of honor. diet and exercise only as a means to muscle. Nothing could be truer, he said. Then may we not say, Glaucon, said I, that those who establishedPlato half seriously attributes his own purposes to the founders. Cf. 405-406 on medicine and 16 C on dialectics. an education in music and gymnastics had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other? But what? he said. It seems likely, I said, that they ordained both chiefly for the soul’s sake. How so? Have you not observed, said I, the effect on the disposition of the mind itselfFor the thought cf. Euripides . 882 f. and Polybius’s account of the effect of the neglect of music on the Arcadians (iv. 20). of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit? In what respect do you mean? he said. In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness? I have observed, he said, that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them. And surely, said I, this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh. I think so, he said. And again, is not the gentleness a quality which the philosophic nature would yield? This if relaxed too far would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly? That is so. But our requirement, we say,Cf. 375 C. With Plato’s doctrine of the two temperaments cf. the distinction of quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham’s . Ascham is thinking of Plato, for he says: Galen saith much music marreth men’s manners; and Plato hath a notable place of the same thing in his book ., well marked also and excellently translated by Tully himself. is that the guardians should possess both natures. It is. And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another? Of course.

And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave? Certainly. And that of the ill adjusted is cowardiy and rude? It surely is. Now when a man abandons himself to music to playCf. 561 C. upon him and pourDemetrius, . 51, quotes this and the following sentence as an example of the more vivid expression following the less vivid. For the image cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes . 18, Aeschylus . 451, Shakespeare, III. ii. 59 Love’s counsellor should fill the bores of hearing. into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just nowCf. 398 D-E, where the θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι are rejected altogether, while here they are used to illustrate the softening effect of music on a hard temperament. It is misspent ingenuity to harp on such contradictions. speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like ironFor images drawn from the tempering of metals cf. Aeschylus 612 and Jebb on Sophocles 650. and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continuesCf. 165 E ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς, and Blaydes on Aristophanes 1121. the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefiesCf. Tennyson’s Molten down in mere uxoriousness (). till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a feeble warrior.A familiar Homeric reminiscence ( xvii. 588) quoted also in 174 C. Cf. Froissart’s un mol chevalier. Assuredly, he said. And if, said I, he has to begin with a spiritlessEtymologically ἄθυμος = deficient in θυμός. nature he reaches this result quickly, but if high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable, quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented. Precisely so. On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and become more brave and bold than he was? He does indeed. But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened? That is so, he said. And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologistA hater of rational discussion, as explained in 188 C, and the beautiful passage in the 89 D ff. Cf. Minucius Felix, 14. 6 Igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum laboremus. John Morley describes obscurantists as sombre hierophants of misology. and stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness. That is entirely true, he said.

For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each. Yes, so it appears, he said. Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another.For virtue as music Cf. 61 A, 188 D, and Iago’s There is a daily music in his life. The perfect musician is the professor of the royal art of 306-308 ff. which harmonizes the two temperaments, not merely by education, but by elminating extremes through judicious marriages. That seems likely, Socrates, he said. And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseerThis epistates is not the director of education of 765 D ff., though of course he or it will control education. It is rather an anticipation of the philosophic rulers, as appears from 497 C-D, and corresponds to the nocturnal council of 950 B ff. Cf. , p. 86, note 650. of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved? We most certainly shall. Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For whyγάρ explains τύποι, or outlines. Both in the and the Plato frequently states that many details must be left to subsequent legislation. Cf. 379 A, 400 B-C, 403 D-E, 425 A-E, 770 B, 772 A-B, 785 A, 788 A-B, 807 E, 828 B, 846 C, 855 D, 876 D-E, 957 A, 968 C. should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them. There is, it may be, no difficulty, he said. Very well, said I; what, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among themαὐτῶν τούτων marks a class within a class. Cf. . vol. vii. (1912) p. 485. 535 A refers back to this passage. shall be the rulers and the ruled? Certainly. That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious. It is. And that the rulers must be their best? This too. And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers? Yes. And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state? Yes. They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable, and furthermore carefulThe argument proceeds by minute links. Cf. on 338 D. of the interests of the state? That is so. But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved. Necessarily. And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered, he too would prosper and if not, the contrary. So it is, he said. Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite. That would be a suitable choice, he said. I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expelCf. 46 B, Xenophon iii. 12. 7. from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state. What do you mean by the expelling? he said.

I will tell you, said I; it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief. The voluntary, he said, I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary. How now, said I, don’t you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don’t you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth? Why, yes, said he, you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.Cf. on 382 A and . 228 C, Marcus Aurelius vii. 63. And doesn’t this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force? I don’t understand now either, he said. I must be talking in high tragic style,The preceding metaphors are in the high-flown, obscure style of tragedy. Cf. Thompson on 76 E, 418 D, Aristophanes , passim, Wilamowitz, , ii. p. 146. I said; by those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not? Yes. Well, then, by those who are constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compelsCf. Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος, who went over from the Stoics to the Cyrenaics because of the pain in his eyes, Diogenes Laertius vii. 166. to change their minds. That too I understand and you are right. And the victims of sorceryCf. 584 A γοητεία. I am sure you too would say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by some fear. Yes, he said: everything that deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind. Well then, as I was just saying, we must look for those who are the best guardians of the indwelling conviction that what they have to do is what they at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose them tasks in which one would be most likely to forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure and who cannot be beguiled we must accept and the other kind we must cross off from our list. Is not that so? Yes. And again we must subject them to toils and pains and competitions in which we have to watch for the same traits. Right, he said. Then, said I, must we not institute a third kind of competitive test with regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state.

And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian, and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honors of burial-rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such, said I, appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail. I too, he said, think much the same. Then would it not truly be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling guardians just now, helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers? I think so, he replied. How, then, said I, might we contriveThe concept μηχανή or ingenious device employed by a superior intelligence to circumvent necessity or play providence with the vulgar holds a prominent place in Plato’s physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers one of the dangerous features of his political and educational philosophy. Cf. 415 C, 664 A, 752 C, 769 E, 798 B, 640 B. one of those opportune falsehoodsCf. 389 B. of which we were just now389 B f. speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city? What kind of a fiction do you mean? said he. Nothing unprecedented, said I, but a sort of Phoenician tale,As was the Cadmus legend of the men who sprang from the dragon’s teeth, which the Greeks believed οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, 663 E. Pater, who translates the passage (, p. 223), fancifully suggests that it is a miners’ story. Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes. The proverb ψεῦσμα Φοινικικόν (Strabo 259 B) probably goes back to the Phoenician tales of the . something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our dayPlato never attempts a Voltairian polemic against the general faith in the supernatural, which he is willing to utilize for ethical ends, but he never himself affirms le surnaturel particulier. and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable. You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought, he said. You will think that I have right good reasonκαὶ μάλ’ here as often adds a touch of humorous colloquial emphasis, which our conception of the dignity of Plato does not allow a translator to reproduce. for shrinking when I have told, I said. Say on, said he, and don’t be afraid. Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good soothPerhaps that so it is that would be better. ὡς ἄρα as often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato’s fancy of men reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton’s Utopia, , as his use of the ring of Gyges (359 D-360 B) is of H. G. Wells’ . all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their motherThe symbolism expresses the Athenian boast of autochthony and Plato’s patriotic application of it, 237 E-238 A. Cf. Burgess, , vol. iii. pp. 153-154; 24 C-D, Aeschylus 17, Lucretius ii. 641 f., and Swineburne, : All races but one are as aliens engrafted or sown,Strange children and changelings, but we, O our mother, thine own. delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same earth. It is not for nothing,οὐκ ἐτός is comic. Cf. 568 A, and Blaydes on Aristophanes 411. he said, that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie.

It was quite natural that I should be, I said; but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation,Cf. 468 E, 547 A, and already 394 D, 398 A. Hesiod’s four metals, 109-201, symbolize four succcessive ages. Plato’s myth cannot of course be interpreted literally or made to express the whole of his apparently undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Huxley in his essay on Administrative Nihilism says: The lapse of more than 2000 years has not weakened the force of these wise words. for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds,The four classes are not castes, but are species which will generally breed true. Cf. 393 B, 394 A. it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing elseThe phrasing of this injunction recalls Shakespeare’s , in fine: I’ll fear no other thing So sore as keeping safe Nerissa’s ring. The securing of disinterested capacity in the rulers is the pons asinorum of political theory. Plato constructs his whole state for this end. Cf. Introduction p. xv. Aristotle, 1262 b 27, raises the obvious objection that the transference from class to class will not be an easy matter. But Plato here and in 423 D-E is merely stating emphatically the postulates of an ideal state. He admits that even if established it will some time break down, and that the causes of its failure will lie beyond human ken, and can only be expressed in symbol. See on 546-547. are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them outThe summary in 19 A varies somewhat from this. Plato does not stress the details. Cf. Introduction p. viii. among the artisans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honor such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oraclePlato’s oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men’s answer to Psammetik (Herodotus ii. 152), and admits of both a moral and a literal physical interpretation, like the lame reign against which Sparta was warned. Cf. Xenophon iii. 3. 3. that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale? No, not these themselves, he said, but I do, their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after.Plato repeats the thought that since the mass of men can be brought to believe anything by repetition, myths framed for edification are a useful instrument of education and government. Cf. 663 E-664 A. Well, said I, even that would have a good effect making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. XXII. And this shall fall out as traditionφήμη, not any particular oracular utterance, but popular belief from mouth to mouth. guides. But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment,The Platonic guardians, like the ruling class at Sparta, will live the life of a camp. Cf. 666 E, Isocrates . a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they have encamped and sacrificed to the proper godsPartly from caution, partly from genuine religious feeling, Plato leaves all the details of the cult to Delphi. Cf. 427 B. they must make their lairs, must they not? Yes, he said. And these must be of a character keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer? Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses. Yes, said I, the houses of soldiersFor the limiting γε cf. 430 E. not of money-makers.

What distinction do you intend by that? he said. I will try to tell you, I said. It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolvesAristotle’s objection ( 1264 a 24) that the Platonic state will break up into two hostile camps, is plagiarized in expression from Plato’s similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 E) and assumes that the enforced disinterestedness, the higher education, and other precautions of the Platonic Republic will not suffice to conjure away the danger to which Plato first calls attention. instead of dogs. A terrible thing, indeed, he said. Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters? We must, he said. And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one? But it surely has, he said. That, said I, dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm,This is not so much a reservation in reference to the higher education as a characteristic refusal of Plato to dogmatize. Cf. 86 B and my paper A.J.P. vol. ix. pp. 7-8. but what we were just now saying we may, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle to one another and to their charges. That is right, he said. In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens. He will rightly affirm that. Consider then, said I, whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private propertyPlato’s communism is primarily a device to secure disinterestedness in the ruling class, though he sometimes treats it as a counsel of perfection for all men and states. Cf. Introduction p. xv note a. save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of warCf. 403 E. sober and brave, they must receive as an agreedCf. 551 B, 91 B, Thucydides i. 108, G.M.T. 837. stipendThey are worthy of their hire. Cf. on 347 A. It is a strange misapprehension to speak of Plato as careless of the welfare of the masses. His aristocracy is one of social service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and power. from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack.This is precisely Aristophanes’ distinction between beggary and honorable poverty, 552-553. And resorting to a common messAs at Sparta. Cf. 458 C, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s , p. 334. like soldiers on campaign they will live together.

Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roofAs if the accursed and tainted metal were a polluted murderer or temple-robber. Cf. my note on Horace, iii. 2. 27 sub isdem trabibus, Antiphon v. 11. with them, nor to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city.Cf. 621 B-C, and 692 A. But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be house-holders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed from the helpers of their fellow citizens to their enemies and masters,δεσπόται. Cf. 238 E. and so in hating and being hated,Cf. 697 D in a passage of similar import, μισοῦντες μισοῦνται. plotting and being plotted against they will pass their days fearing far more and rathermore and rather: so 396 D, 551 B. the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the courseThe image is that of a ship nearing the fatal reef. Cf. Aeschylus, 562. The sentiment and the heightened rhetorical tone of the whole passage recalls the last page of the , with Ruskin’s translation and comment in . of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons, said I, let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not? By all means, said Glaucon.

And Adeimantus broke in and said, What will be your defence, Socrates, if anyone objects that you are not making these men very happy,Adeimantus’s criticism is made from the point of view of a Thrasymachus (343 A, 345 B) or a Callicles ( 492 B-C or of Solon’s critics (cf. my note on Solon’s Trochaics to Phokos, . vol. vi. pp. 216 ff.). The captious objection is repeated by Aristotle, 1264 b 15 ff., though he later (1325 a 9-10) himself uses Plato’s answer to it, and by moderns, as Herbert Spencer, Grote, Newman to some extent (Introduction to Aristotle’s , p. 69.), and Zeller (, ii. p. 224) who has the audacity to say that Plato demanded the abolition of all private possession and the suppression of all individual interests because it is only in the Idea or Universal that he acknowledges any title to true reality. Leslie Stephen does not diverge so far from Plato when he says (, p. 397): The virtuous men may be the very salt of the earth, and yet the discharge of a function socially necessary may involve their own misery. By the happiness of the whole Plato obviously maens not an abstraction but the concrete whole of which Leslie Stephen is thinking. But from a higher point of view Plato eloquently argues (465 B-C) that duty fulfilled will yield truer happiness to the guardians than seeking their own advantage in the lower sense of the word. and that through their own fault? For the city really belongs to them and yet they get no enjoyment out of it as ordinary men do by owning lands and building fine big houses and providing them with suitable furniture and winning the favor of the gods by private sacrificesCf. 362 C, and 909 D ff. where they are forbidden. and entertaining guests and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of, gold and silver and all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy?

But they seem, one might say, to be established in idleness in the city, exactly like hired mercenaries, with nothing to do but keep guard. Yes, said I, and what is more, they serve for board-wages and do not even receive pay in addition to their food as others do,Other men, ordinary men. Cf. 543 B ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, which disposes of other interpretations and misunderstandings. so that they will not even be able to take a journeyThis is, for other reasons, one of the deprivations of a tyrant (579 B). The strictly limits travel (949 E). Here Plato is speaking from the point of view of the ordinary citizen. on their own account, if they wish to, or make presents to their mistresses, or spend money in other directions according to their desires like the men who are thought to be happy. These and many similar counts of the indictment you are omitting. Well, said he, assume these counts too.The Platonic Socrates always states the adverse case strongly (Introduction p. xi), and observes the rule: Would you adopt a strong logical attitudeAlways allow your opponent full latitude. What then will be our apology you ask? Yes. By following the same path I think we shall find what to reply. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of any one class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. For we thoughtCf. 369 A. that in a state so constituted we should be most likely to discover justice as we should injustice in the worst governed state, and that when we had made these out we could pass judgement on the issue of our long inquiry. Our first task then, we take it, is to mold the model of a happy state—we are not isolatingἀπολαβόντες, separating off, abstracting, may be used absolutely as in 495 E, or with any object as 392 E. a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole. But the opposite type of state we will consider presently.That is 449 A and books VIII. and IX. The degenerate types of state are four, but the extreme opposite of the good state, the tyranny, is one. It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes,So 290 B. which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black— we should think it a reasonable justification to reply, Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts. But observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful.For this principle of aesthetics Cf. 264 C, Aristotle 1450 b 1-2. And so in the present case you must not require us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians. For in like manner we couldWe know how to. For the satire of the Socialist millenium which follows cf. Introduction p. xxix, and Ruskin, . Plato may have been thinking of the scene on the shield of Achilles, xviii. 541-560. clothe the farmers in robes of state and deck them with gold and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to righti.e. so that the guest on the right hand occupied a lower place and the wine circulated in the same direction. Many write ἐπὶ δεξιά, but A ἐπιδέξια. Forever, ’tis a single word. Our rude forefathers thought it two. before the fire drinking toasts and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so that thus the entire city may be happy.

But urge us not to this, since, if we yield, the farmer will not be a farmer nor the potter a potter, nor will any other of the types that constitute state keep its form. However, for the others it matters less. For cobblersNote the ab urbe condita construction. For the thought cf. 374 B. Zeller and many who follow him are not justified in inferring that Plato would not educate the masses. (Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s , i. p. 160.) It might as well be argued that the high schools of the United States are not intended for the masses because some people sometimes emphasize their function of fitting for college. In the Plato describes secondary education as a preparation for the higher training. The secondary education of the entire citizenry in the marks no change of opinion ( 818 ff.). Cf. Introduction p. xxxiii. who deteriorate and are spoiled and pretend to be the workmen that they are not are no great danger to a state. But guardians of laws and of the city who are not what they pretend to be, but only seem, destroy utterly, I would have you note, the entire state, and on the other hand, they alone are decisive of its good government and happiness. If then we are forming true guardians and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of farmers and happy feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic community, he would have something else in mindThe expression is loose, but the meaning is plain. The principle one man, one task makes the guardians real guardians. The assumption that their happiness is the end is incompatible with the very idea of a state. Cf. Introduction pp. xxix f. ἑστιάτορας recalls μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι345 C, but we are expected to think also of the farmers of 420 E. than a state. Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest. And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left, to the share of happiness that its nature comports. Well, he said, I think you are right. And will you then, I said, also think me reasonable in another point akin to this? What pray? Consider whether these are the causes that corrupt otherThe guardians are δημιουργοὶ ἐλευθερίας (395 C). craftsmen too so as positively to spoil them.ὥστε καὶ κακούς, I think, means so that they become actually bad, not so that they also become bad. Cf. 217 B. What causes? Wealth and poverty,For the dangers of wealth cf. 550, 553 D, 555 B, 556 A, 562, 831 C, 919 B, and for the praises of poverty cf. Aristophanes 510-591, Lucian, 12, Euripides fr. 55 N., Stobaeus, 94 (Meineke iii. 198), . vol. xxii. pp. 235-236. said I. How so? Thus! do you think a potter who grew rich would any longer be willing to give his mind to his craft? By no means, said he. But will he become more idle and negligent than he was? Far more. Then he becomes a worse potter? Far worse too. And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art, the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches. Of course. From both causes, then, poverty and wealth, the products of the arts deteriorate, and so do the artisans? So it appears. Here, then, is a second group of things it seems that our guardians must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into the city without their knowledge. What are they?

Wealth and poverty, said I, since the one brings luxury, idleness and innovation, and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship in addition to innovation. Assuredly, he said; yet here is a point for your consideration, Socrates, how our city, possessing no wealth, will be able to wage war, especially if compelled to fight a large and wealthy state. Obviously, said I, it would be rather difficult to fight one such, but easier to fight two.Apparent paradox to stimulate attention. Cf. 377 A, 334 A, 382 A, 414 B-C, 544 C, 919 B. For images from boxing cf. Aristotle . 985 a 14, and Demosthenes’ statement (. i. 40-41) that the Athenians fight Philip as the barbarians box. The Greeks felt that lesser breeds without the law were inferior in this manly art of self-defense. Cf. the amusing description of the boxing of Orestes and Plylades by the ἄγγελος in Euripides . 1366 ff. What did you mean by that? he said. Tell me first, I said, whether, if they have to fight, they will not be fighting as athletes of warCf. 416 E, 403 E. against men of wealth? Yes, that is true, he said. Answer me then, Adeimantus. Do you not think that one boxer perfectly trained in the art could easily fight two fat rich men who knew nothing of it? Not at the same time perhaps, said he. Not even, said I, if he were allowed to retreatCf. Herodotus iv. 111. and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents? Doubtless, he said; it wouldn’t be surprising if he did. Well, don’t you think that the rich have more of the skill and practiceTwo elements of the triad φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη. Cf. 374 D. of boxing than of the art of war? I do, he said. It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to fight with double and triple their number. I shall have to concede the point, he said, for I believe you are right. Well then, if they send an embassy to the other city and say what is in fact trueCf. Herodotus vii. 233 τὸν ἀληθέστατον τῶν λόγων, Catullus x. 9 id quod erat.: We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy,The style is of intentional Spartan curtness.—do you suppose any who heard such a proposal would choose to fight against hard and wiry hounds rather than with the aid of the hounds against fat and tender sheep? I think not. Yet consider whether the accumulation of all the wealth of other cities in one does not involve danger for the state that has no wealth. What happy innocence, said I, to suppose that you can properly use the name city of any other than the one we are constructing. Why, what should we say? he said. A greater predication, said I, must be applied to the others. For they are each one of them many cities, not a city, as it goes in the game.As they say in the game or in the jest. The general meaning is plain. We do not know enough about the game called πόλεις (cf. scholiast, Suidas, Hesychius, and Photius) to be more specific. Cf. for conjectures and deatils Adam’s note, and for the phrase Thompson on 77 A.

There are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of the poor,Cf. Aristotle 1316 b 7 and 1264 a 25. and in each of these there are many. If you deal with them as one you will altogether miss the mark, but if you treat them as a multiplicity by offering to the one faction the property, the power, the very persons of the other, you will continue always to have few enemies and many allies. And so long as your city is governed soberly in the order just laid down, it will be the greatest of cities. I do not mean greatest in repute, but in reality, even though it have only a thousandAristotle, 1261 b 38, takes this as the actual number of the military class. Sparta, according to Xenephon, . 1. 1, was τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων, yet one of the strongest. Cf. also Aristotle 1270 a 14 f. In the Plato proposes the number 5040 which Aristotle thinks too large, 1265 a 15. defenders. For a city of this size that is really oneCommentators, I think, miss the subtlety of this sentence; μίαν means truly one as below in D, and its antithesis is not so much πολλάς as δοκούσας which means primarily the appearance of unity, and only secondarily refers to μεγάλην. καί then is rather and than even. So large a city that is really one you will not easily find, but the semblance (of one big city) you will find in cities many and many times the size of this. Cf. also 462 A-B, and my paper and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, . 1914, p. 358. For Aristotle’s comment Cf. 1261 a 15. you will not easily discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think otherwise? No, indeed I don’t, said he. Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should mark off for a city of that size and seek no more? What is the measure? I think, said I, that they should let it grow so long as in its growth it consentsThe Greek idea of government required that the citizens know one another. They would not have called Babylon, London, or Chicago cities. Cf. Introduction p. xxviii, Fowler, , passim, Newman, Aristotle vol. i. Introduction pp. 314-315, and Isocrates’ complaint that Athens was too large, 171-172. to remain a unity, but no further. Excellent, he said. Then is not this still another injunction that we should lay upon our guardians, to keep guard in every way that the city shall not be too small, nor great only in seeming, but that it shall be a sufficient city and one? That behest will perhaps be an easyIronical, of course. one for them, he said. And still easier,Ironical, of course. haply, I said, is this that we mentioned beforeCf. on 415 B. when we said that if a degenerate offspring was born to the guardians he must be sent away to the other classes, and likewise if a superior to the others he must be enrolled among the guardians; and the purport of all this wasThe special precept with regard to the guardians was significant of the universal principle, one man, one task. Cf. 443 C, 370 B-C (note), 394 E, 374 A-D, 846 D-847 B. that the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.It is a natural growth, not an artificial contrivance. For Aristotle’s criticism cf. 1261 A. Why yes, he said, this is even more trifling than that. These are not, my good Adeimantus, as one might suppose, numerous and difficult injunctions that we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy, provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thingThe proverbial one great thing (one thing needful). The proverb perhaps is: πόλλ’ οἶδ’ ἀλώπηξ ἀλλ’ ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα (Suidas). Cf. Archil. fr. 61 ἓν δ’ ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, 297 A μέχριπερ ἂν ἓν μέγα φυλάττωσι.—or instead of great let us call it sufficient.μέγα has the unfavorable associations of ἔπος μέγα, and ἱκανόν, adequate, is characteristically preferred by Plato. What is that? he said.

Their education and nurture, I replied. For if a right educationCf. on 416 E. Plato of course has in mind the education already described and the higher education of books VI. and VII. makes of them reasonable men they will easily discover everything of this kind—and other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage, and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common.The indirect introduction of the proverb is characteristic of Plato’s style. Cf. on 449 C, where the paradox thus lightly introduced is taken up for serious discussion. Quite fantastic is the hypothesis on which much ink has been wasted, that the of Aristophanes was suggested by this sentence and is answered by the fifth book. Cf. introduction pp. xxv and xxxiv. It ought not to be necessary to repeat that Plato’s communism applies only to the guardians, and that its main purpose is to enforce their disinterestedness. Cf. Introduction pp. xv and note a, xxxiv, xlii, xliv, and and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 358. Aristotle’s criticism is that the possessions of friends ought to be common in use but not in ownership. Cf. 1263 a 30, and Euripides 376-377. Yes, that would be the best way, he said. And, moreover, said I, the state, if it once startsCf. 305 D τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμήν. well, proceeds as it were in a cycleNo concrete metaphor of wheel, hook or circle seems to be intended, but only the cycle of cumulative effect of education on nature and nature on education, described in what follows. See the evidence collected in my note, . vol. v. pp. 505-507. of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors both for other purposes and for the production of offspring as among animals also.Cf. 459 A. It is probable, he said. To put it briefly, then, said I, it is to this that the overseers of our state must cleave and be watchful against its insensible corruption. They must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their power guard against them, fearing when anyone says that That song is most regarded among men Which hovers newest on the singer’s lips, Hom. Od. 1.351 Our text has ἐπικλείους’ and ἀκουόντεσσι. For the variant cf. Howes in , vi. p. 205. For the commonplace that new songs are best cf. Pindar, . 9. 52. lest haplyCf. Stallbaum on 238 D-E, Forman, , p. 457. it be supposed that the poet means not new songs but a new way of songThe meaning of the similar phrase in Pindar, . iii. 4 is different. and is commending this. But we must not praise that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet’s meaning. For a change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a hazard of all our fortunes. For the modes of musicμουσικῆς τρόποι need not be so technical as it is in later Greek writers on music, who, however, were greatly influenced by Plato. For the ethical and social power of music cf. Introduction p. xiv note c, and 401 D-404 A, also 700 D-E, 701 A. are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions, as Damon affirms and as I am convinced.Cf. 316 A, Julian 150 B. Set me too down in the number of the convinced, said Adeimantus. It is here, then, I said, in music, as it seems, that our guardians must build their guard-houseThe etymological force of the word makes the metaphor less harsh than the English translation guard-house. Cf. 962 C, where Bury renders safeguard. Cf. Pindar’s ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς, the sharpening thing, that is, the whetstone, . vi. 82. and post of watch. It is certain, he said, that this is the kind of lawlessnessπαρανομία besides its moral meaning (537 E) suggests lawless innovation in music, from association with the musical sense of νόμος. Cf. . i. p. 22 n. 4. that easily insinuatesSo Aristotle 1307 b 33. itself unobserved. Yes, said I, because it is supposed to be only a form of playCf. the warning aagainst innovation in children’s games, 797 A-B. But music is παιδεία as well as παιδιά. Cf. Aristotle’s three uses of music, for play, education, and the entertainment of leisure ( 1339 a 16). and to work no harm. Nor does it work any, he said, except that by gradual infiltration it softly overflowsCf. Demosthenes xix. 228. The image is that of a stream overflowing and spreading. Cf. Euripides fr. 499 N. and Cicero’s use of serpit, . iv. 3, and passim. upon the characters and pursuits of men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business dealings, and from these relations it proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton licence, Socrates, till finally it overthrowsCf. on 389 D. all things public and private. Well, said I, are these things so? I think so, he said.

Then, as we were sayingThe reference is to the general tenor of what precedes. in the beginning, our youth must join in a more law-abiding play, since, if play grows lawless and the children likewise, it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit. Of course, he said. And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the otherπρότερον is an unconscious lapse from the construction of an ideal state to the reformation of a degenerate Athens. Cf. Isocrates 41 ff., and 876 B-C, 948 C-D. type of state. True, indeed, he said. Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether. Of what sort? Such things as the becoming silenceFor these traits of old-fashioned decorum and modesty cf. Aristophanes 961-1023, Blaydes on 991, Herodotus ii. 80, Isocrates 48-49. of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hairCf. Starkie on Aristophanes 1069. and the garments and the fashion of the foot-gear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don’t you think so? I do. Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly.Cf. on 412 B, Isocrates 41, and 788 B, where the further, still pertinent consideration is added that the multiplication of minor enactments tends to bring fundamental laws into contempt. Cf. and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 353, n. 2. For such laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on paper. How could they? At any rate, Adeimantus, I said, the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like? Surely. And the finalCf. 401 C, Demosthenes . iii. 33 τέλειόν τι καὶ μέγα. outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous product of good or the reverse. Of course, said he. For my part, then, I said, for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters.τὰ τοιαῦτα is slightly contemptuous. Specific commercial, industrial and criminal legislation was not compatible with the plan of the , and so Plato omits it here. Much of it is given in the , but even there details are left to the citizens and their rulers. Cf. on 412 B. With good reason, said he. But what, in heaven’s name, said I, about business matters, the dealsCf. 922 A, Aristotle 1263 b 21. All legal relations of contract, impied contract and tort. that men make with one another in the agora— and, if you please, contracts with workmenIn 920 D Plato allows a δίκη ἀτελοῦς ὁμολογίας against workmen or contractors who break or fail to complete contracts. and actions for foul languageCf. 935 C.There was no λοιδορίας δίκη under that name at Athens, but certain words were actionable, ἀπόρρητα and there was a δίκη κακηγορίας. and assault, the filing of declarations,Plato shows his contempt for the subject by this confused enumeration, passing without warning from contracts and torts to procedure and then to taxes, market, harbor and police regulations. the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbors and in general market, police or harbor regulations and the like, can we bringτολμήσομεν is both venture and deign. ourselves to legislate about these? Nay, ʼtwould not be fitting, he said, to dictate to good and honorable men.Cf. Isocrates . 78 ὅτι τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν δεήσει πολλῶν γραμμάτων. For most of the enactments that are needed about these things they will easily, I presume, discover. Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have already discussed. Failing that, said he, they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best. You mean, said I, that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandonCf. Emerson, : They wish to be saved from the mischiefs of their vices but not from their vices. Charity would be wasted on this poor waiting on the symptoms. A wise and hardy physician will say, Come out of that as the first condition of advice. their unwholesome regimen.

By all means. And truly, said I, these latter go on in a most charmingIronical. Quite fanciful is Dümmler’s supposition (, i, p. 99) that this passage was meant as destructive criticism of Isocrates and that 62 is a reply. Plato is obviously thinking of practical politicians rather than of Isocrates. fashion. For with all their doctoring they accomplish nothing except to complicate and augment their maladies. Andπλήν γε etc., is loosely elliptical, but emendations are superfluous. they are always hoping that some one will recommend a panacea that will restore their health. A perfect description, he said, of the state of such invalids. And isn’t this a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who tells them the truth that until a man stops drinking and gorging and wenching and idling, neither drugsFor the list cf. Pindar, . iii. 50-54. οὐδ’ αὖ emphasizes the transition to superstitious remedies in which Plato doesn’t really believe. Cf. his rationalizing interpretations of ἐπῳδαί, 157 A, 149 C. 933 A-B is to be interpreted in the spirit of the observation in Selden’s : The law against witches does not prove that there be any but it punishes the malice, etc. [Demosthenes] xxv. 80 is sceptical. nor cautery nor the knife, no, nor spells nor periaptsCf. any lexicon, Shakespeare . v. iii. 2 Now help, ye charming spells and periapts, and Plutarch’s story of the women who hung them on Pericles’ neck on his death-bed. will be of any avail? Not altogether charming, he said, for there is no grace or charm in being angryCf. 480 A, 354 A. with him who speaks well. You do not seem to be an admirerThe noun is more forcible than the verb would be. Cf. 309 A ἐπαινέτης. of such people, said I. No, by heaven, I am not. Neither then, if an entire city,We return from the illustration to its application to the state. as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your approval, or don’t you think that the way of such invalids is precisely that of those cities which being badly governed forewarn their citizens not to meddleCf. 497 B, Aristotle 1301 b 11. Cf. the obvious imitation in the (probably spurious) vii. 330 E. For the thought, from the point of view of an enemy of democracy, cf. the statement in [Xenophon] . 3. 9, that the faults of Athens cannot be corrected while she remains a democracy. The Athenians naturally guarded their constitution and viewed with equal suspicion the idealistic reformer and the oligarchical reactionary. with the general constitution of the state, denouncing death to whosoever attempts that—while whoever most agreeably servesCf. , p. 65 note d, and 923 B. The phraseology here recalls 517 B, Aristophanes 46-63. Cf. and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, . vol. ix. (Oct. 1914) p. 363, n. 3. them governed as they are and who curries favor with them by fawning upon them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile things,Almost technical. Cf. 538 B. the man they will delight to honor? Yes, he said, I think their conduct is identical, and I don’t approve it in the very least. And what again of those who are willing and eager to serveHere serve, not flatter. such states? Don’t you admire their valiance and light-hearted irresponsibilityThis word εὐχέρεια is often misunderstood by lexicons and commentators. It is of course not dexterity (L. and S.) nor yet probably complaisance, nor yet humanitas or Gutmütigkeit as Adam and Schneider think. It expresses rather the light-heartedness with which such politicians rush in where wiser men fear to tread, which is akin to the lightness with which men plunge into crime. Cf. 690 D τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέσιν ἰόντων ῥᾳδίως and 969 ἀνδρειότατος. Plato’s political physician makes come out of that a precondition of his treatment. Cf. 736-737, 299 A-B, 501 A, 540 E, vii. 330 C-D, and the story in Aelian. V.H. ii. 42. of Plato’s refusal to legislate for the Arcadians because they would not accept an equalization of property.? I do, he said, except those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmenCf. 2 C-D, 513 B, 275 C and 292 D. because they are praised by the many. What do you mean? Can’t you make allowancesPlato often condescendingly and half ironically pardons psychologically inevitable errors. Cf. 366 C, 269 B, 306 C. for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure when a multitude of others equally ignorant assure him that he is four cubits tall not to suppose this to be the fact about himself? Why no,For οὐκ αὖ cf. 393 D, 442 A, 161 A, . vol. xxiii. pp. 285-287. ἔγωγε above concurs with ἄγασαι, ignoring the irony. πλήν γε etc. marks dissent on one point. This dissent is challenged, and is withdrawn by οὐκ αὖ . . . τοῦτο γε (οἶμαι). he said, I don’t think that. Then don’t be harsh with them. For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can’t see that they are in very truth τῷ ὄντι points the application of the proverbial ὕδραν τέμνειν, which appears in this now trite metaphorical use for the first time here and in 297 C. Cf. my note on Horace iv. 4. 61. For the thought cf. Isocrates vii. 40, Macrob. . ii. 13 leges bonae ex malis moribus procreantur, Arcesilaus apud Stobaeus . xliii. 981 οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὅπου νόμοι πλεῖστοι ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀδικίαν εἶναι μεγίστην, Theophrastus apud Stobaeus . xxxvii. 21 ὀλίγων οἱ ἀγαθοὶ νόμων δέονται. trying to cut off a Hydra’s head.

Indeed, he said, that is exactly what they are doing. I, then, said I, should not have supposedIronically, I should not have supposed, but for the practice of our politicians. that the true lawgiver ought to work out matters of that kind εἶδος νόμων πέρι is here a mere periphrasis, though the true classification of laws was a topic of the day. Cf. 630 E, Aristotle 1267 b 37. Plato is not always careful to mark the distinction between the legislation which he rejects altogether and that which he leaves to the discretion of the citizens. in the laws and the constitution either of an ill-governed or a well-governed state—in the one because they are useless and accomplish nothing, in the other because some of them anybody could discover and others will result spontaneously from the pursuits already described. What part of legislation, then, he said, is still left for us? And I replied, For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest and the first of enactments. What are they? he said. The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond ἐκεῖ=in the other world. So often. to keep them gracious. For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreterFor the exegete as a special religious functionary at Athens. cf. L. and S. s. v. and 759 C-D. Apollo in a higher sense is the interpreter of religion for all mankind. He is technically πατρῷος at Athens ( 302 D) but he is πάτριος for all Greeks and all men. Plato does not, as Thümser says (p. 301), confuse the Dorian and the Ionian Apollo, but rises above the distinction. than the God of our fathers.Plato prudently or piously leaves the deatils of ceremonial and institutional religion to Delphi. Cf. 540 B-C, 759 C, 738 B-C, 828 A, 856 E, 865 B, 914 A, 947 D. For this God surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navelThis navel stone, supposed to mark the center of the earth, has now been found. Cf. Poulsen’s , pp. 19, 29, 157, and Frazer on Pausanias x. 16. of the earth delivers his interpretation. Excellently said, he replied; and that is what we must do. At last, then, son of Ariston, said I, your cityNot the ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις of 369 E, nor the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις of 372 E, but the purified city of 399 E has now been established and described. The search for justice that follows formulates for the first time the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues and defines each provisionally and sufficiently for the present purpose, and solves the problems dramatically presented in the minor dialogues, , etc. Cf. , pp. 15-18, nn. 81-102, and the introduction to the second volume of this translation. may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself, αὐτός τε καί: cf. 398 A. and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injusticeSee on 369 A. Matter-of-fact critics may object that there is no injustice in the perfectly good state. But we know the bad best by the canon of the good. Cf. on 409 A-B. The knowledge of opposites is the same. Injustice can be defined only in relation to its opposite (444 A-B), and in the final argument the most unjust man and state are set up as the extreme antitypes of the ideal (571-580). By the perfect state Plato does not mean a state in which no individual retains any human imperfections. It is idle then to speak of difficulties or contradictions or changes of plan in the composition of the . should be in it, wherein they differ from one another and which of the two he must have who is to be happy, alikeFor ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε cf. 367 E. whether his condition is known or not known to all gods and men. Nonsense, said Glaucon, youCf. 331 E. Emphatic as in 449 D-450 A, 95 A, and . 135 D. promised that you would carry on the search yourself, admitting that it would be impiousCf. 368 B-C. for you not to come to the aid of justice by every means in your power. A true reminder, I said, and I must do so, but you also must lend a hand. Well, he said, we will. I expect then, said I, that we shall find it in this way. I think our city, if it has been rightly founded is good in the full sense of the word.Cf. 434 E, 449 A. This in a sense begs the original question in controversy with Thrasymachus, by the assumption that justice and the other moral virtues are goods. Cf. 507 C. See , p. 205. For the cardinal virtues cf. Schmidt, , i. p. 304, Pearson, , pp. 173 f., and commentators on Pindar, . iii. 74, which seems to refer to four periods of human life, and Xenophon iii. 9. 1-5, and iv. 6. 1-12. Plato recognizes other virtues even in the (402 C ἐλευθεριότης and μεγαλοπρέπεια. Cf. 536 A), and would have been as ready to admit that the number four was a part of his literary machinery as Ruskin was to confess the arbitrariness of his Seven Lamps of Architecture. Necessarily, he said. Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just. Clearly. Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainderIt is pedantry to identify this with Mill’s method of residues and then comment on the primitive naïveté of such an application of logic to ethics. One might as well speak of Andocides’ employment of the method (. 109) or of its use by Gorgias in the disjunctive dilemma of the Palamedes 11 and passim, or say that the dog of the anecdote employs it when he sniffs up one trail and immediately runs up the other. Plato obviously employs it merely as a literary device for the presentation of his material under the figure of a search. He, in the infancy of philosophy, is quite as well aware as his censors can be in the senility of criticism that he is not proving anything by this method, but merely setting forth what he has assumed for other reasons. will be that which we have not found?

Surely. Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for any one of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing left for it to be but the remainder. Right, he said. And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way. Clearly. And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom,σοφία is wisdom par excellence. Aristotle, . i., traces the history of the idea from Homer to its identification in Aristotle’s mind with first philosophy for metaphysics. For Plato, the moralist, it is virtue and the fear of the Lord; for his political theory it is the political or royal art which the dramatic dialogues fail to distinguish from the special sciences and arts. Cf. , p. 17, n. 97, 319 A, 282 E, 291 C, 501 A-B, etc. In the unreformed Greek state its counterfeit counterpart is the art of the politician. In the its reality will be found in the selected guardians who are to receive the higher education, and who alone will apprehend the idea of the good, which is not mentioned here simply because Plato, not Krohn, is writing the . and there is something odd about that, it appears. What? said he. Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counselled, is it not? Yes. And surely this very thing, good counsel,Protagoras, like Isocrates, professed to teach εὐβουλία ( 318 E), which Socrates identifies at once with the political art. Plato would accept Protagoras’s discrimination of this for the special arts (ibid. 318 ff.), but he does not believe that such as Protagoras can teach it. His political art is a very different thing from Protagoras’s εὐβουλία and is apprehended by a very different education from that offered by Protagoras. Cf. and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 348, n. 5, 291 B-C, 170 B, 319 A, 501 A-B, 503 D, 289 C, 293 D, 309 C. is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well. Obviously. But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city. Of course. Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that a city is to be called wise and well advised? By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building. Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberationsβουλευομένη: Heindorf’s βουλευομένην is perhaps supported by ᾗ . . . βουλεύεται below, but in view of Plato’s colloquial anacloluthic style is unnecessary. of the science of wooden utensils for their best production? No, I grant you. Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind? None whatsoever, he said. Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that is agricultural. I think so. Then, said I, is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itselfCf. on 416 C. and other states? Why, there is. What is it, said I, and in whom is it found? It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word. And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge? Well advised, he said, and truly wise. Which class, then, said I, do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians? The smiths, by far, he said. And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellationsCf. 311 E τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν.? By far.

Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole. And as it appears these are by nature the fewest, the class to which it pertains to partake of the knowledge which alone of all forms of knowledge deserves the name of wisdom. Most true, he said. This one of our four, then, we have, I know not how, discovered, the thing itself and its place in the state. I certainly think, said he, that it has been discovered sufficiently. But again there is no difficulty in seeing bravery itself and the part of the city in which it resides for which the city is called brave.τοιαύτη such, that is, brave. The courage of a state, qua such, also resides in a small class, the warriors. How so? Who, said I, in calling a city cowardly or brave would fix his eyes on any other part of it than that which defends it and wages war in its behalf? No one at all, he said. For the reason, I take it, said I, that the cowardice or the braveryἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες: the ab urbe condita construction. Cf. 421 A. of the other inhabitants does not determine for it the one quality or the other.τοίαν . . . ἢ τοίαν: cf. 437 E, 271 D, 721 B. It does not. Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve the conviction that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiverCf. 442 C, Aristotle . 1129 b 19 προστάττει δ’ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν. inculcated in their education. Is not that what you call bravery? I don’t altogether understandCf. on 347 A. what you said, he replied; but say it again. A kind of conservation, I said, is what I mean by bravery. What sort of a conservationσωτηρίαν is the genus; 34 A, . 412 A-B. Hence ποίαν as often in the minor dialogues sometimes with a play on its idiomatic, contemptuous meaning. Cf. 194 D.? The conservation of the conviction which the law has created by education about fearful things—what and what sort of things are to be feared. And by the phrase under all conditionsIn the 191 D-E, and the 633 D also, Plato generalizes courage to include resistance to the lure of pleasure. I mean that the brave man preserves it both in pain and pleasures and in desires and fears and does not expelCf. 412 E. it from his soul. And I may illustrate it by a similitudeThe moral training of the guardians is likened to the dyeing of selected white wools with fast colors. Cf. Aristotle . 1105 a 2, Marc. Aurel. iii. 4. 3 δικαιοσύνῃ βεβαμμένον εἰς βάθος, Sir Thomas Browne, , i. 9 Be what thou virtuously art, and let not the ocean wash away thy tincture. The idea that the underlying subsatnce must be of neutral quality may have been suggested to Plato by Anaxagoras. It occurs in the 50 D-E, whence it passed to Aristotle’s psychology and Lucretius. Cf. my paper on , vol. xii. p. 204. if you please. I do. You are aware that dyers when they wish to dye wool so as to hold the purple hue begin by selecting from the many colors there be the one nature of the white and then give it a careful preparatory treatment so that it will take the hue in the best way, and after the treatment,For the technique cf. Blummer, , vol. i. pp. 227 ff. The θεράπευσις seems to be virtually identical with the προπαρασκευή, so that the aorist seems appropriate, unless with Adam’s earlier edition we transpose it immediately before οὕτω δή. then and then only, dip it in the dye. And things that are dyed by this process become fast-coloredFor δευσοποιός cf. L. and S., and Nauck, 441 τοῖς δευσοποιοῖς φαρμάκοις ξανθίζεται. and washing either with or without lyes cannot take away the sheen of their hues. But otherwise you know what happens to them, whetherThe two points of precaution are (1) to select white wool, not ἄλλα χρώματα, (2) to prepare by treatment even this. anyone dips other colors or even these without the preparatory treatment. I know, he said, that they present a ridiculous and washed-out appearance.

By this analogy, then, said I, you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in musicCf. 522 A, 17 B. and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might beγίγνοιτο is process; ἐκπλύναι (aorist) is a single event (μή). fast-colored both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes that have such dreadδεινά: it is not fanciful to feel the unity of Plato’s imagination as well as of his thought in the recurrence of this word in the δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα of the mortal soul in 69 C. power to scour our faiths away, pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent to accomplish this, and pain and fear and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful beliefCf. 360 C-D, 632 C, Aristotle . 1116 b 24. Strictly speaking, Plato would recognize four grades, (1) philosophic bravery, (2) the bravery of the ἐπίκουροι here defined, (3) casual civic bravery in ordinary states, (4) animal instinct, which hardly deserves the name. Cf. 196 E, Mill, , p. 47 Consistent courage is always the effect of cultivation, etc., , nn. 46 and 77. about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say. No, nothing, said he; for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave, 69 B. to have little or nothing to do with lawνόμιμον of the Mss. yields quite as good a meaning as Stobaeus’s μόνιμον. The virtuous habit that is inculcated by law is more abiding than accidental virtue. and that you would call it by another name than courage. That is most true, said I. Well then, he said, I accept this as bravery. Do so, said I, and you will be right with the reservationγε marks a reservation as 415 E στρατιωτικάς γε, 30 E, 710 A τὴν δημώδη γε. Plotinus, unlike some modern commentators, perceived this. Cf. . i. 2. 3. In 82 A πολιτικήν is used disparagingly of ordinary bourgeois virtue. In Xenophon . 10. 7 and Aristotle . iii. 8. 1 (1116 a 17) there is no disparagement. The word is often used of citizen soldiery as opposed to professional mercenaries. that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time,This dismissal of the subject is sometimes fancifully taken as a promise of the . Cf. , nn. 77 and 603. if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice; and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough. You are quite right, he said. Two things still remain, said I, to make out in our city, sobernessMatthew Arnold’s word. But cf. on 398 D and 430 E — sobriety, temperance, Besonnenheit. and the object of the whole inquiry, justice. Quite so. If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness. Well, I, for my part, he said, neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that. It would certainly be very wrongεἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ is idiomatic, I ought to. Cf. 608 D, 612, 236 B. of me not to desire it, said I. Go on with the inquiry then, he said. I must go on, I replied, and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did. How so? Soberness is a kind of beautiful orderCf. 506 E ff. σωφροσύνη and σωφρονεῖν sometimes mean etymologically of sound mind or level head, with or without ethical suggestion, according to the standpoint of the spaeker. Cf. 333 B-C. Its two chief meanings in Greek usage are given in 389 D-E: subordination to due authority, and control of appetite, both raised to higher significance in Plato’s definition. As in the case of bravery, Plato distinguishes the temperamental, the bourgeois, the disciplined, and the philosophical virtue. But he affects to feel something paradoxical in the very idea of self-control, as perhaps there is. Cf. 626 E ff., 863 D, A.J.P. vol. xiii. pp. 361 f., , nn. 77 and 78. and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase master of himself I know not how; and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so? Most certainly.

Now the phrase master of himself is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions. Of course. But, said I, the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But when, because of bad breeding or some association,Cf. 250 A. the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitudeCf. 442 A, 689 A-B. The expression is intended to remind us of the parallelism between man and state. See Introduction. of the worse, I think that our speech censures this as a reproach,Cf. 189 E. and calls the man in this plight unselfcontrolled and licentious. That seems likely, he said. Turn your eyes now upon our new city, said I, and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in whichCf. 441 D, 443 B, 573 D. the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered. I do turn my eyes upon it, he said, and it is as you say. And again, the mob of motleyπαντοδαπός is disparaging in Plato. appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in childrenπαισί: so Wolf, for Ms. πᾶσι, a frequent error. Cf. 494 B. Plato, like Shakespeare’s Rosalind, brackets boys and women as creatures who have for every passion something and for no passion truly anything. and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are freemen in name.Cf. on 336 A. The ordinary man who is passion’s slave is not truly free. The Stoics and Cynics preached many sermons on this text. See Persius, . v. 73. and 124, Epictetus . iv. 1, Xenophon iv. 5. 4, Xenophon . 1. 22-23. By all means. But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated. True, he said. And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better? I do, he said. If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation. Most assuredly, he said. And is it not also to be called soberPlato is again proceeding by seemingly minute verbal links. Cf. 354 A, 379 B, 412 D. καὶ μήν introduces a further verification of the definition. in all these respects? Indeed it is, he said. And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don’t you think so? I most emphatically do, he said. In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled? In both, I suppose,που marks the slight hesitation at the deviation from the symmetry of the scheme which would lead us to expect, as Aristotle and others have taken it, that σωφροσύνη is the distinctive virtue of the lowest class. It is so practically for the lower sense of σωφροσύνη, but in the higher sense of the willingness of each to fulfil his function in due subordination to the whole, it is common to all classes. he said. Do you see then, said I, that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmonyCf. 430 E. Aristotle gives this as an example of (faulty) defintion by metaphor ( iv. 3. 5).? Why so?

Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamutδι’ ὅλης: sc. τῆς πόλεως, but as ἀτεχνῶς shows (Cf. on 419 E) it already suggets the musical metaphor of the entire octave διὰ πασῶν. throughout, bringing aboutThe word order of the following is noteworthy. The translation gives the meaning. ταὐτόν, the object of συνᾴδοντας, is, by a trait of style that grows more frequent in the and was imitated by Cicero, so placed as to break the monotony of the accusative terminations. the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please,For the comparison the kind of superiority is indifferent. See Thompson on 71 E and compare the enumeration of claims to power in the , ἀξιώματα . . . τοῦ ἀρχεῖν, 690 A ff. and 434 B. in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimityThe final statement of the definition, which, however, has little significance for Plato’s thought, when isolated from its explanatory context. Cf. . 413 E, , pp. 15. f., n. 82. Quite idle is the discussion whether σωφροσύνη is otiose, and whether it can be absolutely distinguished from δικαιοσύνη. They are sufficiently distinguished for Plato’s purpose in the imagery and analogies of the . to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual.Cf. on 351 E. I entirely concur, he said. Very well, said I. We have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgement.Cf. Demosthenes 18 and 430 E ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν. Plato’s definitions and analyses are never presented as final. They are always sufficient for the purpose in hand. Cf. , p. 13, nn. 63-67 and 519. What can be the remaining form thatδι’ ὅ: cf. my paper on the Origin of the Syllogism, . vol. xix. pp. 7 ff. This is an example of the terminology of the theory of ideas already in the first four books. Cf. , p. 35, n. 238, p. 38. would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice. Obvious. Now then,νῦν δή: i.e. νῦν ἤδη. Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmenCf. . 235 B, 290 B-C, 66 C, 654 E, 128 C, 218 C, Thompson on 96 E, Huxley, , p. 139 There cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy. Cf. also Hardy’s He never could beat the covert of conversation without starting the game. The elaboration of the image here is partly to mark the importance of δικαιοσύνη and partly to relieve the monotony of continuous argument. to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabouts. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me. Would that I could, he said; but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fairIt is not necessary, though plausible, to emend μετρίως to μετρίῳ. The latter is slightly more idiomatical. Cf. Terence’s benigno me utetur patre. use of me. PrayPrayer is the proper preface of any act. Cf. 27 C, 712 B. for success then, said I, and follow along with me. That I will do, only lead on, he said. And truly, said I, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows. It certainly is a dark covert, not easy to beat up. But all the same on we must go. Yes, on. And I caught view and gave a hulloa and said, Glaucon, I think we have found its trail and I don’t believe it will get away from us. I am glad to hear that, said he. Truly, said I, we were slackersτὸ πάθος: for the periphrasis cf. 376 A. indeed. How so? Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feetCf. 201 A. from the start and yet we couldn’t see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands.A homely figure such as Dante and Tennyson sometimes use. So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps was the reason it escaped us. What do you mean? he said. This, I replied, that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselvesThis sounds like Hegel but is not Hegelian thought. or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense. That is a tedious prologue, he said, for an eager listener.

Listen then, said I, and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, orCf. on 344 E. Justice is a species falling under the vague genus τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, which Critias in the proposed as a definition of σωφροσύνη ( 161 B), but failed to sustain owing to his inability to distinguish the various possible meanings of the phrase. In the too we have hitherto failed to learn from ourselves its true meaning, till now when Socrates begins to perceive that if taken in the higher sense of spiritual division of labor in the soul and in the state, it is the long-sought justice. Cf. 433 B-D, 443 C-D. some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted. Yes, we said that. And again that to do one’s own business and not to be a busybody is justice, is a saying that we have heard from many and have often repeated ourselves.This need not refer to any specific passage in the dialogues. Cf. , n. 236. A Greek could at any time say that minding one’s own business and not being a busybody is σῶφρον or δίκαιον or both. We have. This, then, I said, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice,τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον: as in the translation, not justice seems somehow to be proving to be this. Cf. 432 E, 516 C, 217 E, 910 B, 495 A, 596 D, Goodwin, , 830. Yet, Cf. 291 D. this principle of doing one’s own business. Do you know whence I infer this? No, but tell me, he said. I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you thatκαίτοι: cf. on 360 C and 376 B. Here it points out the significance of τὸ ὑπόλοιπον if true, while ἀλλὰ μέντοι introduces the considerations that prove it true. we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three. That is an unavoidable conclusion, he said. But moreover, said I, if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody. Hard to decide indeed, he said. A thing, then, that in its contribution to the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task. It is indeed, he said. And is not justice the name you would have to giveγε argues from the very meaning of ἐνάμιλλον. Cf. 379 B. to the principle that rivals these as conducing to the virtue of state? By all means. Consider it in this wise tooSo 79 E ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε. It introduces a further confirmation. The mere judicial and conventional conception of justice can be brought under the formula in a fashion (πῃ), for legal justice est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens. Cf. 331 E and Aristotle . 1366 b 9 ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος. if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers? Of course. Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to othersτἀλλότρια: the article is normal; Stallb. on 230 A. For the ambiguity of τἀλλότρια cf. 443 D. So οἰκείου is one’s own in either literal or the ideal sense of the Stoics and Emerson, and ἑαυτοῦ is similarly ambiguous. Cf. on 443 D. or be deprived of his own? Nothing else but this. On the assumption that this is just? Yes.

From this point of view too, then, the havingἕξις is still fluid in Plato and has not yet taken the technical Aristotelian meaning of habit or state. and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice. That is so. Consider nowA further confirmation. For what follows cf. 421 A. whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another’s tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it? Not much, he said. But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state. By all means. The interference with one another’s business, then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chieflyμάλιστα with κακουργία. works it harm. Precisely so. And the thing that works the greatest harm to one’s own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice? Of course. This, then, is injustice. Again,πάλιν, again, here means conversely. Cf. 425 A. The definition is repeated in terms of the three citizen classes to prepare the way for testing it in relation to the individual soul, which, if the analogy is to hold, must possess three corresponding faculties or parts. The order of words in this and many Platonic sentences is justified by the psychological investigation, which showed that when the question which do you like best, apples, pears, or cherries? was presented in the form apples, pears, cherries, which do you like best? the reaction time was appreciably shortened. let us put it in this way. The proper functioning οἰκειοπραγία: this coinage is explained by the genitive absolute. Proclus (Kroll i. p. 207) substitutes αὐτοπραγία. So . 411 E. of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of thatἐκείνου: cf. ἐκείνοις, 425 A. just described, would be justice and would render the city just. I think the case is thus and no otherwise, said he. Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly,παγίως: cf. 479 C, Aristotle . 1062 b 15. I said, but if this formThe doctrine of the transcendental ideas was undoubtedly familiar to Plato at this time. Cf. on 402 B, and , p. 31, n. 194, p. 35. But we need not evoke the theory of παρουσία here to account for this slight personification of the form, idea, or definition of justice. Cf. 538 D, and the use of ἐλθών in Euripides . 562 and of ἰόν in 52 E. Plato, in short, is merely saying vivaciously what Aristotle technically says in the words δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν, . 1107 a 28. when applied to the individual man, accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in whichIn 368 E. For the loose internal accusative ἥν cf. 443 B, 666 B, 249 D, 264 B, my paper on Illogical Idiom, T.A.P.A., 1916, vol. xlvii. p. 213, and the school-girl’s This is the play that the reward is offered for the best name suggested for it. we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there,ἐκεῖ though redundant need not offend in this intentionally ancoluthic and resumptive sentence. Some inferior Mss. read ἐκεῖνο. Burnet’s ἢ is impossible. we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the goodἔν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ: cf. on 427 E, and for the force of γε cf. 379 B, 403 E. city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well.

But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by sideCf. 230 B τιθέασι παρ’ ἀλλήλας, Isocrates 79, . 17. and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticksCf. L and S. and Morgan, De Ignis Eliciendi Modis, , vol. i. pp. 15, 21 ff. and 30; and Damascius (Ruelle, p. 54, line 18) καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὅπερ εξαίφνης ἀνάπτεται φῶς ἀληθείας ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων προστριβομένων. we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth,Cf. 484 B, vii. 344 B. and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds. Well, he said, that seems a sound method Plato often observes that a certain procedure is methodical and we must follow it, or that it is at least methodical or consistent, whatever the results may be. and that is what we must do. Then, said I, if you call a thing by the sameὅ γε ταὐτόν: there are several reasons for the seeming over-elaboration of the logic in the next few pages. The analogy between the three classes in the state and the tripartite soul is an important point in Plato’s ethical theory and an essential feature in the structure of the . Very nice distinctions are involved in the attempt to prove the validity of the analogy for the present argument without too flagrant contradiction of the faith elsewhere expressed in the essential unity of the soul. Cf. , p. 42. These distinctions in the infancy of logic Plato is obliged to set forth and explain as he proceeds. Moreover, he is interested in logical method for its own sake (cf.. Introduction p. xiv), and is here stating for the first time important principles of logic afterwards codified in the treatises of Aristotle. γε marks the inference from the very meaning of ταὐτόν. Cf. on 379 B, 389 B, and 278 E; cf. also 139 E. The language suggests the theory of ideas. But Plato is not now thinking primarily of that. He is merely repeating in precise logical form the point already made (434 D-E), that the definition of justice in the individual must correspond point for point with that worked out for the state. name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like? Like, he said. Then a just man too will not differCf. 369 A and 72 B. In 12 E-13 C, Plato points out that the generic or specific identity does not exclude specific or sub-specific differences. at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it. Yes, like. But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habitsἕξεις is here almost the Aristotelian ἕξις. Aristotle, . 1105 b 20, regards πάθη, ἕξεις and δυνάμεις as an exhaustive enumeration of mental states. For δυνάμεις cf. 477 C, Simplic. . Hayduck, p. 289 ἀλλὰ τὰ ὧν πρὸς πρακτικὴν ἐδεῖτο ζωήν, τὰ τρία μόνα παρείληφεν. of these three kinds. True, he said. Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations. Inevitable, he said. Goodness gracious, said I, here is another triflingCf. 423 C. inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not. It does not seem to me at all trifling, he said, for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that ’fine things are difficult.’A proverb often cited by Plato with variations. Cf. 497 D-E. Apparently, said I; and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never in the world apprehend this matterτοῦτο by strict grammatical implication means the problem of the tripartite soul, but the reference to this passage in 504 B shows that it includes the whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately the whole of ethical and political philosophy. We are there told again that the definitions of the fourth book are sufficient for the purpose, but that complete insight can be attained only by relating them to the idea of the good. That required a longer and more circuitous way of discipline and training. Plato then does not propose the longer way as a method of reasoning which he himself employs to correct the approximations of the present discussion. He merely describes it as the higher education which will enable his philosophical rulers to do that. We may then disregard all idle guesses about a new logic hinted at in the longer way, and all fantastic hypotheses about the evolution of Plato’s thought and the composition of the based on supposed contradictions between this passage and the later books. Cf. Introduction p. xvi, Idea of Good, p. 190, , p. 16, n. 90; followed by Professor Wilamowitz, ii. p. 218, who, however, does not understand the connection of it all with the idea of good. Plato the logician never commits himself to more than is required by the problem under discussion (cf. on 353 c), and Plato the moralist never admits that the ideal has been adequately expressed, but always points to heights beyond. Cf. 506 E, 533 A, 85 C, 29 B-C, 254 C. from such methods as we are now employing in discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of previous statements and inquiries. May we acquiesce in that? he said. I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present. And I surely should be more than satisfied, I replied. Don’t you weary then, he said, but go on with the inquiry. Is it not, then, said I, impossible for us to avoid admittingPlato takes for granted as obvious the general correspondence which some modern philosophers think it necessary to reaffirm. Cf. Mill, , vi. 7. 1 Human beings in society have no properties, but those which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws and the nature of individual man; Spencer, . ii. p. 543 Society is created by its units. . . . The nature of its organization is determined by the nature of its units. Plato illustrates the commonplace in a slight digression on national characteristics, with a hint of the thought partially anticipated by Hippocrates and now identified with Buckle’s name, that they are determined by climate and environment. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle pp. 318-320. this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source.

It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed toαἰτιάσαιτο: this merely varies the idiom αἰτίαν ἔχειν, predicate of, say of. Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Euripides 829-830, Isocrates vii. 74, Roberts, , pp. 59, 76. the region where we dwell, or the love of moneyφιλοχρήματον is a virtual synonym of ἐπιθυμητικόν. Cf. 580 E and 68 C, 82 C. which we might say is not least likely to be found in PhoeniciansIn 747 C, Plato tells that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them πανουργία rather than σοφία. and the population of Egypt. One certainly might, he replied. This is the fact then, said I, and there is no difficulty in recognizing it. Certainly not. But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soulThe questions debated by psychologists from Aristotle (. 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry, and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the faculties of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold’s Lines on Butler’s Sermons and my remarks in . Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and 68 C, 82 C, and x. 611-12. Cf. , pp. 42-43. that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly. I think so too, he said. Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way. How? It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer oppositesThe first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. 102 E, 188 A, . 220 B, 602 E. Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 E) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις (. 17 a 36-37). Cf. . 1005 b 22 πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας, and . ii. 24. Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. , pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή ( 1005 b 18). in the same respectκατὰ ταὐτόν = in the same part or aspect of itself; πρὸς ταὐτόν = in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. 230 B ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας. in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we findFor this method of reasoning cf. 478 D, 609 B, 896 C, 168 B-C, 496 C, 11 D-E. these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it wasἦν = was all along and is. not the same thing functioning but a plurality. Very well. Consider, then, what I am saying. Say on, he replied. Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at restThe maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. Cf. 249 C-D, 156 D and passim. and in motion? By no means. Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a partCf. 181 E. of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so? It is. Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rateThe argumentative γε is controversial. For the illustration of the top cf. Spencer, , 170, who analyzes certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word wobbling and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the equilibrium mobile. stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such casesThe meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of τὰ τοιαῦτα is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read τῶν τοιούτων, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures. were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing stillCf. Aristotle . 1022 a 23 ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἕστηκεν, etc, since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest. And that would be right, he said.

No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation to suffer, be,εἴη, the reading of most Mss., should stand. It covers the case of contradictory predicates, especially of relation, that do not readily fall under the dichotomy ποιεῖν πάσχειν. So 97 C ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. or do opposites. They will not me, I am sure, said he. All the same, said I, that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentionsἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly contemptuous. Cf. Aristotle , ἐνοχλήσεις, and 158 C τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν. and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesisIt is almost a Platonic method thus to emphasize the dependence of one conclusion on another already accepted. Cf. , n. 471, 284 D, 77 A, 92 D, 51 D, 149 A. It may be used to cut short discussion (, n. 471) or divert it into another channel. Here, however, he is aware, as Aristotle is, that the maximum of contradiction can be proved only controversially against an adversary who says something. (cf. my , pp. 7-9, Aristotle . 1012 b 1-10); and so, having sufficiently guarded his meaning, he dismisses the subject with the ironical observation that, if the maxim is ever proved false, he will give up all that he bases on the hypothesis of its truth. Cf. 247 E. that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated. That is what we must do, he said. Will you not then, said I, set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions; it will make no difference which?Cf. 496 E, and on 435 D. None, said he, but they are opposites. What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consentingἐθέλειν in Plato normally means to be willing, and βούλεσθαι to wish or desire. But unlike Prodicus, Plato emphasizes distinctions of synonyms only when relevant to his purpose. Cf. , p. 47 and n. 339, 60 D. προσάγεσθαι below relates to ἐπιθυμία and ἐπινεύειν to ἐθέλειν . . . βούλεσθαι. and willing, would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws towards its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it; or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question,Cf. Aristotle 434 a 9. The Platonic doctrine that opinion,δόξα, is discussion of the soul with herself, or the judgement in which such discussion terminates (Cf. , p. 47) is here applied to the specific case of the practical reason issuing in an affirmation of the will. striving towards its attainment? I would say so, he said. But what of not-willingἀβουλεῖν recalls the French coinage nolonté, and the southern mule’s won’t-power. Cf. vii. 347 A, Demosthenes ii. 17. and not consenting nor yet desiring, shall we not put these under the soul’s rejectionCf. Aristotle’s ἀνθέλκειν, 433 b 8. All willing is either pushing or pulling, Jastrow, , p. 336. Cf. the argument in Spencer’s 80, that the phrase impelled by desires is not a metaphor but a physical fact. Plato’s generalization of the concepts attraction and repulsion brings about a curious coincidence with the language of a materialistic, physiological psychology (cf. Lange, , passim), just as his rejection in the of attraction and actio in distans allies his physics with that of the most consistent materialists. and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former? Of course. This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a classCf. on 349 E. and that the most conspicuous members of that classCf. 412 B and . vii. (1912) pp. 485-486. are what we call thirst and hunger? We shall, said he. Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food? Yes. Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul?The argument might proceed with 439 A τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. All that intervenes is a digression on logic, a caveat against possible misunderstandings of the proposition that thirst qua thirst is a desire for drink only and unqualifiedly. We are especially warned (438 A) against the misconception that since all men desire the good, thirst must be a desire not for mere drink but for good drink. Cf. the dramatic correction of a misconception, 79 B, 529 A-B. I mean is thirst thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heatIn the terminology of the doctrine of ideas the presence of cold is the cause of cool, and that of heat, of hot. Cf. The Origin of the Syllogism, . vol. xix. p. 10. But in the concrete instance heat causes the desire of cool and . Cf. 35 A ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. If we assume that Plato is here speaking from the point of view of common sense (Cf. 215 E τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ), there is no need of Hermann’s transposition of ψυχροῦ and θερμοῦ, even though we do thereby get a more exact symmetry with πλήθους παρουσίαν . . . τοῦ πολλοῦ below. is attachedπροσῇ denotes that the presence is an addition. Cf. προσείη in 149 E. to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink, 35 A adds a refinement not needed here, that thirst is, strictly speaking, a desire for repletion by drink. and so hunger of food. That is so, he said; each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.Cf. 429 B. But (the desires) of such or such a (specific) drink are (due to) that added qualification (of the thirst).

Let no one then,μήτοι τις=look you to it that no one, etc. said I, disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because (the argument will runἄρα marks the rejection of this reasoning. Cf 358 C, 364 E, 381 E, 499 C. Plato of course is not repudiating his doctrine that all men really will the good, but the logic of this passage requires us to treat the desire of good as a distinct qualification of the mere drink.) all men desire good, and so, if thirst is desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires. Why, he said, there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection. But I need hardly remind you, said I, that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.ὅσα γ’ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα etc.: a palmary example of the concrete simplicity of Greek idiom in the expression of abstract ideas. ὅσα etc. (that is, relative terms) divide by partitive apposition into two classes, τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ. The meaning is that if one term of the relation is qualified, the other must be, but if one term is without qualification, the other is also taken absolutely. Plato, as usual (Cf. on 347 B), represents the interlocutor as not understandiong the first general abstract statement, which he therefore interprets and repeats. I have varied the translation in the repetition in order to bring out the full meaning, and some of the differences between Greek and English idiom. I don’t understand, he said. Don’t you understand, said I, that the greaterThe notion of relative terms is familiar. Cf. 167 E, 160 A, 199 D-E, 133 C ff., 255 D, Aristotle vi. 4, and . v. It is expounded here only to insure the apprehension of the further point that the qualifications of either term of the relation are relative to each other. In the 283 f. Plato adds that the great and small are measured not only in relation to each other, but by absolute standards. Cf. , pp. 61, 62, and 531 A. is such as to be greater than something? Certainly. Is it not than the less? Yes. But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so? Yes. And may we add the one time greater than the one time less and that which will be greater than that which will be less? Surely. And similarly of the more towards the fewer, and the double towards the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier towards the lighter, the swifter towards the slower, and yet again of the hot towards the cold and all cases of that kind,καὶ . . . καὶ αὖ . . . καὶ ἔτι γε etc. mark different classes of relations, magnitudes, precise quantites, the mechanical properties of matter and the physical properties. does not the same hold? By all means. But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoeverPlato does not wish to complicate his logic with metaphysics. The objective correlate of ἐπιστήμη is a difficult problem. In the highest sense it is the ideas. Cf. 134 A.But the relativity of ἐπιστήμη (Aristotle iv. 1. 5) leads to psychological difficulties in 168 and to theological in 134 C-E, which are waived by this phrase. Sceince in the abstract is of knowledge in the abstract, architectural science is of the specific knowledge called architecture. Cf. 257 C. we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean something like this: As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture. Certainly. Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kindCf. 37 C. such as no other of all the rest? Yes. And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences? That is so. This then, said I, if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don’t at all meanCf. 393 B, 81 D, and for the thought Aristotle . 1030 b 2 ff. The added determinants need not be the same. The study of useful things is not necessarily a useful study, as opponents of the Classics argue. In 476 B this principle is violated by the wilful fallacy that if to do justice is fine, so must it be to suffer justice, but the motive for this is explained in 859-860. that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thingαὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν is here a mere periphrasis for μαθήματος, αὐτοῦ expressing the idea abstract, mere, absolute, or per se, but ὅπερ or ἥπερ ἐστίν is often a synonym of αὐτός or αὐτή in the sense of abstract, absolute, or ideal. Cf. Thompson on 71 B, 255 D τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι. of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, of health and disease, the resultδή marks the application of this digression on relativity, for δῖψος is itself a relative term and is what it is in relation to something else, namely drink. was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but with the addition of the particular kind, medical science. I understand, he said, and agree that it is so.

To return to thirst, then, said I, will you not class it with the thingsτῶν τινὸς εἶναι: if the text is sound, εἶναι seems to be taken twice, (1) with τοῦτο etc., (2)τῶν τινός as predicates. This is perhaps no harsher than τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι in Aeschylus 788. Cf. Tennyson’s How sweet are the looks that ladies bendOn whom their favors fall, and Pope’s And virgins smiled at what they blushed before. Possibly θήσεις τῶν τινός is incomplete in itself (cf. 437 B) and εἶναι τοῦτο etc. is a loose epexegesis. The only emendation worth notice is Adam’s insertion of καὶ τινὸς between τινὸς and εἶναι, which yields a smooth, but painfully explicit, construction. that are of something and say that it is what it isCf. further 255 D, Aristotle . 1021 a 27. Aristotle . v., . vi. 4. So Plotinus vi. 1. 7 says that relative terms are those whose very being is the relation καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst? I will, said he, —namely of drink. Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only. By all means. The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is towards this. Obviously. Then if anything draws it backCf. on 437 C, Aristotle, 433 b 8, 644 E, 604 B, 238 C. The practical moral truth of this is independent of our metaphysical psychology. Plato means that the something which made King David refuse the draught purchased by the blood of his soldiers and Sir Philip Sidney pass the cup to a wounded comrade is somehow different than the animal instinct which it overpowers. Cf. Aristotle . 1102 b 24, 863 E. when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beastCf. 589, 335 B. Cf. Descartes, , article xlvii: En quoi consistent les combats qu’on a coutume d’imaginer entre la partie inférieure et la supérieure de l’âme. He says in effect that the soul is a unit and the lower soul is the body. Cf. ibid. lxviii, where he rejects the concupiscible and the irascible. to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing. We must admit that it does not. So I fancy it is not well said of the archerCf. , p. 68: Plato . . . delights to prick the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is united by disunion ( 187 A) or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow. But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis. For the conceit cf. Samuel Butler’s lines: He that will win his dame must do As love does when he bends his bow, With one hand thrust his lady from And with the other pull her home. that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to. By all means, he said. Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink? We are indeed, he said, many and often. What then, said I, should one affirm about them? Is it not that there isἐνεῖναι μὲν . . . ἐνεῖναι δέ: the slight artificiality of the anaphora matches well with the Gorgian jingle κελεῦον . . . κωλῦον. Cf. Iambl. . p. 41 Postelli ἔστι γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὃ κελεύει καὶ κωλύει. something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids? I think so. And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affectionsThe pulls are distinguished verbally from the passions that are their instruments. νοσημάτων suggests the Stoic doctrine that passions are diseases. Cf. Cicero . iii. 4 perturbationes, and passim, and 45 C. and diseases? Apparently. Not unreasonably, said I, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rationalλογιστικόν is one of Plato’s many synonyms for the intellectual principle. Cf. 441 C, 571 C, 587 D, 605 B. It emphasizes the moral calculation of consequences, as opposed to blind passion. Cf. 46 B (one of the passages which the Christian apologists used to prove that Socrates knew the λόγος), 186 C ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν, and 644 D. Aristotle . 1139 a 12 somewhat differently. and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutterἐπτόηται: almost technical, as in Sappho’s ode, for the flutter of desire. ἀλόγιστον, though applied here to the ἐπιθυμητικόν only, suggests the bipartite division of Aristotle, . 1102 a 28. and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companionSo the bad steed which symbolizes the ἐπιθυμητικόν in 253 E is ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος. of various repletions and pleasures. It would not be unreasonable but quite natural, he said, for us to think this. These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the ThumosWe now approach the distinctively Platonic sense of θυμός as the power of noble wrath, which, unless perverted by a bad education, is naturally the ally of the reason, though as mere angry passion it might seem to belong to the irrational part of the soul, and so, as Glaucon suggets, be akin to appetite, with which it is associated in the mortal soul of the 69 D. In 731 B-C Plato tells us again that the soul cannot combat injustice without the capacity for righteous indignation. The Stoics affected to deprecate anger always, and the difference remained a theme of controversy between them and the Platonists. Cf. Schmidt, , ii. pp. 321 ff., Seneca, , i. 9, and passim. Moralists are still divided on the point. Cf. Bagehot, : Another faculty of Brougham . . . is the faculty of easy anger. The supine placidity of civilization is not favorable to animosity [Bacon’s word for θυμός]. Leslie Stephen, , pp. 60 ff. and p. 62, seems to contradict Plato: The supposed conflict between reason and passion is, as I hold, meaningless if it is taken to imply that the reason is a faculty separate from the emotions, etc. But this is only his metaphysics. On the practical ethical issue he is with Plato. or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these? Perhaps, he said, with one of these, the appetitive.

But, I said, I once heard a storySocrates has heard and trusts a, to us, obscure anecdote which shows how emotion may act as a distinct principle rebuking the lower appetites or curiosities. Leontius is unknown, except for Bergk’s guess identifying him with the Leotrophides of a corrupt fragment of Theopompus Comicus, fr. 1 Kock, p. 739. which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Peiraeus under the outer side of the northern wall,He was following the outer side of the north wall up the city. Cf. 203 A, Frazer, . ii. 40, Wachsmuth, , i. p. 190. becoming aware of dead bodiesThe corpses were by, near, or with the executioner (ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι) whether he had thrown them into the pit (βάραθρον) or not. that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he resistedCf. Antiphon fr. 18 Kock πληγείς, τέως μὲν ἐπεκράτει τῆς συμφορᾶς, etc., and Maids who shrieked to see the heads Yet shrieking pressed more nigh. and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, There, ye wretches,He apostrophizes his eyes, in a different style from Romeo’s, Eyes, look your last. take your fill of the fine spectacle! I too, he said, have heard the story. Yet, surely, this anecdote, I said, signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien. Yes, it does, he said. And do we not, said I, on many other occasions observe when his desires constrain a man contrary to his reason that he reviles himself and is angry with that within which masters him and that as it were in a faction of two parties the high spirit of such a man becomes the ally of his reason? But itsαὐτόν: we shift from the θυμός to the man and back again. making common causeἀντιπράττειν: that is, opposite the reason. It may be construed with δεῖν or as the verb of αὐτόν. There are no real difficulties in the passage, though many have been found. The order of the words and the anacoluthon are intentional and effective. Cf. on 434 C. οὐκ ἂν . . . ποτέ is to literal understanding an exaggeration. But Plato is speaking of the normal action of uncorrupted θυμός. Plato would not accept the psychology of Euripides’ (1079-1080): καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων. Cf. Dr. Loeb’s translation of Décharme, p. 340. with the desires against the reason when reason whispers lowαἱροῦντος: cf. 604 C, and L. and S. s. v. A. II. 5. Thou must not—that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in anybody else either. No, by heaven, he said. Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong,So Aristotle . 1380 b 17 οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, and . 1135 b 28 ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. This is true only with Plato’s reservation γενναιότερος. The baser type is angry when in the wrong. is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger and coldCf. Demosthenes xv. 10 for the same general idea. and whatsoever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I sayὃ λέγω: idiomatic, as I was saying. his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one? True, he said. But what when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that caseἐν τούτῳ: possibly in such an one, preferably in such a case.θυμός is plainly the subject of ζεῖ. (Cf. the physiological definition in Aristotle 403 a 31 ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἵματος), and so, strictly speaking, of all the other verbs down to λήγει. καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν . . . πάσχειν is best taken as a parenthesis giving an additional reason for the anger, besides the sense of injustice. seethe and grow fierce (and also because of his suffering hunger, cold and the like) and make itself the ally of what he judges just, and in noble soulsτῶν γενναίων: i.e. the θυμός of the noble, repeating ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ above. The interpretation does not desist from his noble (acts) destroys this symmetry and has no warrant in Plato’s use of γενναῖος. Cf. 375 E, 459 A. The only argument against the view here taken is that θυμός is not the subject of λήγει, which it plainly is. The shift from θυμός to the man in what follows is no difficulty and is required only by τελευτήσῃ, which may well be a gloss. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237. it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed. Your similitude is perfect, he said, and it confirms καίτοι γε calls attention to the confirmation supplied by the image. Cf on 376 B, and my article in . vol. iii. p. 29. our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city. You apprehend my meaning excellently, said I. But do you also take note of this? Of what? That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far from that, we say that, in the factionsCf. 440 B and 237 E. of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason. By all means, he said.

Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture? We have to assume it as a third, he said. Yes, said I, providedIt still remains to distinguish the λογιστικόν from θυμός, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess θυμός (Cf. 963 E, Aristotle 1334 b 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 D, and used in 94 E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the . See , pp. 42-43. it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive. That is not hard to be shown, he said; for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late. Yes, by heaven, excellently said, I replied; and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above: He smote his breast and chided thus his heart. Hom. Od. 20.17 For there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing. You are entirely right, he said. Through these waters, then, said I, we have with difficulty made our wayCf. 137 A, Pindar, . xiii. 114 ἐκνεῦσαι. and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us. That is so. Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and wherebyCf. 435 B. the state was wise so and thereby is the individual wise? Surely. And so whereby and as the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same wayCf. 73 C, 295 D. A virtual synonym for τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει, 72 E.? Necessarily. Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just. That too is quite inevitable. But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function. I don’t think we have forgotten, he said. We must remember, then, that each of us also in whomὅτου: cf. 431 B οὗ, and 573 D ὧν. the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair. We must indeed remember, he said. Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally? Assuredly.

Then is it not, as we said,Cf. 411 E, 412 A. the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm? Quite so, said he. And these two thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase,Cf. on 433 B-E, 443 D, and 161 B. will preside over the appetitive part which is the massCf. on 431 A-B, 689 A-B. of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the bodyStrictly speaking, pleasure is in the mind, not in the body. Cf. , n. 330. καλουμένων implies the doctrine of the 493 E, 494 C, 42 C, 258 E, and 583 B-584 A, that the pleasures of appetite are not pure or real. Cf. , n. 152. Cf. on λεγομένων431 C. and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep toCf. on 426 E, 606 B. its own work but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fittingπροσῆκον: sc. ἐστὶν ἄρχειν. γένει, by affinity, birth or nature. Cf. 444 B. q reads γενῶν. that it should, and so overturnCf. 389 D. the entire life of all. By all means, he said. Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from withoutCf. 415 E. also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel,Cf. Isocrates xii. 138 αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων. the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler’s designs? That is so. Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasuresCf. 429 C-D the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared. Right, he said. But wise by that small part thatCf. Goodwin’s , 1027. ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possessionἔχον: anacoluthic epexegesis, corresponding to ὅταν . . . διασώζῃ. αὖ probably marks the correspondence. in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three. By all means. And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it? The virtue of soberness certainly, said he, is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual. But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so oftenᾧ πολλάκις: that is, by the principle of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. described. That is altogether necessary. Well then, said I, has our idea of justice in any way lost the edgeἀπαμβλύνεται: is the edge or outline of the definition blunted or dimmed when we transfer it to the individual? of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state? I think not, he said. We might, I said, completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgarThe transcendental or philosophical definition is confirmed by vulgar tests. The man who is just in Plato’s sense will not steal or betray or fail in ordinary duties. Cf. Aristotle . 1178 b 16 ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος. . . to say that the gods are σώφρονες. Similarly Plato feels that there is a certain vulgarity in applying the cheap tests of prudential morality (Cf. 68 C-D) to intrinsic virtue. Be this, is the highest expression of the moral law. Do this, eventually follows. Cf. Leslie Stephen, , pp. 376 and 385, and Emerson, : But I may also neglect the reflex standard, and absolve me to myself . . . If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day. The Xenophontic Socrates (Xenophon iv. 4. 10-11 and iv. 4. 17) relies on these vulgar tests. tests to it. What are these?

For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a depositCf. on 332 A and Aristotle . 1383 b 21. of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act than men of a different kind? No one would, he said. And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public? He would. And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements. How could he? Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man. To anyone indeed, he said. And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled? Yes, that and nothing else. Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort? No, by heaven, he said, I do not. Finished, then, is our dream and perfected —the surmise we spoke of,ὅ: Cf. on 434 D. that, by some Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice. Most assuredly. It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps,The contemplation of the εἴδωλον, image or symbol, leads us to the reality. The reality is always the Platonic Idea. The εἴδωλον, in the case of ordinary things, is the material copy which men mistake for the reality (516 A). In the case of spiritual things and moral ideas, there is no visible image or symbol ( 286 A), but imperfect analogies, popular definitions, suggestive phrases, as τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, well-meant laws and institutions serve as the εἴδωλα in which the philosophic dialectician may find a reflection of the true idea. Cf. on 520 C, 234 C, 150 B. a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practice carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matterCf. 86 D, 731 E, 23 A. The reality of justice as distinguished from the εἴδωλον, which in this case is merely the division of labor. Adam errs in thinking that the real justice is justice in the soul, and the εἴδωλον is justice in the state. In the state too the division of labor may be taken in the lower or in the higher sense. Cf. on 370 A, Introduction p. xv. was, as it seems, that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one’s own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one’s self, and the things of one’s self—it means thatμὴ ἐάσαντα . . . δόχαν 444 A: Cf. 459 C, 462 C. A series of participles in implied indirect discourse expand the meaning of τὴν ἐντός (πρᾶξιν), and enumerate the conditions precedent (resumed in οὕτω δή443 E; Cf. 325 A) of all action which is to be called just if it tends to preserve this inner harmony of the soul, and the reverse if it tends to dissolve it. The subject of πράττειν is anybody or Everyman. For the general type of sentence and the Stoic principle that nothing imports but virtue cf. 591 E and 618 C. a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own,Cf. on 433 E. and having first attained to self-masteryCf. 491 D where Callicles does not understand. and beautiful orderCf. 504. within himself,Cf. 621 C and on 352 A. and having harmonizedThe harmony of the three parts of the soul is compared to that of the three fundamental notes or strings in the octave, including any intervening tones, and so by implication any faculties of the soul overlooked in the preceding classification. Cf. Plutarch, 9. Proclus, p. 230 Kroll. ὥσπερ introduces the images, the exact application of which is pointed by ἀτεχνῶς. Cf. on 343 C. The scholiast tries to make two octaves (δὶς διὰ πασῶν) of it. The technical musical details have at the most an antiquarian interest, and in no way affect the thought, which is that of Shakespeare’s For government, though high and low and lower, Put into parts, doth keep one in concent, Congreeing in a full and natural close Like music. (. I. ii. 179) Cf. Cicero, . ii. 42, and Milton (), Discipline . . . which with her musical chords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together. these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit,Cf. . 992 B. The idea was claimed for the Pythagoreans; cf. Zeller I. i. p. 463, Guyau, , p. 109 La moralité n’est autre chose que l’unité de l’être. The key to effective life is unity of life, says another modern rationalist. one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and namingὀνομάζοντα betrays a consciousness that the ordinary meaning of words is somewhat forced for edification. Cf. 864 A-B and , p. 9, n. 21. Aristotle (. 1138 b 6) would regard all this as mere metaphor. the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct; and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance, to be the opinionἐπιστήμην . . . δόχαν: a hint of a fundamental distinction, not explicitly mentioned before in the . Cf. 97 B ff. and , pp. 47-49. It is used here rhetorically to exalt justice and disparage injustice. ἀμαθία is a very strong word, possibly used here already in the special Platonic sense: the ignorance that mistakes itself for knowledge. Cf. . that in turn presides ἐπιστατοῦσαν: Isocrates would have used a synonym instead of repeating the word. over this.

What you say is entirely true, Socrates. Well, said I, if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really isCf. 337 B. in them, I think we should not be much mistaken. No indeed, we should not, he said. Shall we affirm it, then? Let us so affirm. So be it, then, said I; next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice. Obviously. Must not this be a kind of civil warστάσιν: cf. 440 E. It is defined in 228 B. Aristotle would again regard this as mere metaphor. of these three principles, their meddlesomenessπολυπραγμοσύνην:434 B and Isocrates viii. 59. and interference with one another’s functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general,συλλήβδην: summing up, as in 69 B. all turpitude. Precisely this, he replied. Then, said I, to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so. How so? Because, said I, these are in the soul whatὡς ἐκεῖνα: a proportion is thus usually stated in an ancoluthic apposition. the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference. In what respect? he said. Healthful things surely engender healthThe common-sense point of view, fit fabricando faber. Cf. Aristotle . 1103 a 32. In 460 B, Socrates argues the paradox that he who knows justice does it. Cf. , p. 11, n. 42. and diseaseful disease. Yes. Then does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice? Of necessity. But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominatedCf. the generalization of ἔρως to include medicine and music in 186-187, and 82 A, 906 C, , n. 500. by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature. Yes, that is so. And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? Exactly so, he said. Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of healthThe identification of virtue with spiritual health really, as Plato says (445 A), answers the main question of the . It is not explicitly used as one of the three final arguments in the ninth book, but is implied in 591 B. It is found already in 47 D-E. Cf. 479 B and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease,κακία . . . αἶσχος: 228 E distinguishes two forms of κακία· νόσος or moral evil, and ignorance or αἰσχος. Cf. 477 B. ugliness, and weakness. It is so. Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice? Of necessity.

And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice and practice honorable pursuits and be just, whetherἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε: Cf. 337 C, 367 E, 427 D, 429 E. one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.Cf. 512 A-B, and on 380 B. Nay, Socrates, he said, I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdityCf. on 456 D. On the following argumentum ex contrario Cf. on 336 E.—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we liveCf. on 353 D and Aristotle 414 a 12 ff. Cf. , p. 41. is disordered and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases,Cf. 577 D, 466 E. If all men desire the good, he who does evil does not do what he really wishes. and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two have been shown to be as we have described them. Yes, it is absurd, said I; but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover ὅσον . . . κατιδεῖν is generally taken as epexegetic of ἐνταῦθα. It is rather well felt with οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν. with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so. That is the last thing in the world we must do, he said. Come up hereCf. 25 C. then, said I, that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worth while to observe and distinguish.ἅ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας: for καί Cf. 223 A, 229 D, 83 C, 285 B, and 544 A, C-D. By the strict theory of ideas any distinction may mark a class, and so constitute an idea. (Cf. , pp. 22-25.) But Plato’s logical practice recognizes that only typical or relevant Ideas are worth naming or considering. The does not raise the metaphysical question how a true idea is to be distinguished from a part or from a partial or casual concept. Cf. , pp. 52-53, n. 381, 263 A-B. I am with you, he said; only do you say on. And truly, said I, now that we have come to this heightCf. 588 B, Emerson, , ii. p. 256: We like to come to a height of land and see the landscape, just as we value a general remark in a conversation. Cf. Lowell, , Prose Works, vi. 8: He who has mounted the tower of Plato to look abroad from it will never hope to climb another with so lofty a vantage of speculation. From this and 517 A-B, the ἀνάβασις became a technical or cant term in Neoplatonism. of argument I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form ἓν μέν, etc.: perhaps a faint remembrance of the line ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί, quoted by Aristotle . 1106 b 35. It suggests Plato’s principle of the unity of virtue, as ἄπειρα below suggests the logical doctrine of the 16 and 145 A, 158 B-C that the other of the definite idea is the indefinite and infinite. of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worth while to take note of. What do you mean? he said. As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely, are the characters of soul. How many, pray? There are five kinds of constitutions, said I, and five kinds of soul. Tell me what they are, he said. I tell you, said I, that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two.The true state is that in which knowledge governs. It may be named indifferently monarchy, or aristocracy, according as such knowledge happens to be found in one or more than one. It can never be the possession of many. Cf. 494 A. The inconsistencies which some critics have found between this statement and other parts of the , are imaginary. Hitherto the has contemplated a plurality of rulers, and such is its scheme to the end. But we are explicitly warned in 540 D and 587 D that this is a matter of indefference. It is idle then to argue with Immisch, Krohn, and others that the passage marks a sudden, violent alteration of the original design. If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy. True, he said. Well, then, I said, this is one of the forms I have in mind. For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described. It is not likely, he said.

To such a city, then, or constitution I apply the terms goodCf. on 427 E, and Newman, Introduction to Aristotle p. 14; for ὀρθή, normal, see p. 423. and right—and to the corresponding kind of man; but the others I describe as bad and mistaken, if this one is right, in respect both to the administration of states and to the formation κατασκευήν: a highly general word not to be pressed in this periphrasis. Cf. 455 E, 477 B. of the character of the individual soul, they falling under four forms of badness. What are these, he said. And I was going onCf. 562 C, 180 C, Stein on Herodotus i. 5. For the transition here to the digression of books V., VI., and VII. cf. Introduction p. xvii, 84 C. Digression need not imply that these books were not a part of the original design. to enumerate them in what seemed to me the order of their evolutionμεταβαίνειν: the word is half technical. Cf. 547 C, 550 D, 676 A, 736 D-E, 894 A. from one another, when Polemarchus—he sat at some little distanceἀπωτέρω absolutely. Cf. Cratinus 229 Kock ὄνοι κάθηνται τῆς λύρας ἀπωτέρω. from Adeimantus—stretched forth his hand, and, taking hold of his garmentCf. 327 B. from above by the shoulder, drew the other toward him and, leaning forward himself, spoke a few words in his ear, of which we overheard nothingCf. 359 E. else save only this, Shall we let him off,Cf. on 327 C. then, he said, or what shall we do? By no means, said Adeimantus, now raising his voice. What, pray,Cf. 337 D, 343 B, 421 C, 612 C, 188 E, 80 B. There is a play on the double meaning, What, pray? and Why, pray? said I, is it that you are not letting off? You, said he. And for what reason, pray? said I. We think you are a slacker, he said, and are trying to cheatCf. Sophocles . 437. us out of a whole division,So Isocrates xv. 74 ὅλοις εἴδεσι. and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to get away with it by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common.Cf. 424 A, 739 C. Aristotle says that the possessions of friends should be separate in ownership but common in use, as at Sparta. Cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle p. 201, Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius x. 11, Aristotle 1263 a 30 ff., Euripides 270. Well, isn’t that right, Adeimantus? I said. Yes, said he, but this word right,Cf. 459 D, 668 D, Aristotle 1269 b 13, Shakespeare . I. i. 23 But here’s yet in the word hereafter the kneading, the making of the cake, etc. like other things, requires definingCf. 665 B 7. as to the wayCf. Aristotle 1264 a 12. and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don’t, then, pass over the one that youEmphatic. Cf. 427 E. have in mind. For we have long been lying in wait for you, expecting that you would say something both of the procreation of children and their bringing up, γενομένους: a noun is supplied from the preceding verb. Cf. on 598 C, and on 341 D. and would explain the whole matter of the community of women and children of which you speak. We think that the right or wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the world, μέγα . . . καὶ ὅλον: cf. 469 C, 527 C, 79 E, 779 B, 944 C, 188 D, Demosthenes ii. 22, Aeschylus . 961. in the constitution of a state;

so now, since you are beginning on another constitution before sufficiently defining this, we are firmly resolved, as you overheard, not to let you go till you have expounded all this as fully as you did the rest. Set me down, too, said Glaucon, as voting this ticket.Cf. 330 C. Surely, said Thrasymachus, you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates. What a thing you have done, said I, in thus challengingCf. 184 C, 469 C. me! What a huge debate you have started afresh, as it were, about this polity, in the supposed completion of which I was rejoicing, being only too glad to have it accepted as I then set it forth! You don’t realize what a swarmFor the metaphor cf. Euripides 710 and σμῆνος, 574 D, 401 C, 72 A. of arguments you are stirring upCf. 36 D, 184 A, 411 A. by this demand, which I foresaw and evaded to save us no end of trouble. Well, said Thrasymachus,Thrasymachus speaks here for the last time. He is mentioned in 357 A, 358 B-C, 498 C, 545 B, 590 D.do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for goldLit. to smelt ore. The expression was proverbial and was explained by an obscure anecdote. Cf. Leutsch, , ii. pp. 91, 727, and i. p. 464, and commentators on Herodotus iii. 102. and not to listen to discussions? Yes, I said, in measure. Nay, Socrates, said Glaucon, the measurePlato often anticipates and repels the charge of tedious length (see 286 C, 28 D, 36 D). Here the thought takes a different turn (as 504 C). The δέ γε implies a slight rebuke (Cf. . xiv. pp. 165-174). of listening to such discussions is the whole of life for reasonable men. So don’t consider us, and do not you yourself grow weary in explaining to us what we ask or, your views as to how this communion of wives and children among our guardians will be managed, and also about the rearing of the children while still young in the interval betweenSo 498 A. Cf. on Aristophanes 434, and 792 A. birth and formal schooling which is thought to be the most difficult part of education. Try, then, to tell us what must be the manner of it. It is not an easy thing to expound, my dear fellow, said I, for even more than the provisions that precede it, it raises many doubts. For one might doubt whether what is proposed is possibleCf. 456 C, Thucydides vi. 98, Introduction xvii. and, even conceding the possibility,εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα: a common formula for what a disputant can afford to concede. Cf. Lysias xiii. 52, xxii. 1, xxii. 10. It occurs six times in the . one might still be sceptical whether it is best. For which reason one as it were, shrinks from touching on the matter lest the theory be regarded as nothing but a wish-thought,Cf. Introduction xxxi-xxxii, 456 C, 499 C, 540 D, 736 D, Aristotle 1260 b 29, 1265 a 17 δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ’ εὐχην, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. my dear friend. Do not shrink, he said, for your hearers will not be inconsiderateἀγνώμονες = inconsiderate, unreasonable, as Andocides ii. 6 shows. nor distrustful nor hostile. And I said, My good fellow, is that remark intended to encourage me? It is, he said. Well, then, said I, it has just the contrary effect. For, if I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, it would be an excellent encouragement. For there is both safety and security in speaking the truth with knowledge about our greatest and dearest concerns to those who are both wise and dear.

But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at,Cf. on 452 C-D, 3 C To be laughed at is no matter, 830 B τὸν τῶν ἀνοήτων γέλωτα, Euripides fr. 495. for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble. So I salute Nemesis,Ἀδράστειαν: practically equivalent to Nemesis. Cf. our knock on wood. Cf. Posnansky in . v. 2, Nemesis und Adrasteia: Herodotus i. 35, Aeschylus . 936, Euripides 342, Demosthenes xxv. 37 καὶ Ἀδράστειαν μὲν ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἐγὼ προσκυνῶ. For the moral earnestness of what follows cf. 336 E, 458 A, and Joubert apud Arnold, . p. 29 Ignorance . . . is in itself in intellectual matters a crime of the first order. Glaucon, in what I am about to say. For, indeed,γὰρ οὖν, for in fact, but often with the suggestion that the fact has to be faced, as e.g. in 47 E, where the point is often missed. I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honorable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemiesAlmost proverbial. Cf. my note on Horace, iii. 27. 21. Plato is speaking here from the point of view of the ordinary man, and not from that of his Sermon on the Mount ethics. Cf. 49 D and 480 E, where Gomperz, , ii. pp. 332 and 350, goes astray. Cf. . vol. i. p. 297. than with friends, so that your encouragement is none. And Glaucon, with a laugh, said, Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you asὥσπερ marks the legal metaphor to which ἐκεῖ below refers. Cf. 869 E, and Euripides 1433 and 1448-1450, with Hirzel, Δίκη etc. p. 191, n. 1, Demosthenes xxxvii. 58-59. Plato transfers the idea to the other world in 114 A-B, where the pardon of their victims is required for the release of sinners. The passage is used by the older critics in the comparison of Plato with Christianity. in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence. Well, said I, he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here too. Speak on, then, he said, for all this objection. We must return then, said I, and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there. But maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female,Sophron’s Mimes are said to have been so classified. For δρᾶμα cf. also 150 A. especially since you are so urgent. For men, then, born and bred as we described there is in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women than that which accords with the start we gave them. Our endeavor, I believe, was to establish these men in our discourse as the guardians of a flockFor the use of analogies drawn from animals cf. 375-376, 422 D, 466 D, 467 B, 491 D-E, 537 A, 546 A-B, 564 A. Plato is only pretending to deduce his conclusions from his imagery. Aristotle’s literal-minded criticism objects that animals have no economy, 1264 b 4-6.? Yes. Let us preserve the analogy, then, and assign them a generation and breeding answering to it, and see if it suits us or not. In what way? he said. In this. Do we expect the females of watch-dogs to join in guarding what the males guard and to hunt with them and share all their pursuits or do we expect the females to stay indoors as being incapacitated by the bearing and the breeding of the whelps while the males toil and have all the care of the flock? They have all things in common, he replied, except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger. Is it possible, then, said I, to employ any creature for the same ends as another if you do not assign it the same nurture and education? It is not possible.

If, then, we are to use the women for the same things as the men, we must also teach them the same things. Yes. Now music together with gymnastic was the training we gave the men. Yes. Then we must assign these two arts to the women also and the offices of war and employ them in the same way. It would seem likely from what you say, he replied. Perhaps, then, said I, the contrast with present customReformers always denounce this source of wit while conservative satirists maintain that ridicule is a test of truth. Cf. e.g. >Renan, , p. 439 Le premier pas dans la carrière philosophique est de se cuirasser contre le ridicule, and Lucian, 14 No harm can be done by a joke; that on the contrary, whatever is beautiful shines brighter . . . like gold cleansed, Harmon in Loeb translation, iii. 22. There was a literature for and against custom (sometimes called συνήθεια) of which there are echoes in Cicero’s use of consuetudo, . ii. 75, . i. 148, . i. 83. would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our wordsᾖ λέγεται: cf. on 389 D. are to be realized in fact. Yes, indeed, he said. What then, said I, is the funniest thing you note in them? Is it not obviously the women exercising unclad in the palestra together with the men, not only the young, but even the older, like old men in gymnasiums,Cf. 162 B, and the ὀψιμαθής or late learner in Theophrastus’ xxvii. 14 Loeb. Euripides 596 ff. denounces the light attire of Spartan women when exercising. when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising? Yes, on my word, he replied, it would seem ridiculous under present conditions. Then, said I, since we have set out to speak our minds, we must not fear all the jibesCf. Propert. iv. 13 Muller. with which the wits would greet so great a revolution, and the sort of things they would say about gymnastics and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms and the bestriding of horses. You’re right, he said. But since we have begun we must go forward to the rough part of our law,For a variation of this image cf. 568 D. after begging these fellows not to mind their own businessPlato plays on his own favorite phrase. The proper business of the wit is to raise a laugh. Cf. 189 B. but to be serious, and reminding them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it disgraceful and ridiculous, as most of the barbariansCf. Thucydides i. 6, Herodotus i. 10. Sikes in says this was borrowed from Thucydides, whom Wilamowitz says Plato never read. Cf. Dio Chrys. xiii. 226 M. For ἐξ οὗ cf. Demosthenes iv. 3, Isocrates v. 47. do now, for men to be seen naked. And when the practice of athletics began, first with the Cretans and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don’t you think so? I do. But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the eyesLit. what (seemed) laughable to (in) the eyes. faded away before that which reason revealed to be best, and this made it plain that he talks idly who deems anything else ridiculous but evil, and who tries to raise a laugh by looking to any other pattern of absurdity than that of folly and wrong or sets up any other standard of the beautiful as a mark for his seriousness than the good. Most assuredly, said he.

Then is not the first thing that we have to agree upon with regard to these proposals whether they are possible or not? And we must throw open the debateCf. 607 D δοῖμεν . . . λόγον. to anyone who wishes either in jest or earnest to raise the question whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others,Plato as elsewhere asks whether it is true of all, some, or none. So of the commingling of ideas in 251 D. Aristotle ( 1260 b 38) employs the same would-be exhaustive method. and under which of these heads this business of war falls. Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best endἀρχόμενος . . . τελευτήσειν: an overlooked reference to a proverb also overlooked by commentators on Pindar, . i. 35. Cf. Pindar, fr. 108 A Loeb, 775 E, Sophocles, fr. 831 (Pearson), Antiphon the Sophist, fr. 60 (Diels).? Far the best, he said. Shall we then conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those othersThis pleading the opponent’s case for him is common in Plato. Cf. especially the plea for Protagoras in 166-167. so that the case of the other side may not be taken defenceless and go by defaultApparently a mixture of military and legal phraseology. Cf. ἐκπέρσῃ in 340 A, v. 140 τὰ δ’ ἐρῆμα φοβεῖται, and the legal phrase ἐρήμην καταδιαιτᾶν or οφλεῖν.? Nothing hinders, he said. Shall we say then in their behalf: There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, of others disputing against you, for you yourselves at the beginning of the foundation of your city agreedὡμολογεῖτε: cf. 369 E f. For κατὰ φύσιν cf. 370 C and 456 C. The apparent emphasis of φύσις in this book is of little significance. Cf. , passim. that each one ought to mind as his own business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature? We did so agree, I think; certainly! Can it be denied then that there is by nature a great difference between men and women? Surely there is. Is it not fitting, then, that a different function should be appointed for each corresponding to this difference of nature? Certainly. How, then, can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart? Can you surprise me with an answer to that question? Not easily on this sudden challenge, he replied: but I will and do beg you to lend your voice to the plea in our behalf, whatever it may be. These and many similar difficulties, Glaucon, said I, I foresaw and feared, and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting and breeding of women and children. It does not seem an easy thing, by heaven, he said, no, by heaven. No, it is not, said I; but the fact is that whether one tumbles into a little diving-pool or plump into the great sea he swims all the same. By all means. Then we, too, must swim and try to escape out of the seaCf. the πέλαγος τῶν λόγων 338 A. Similarly Sidney Smith: cut his cable, and spread his enormous canvas, and launch into the wide sea of reasoning eloquence. of argument in the hope that either some dolphinAn allusion to the story of Arion and the dolphin in Herodotus i. 24, as ὑπολαβεῖν perhaps proves. For ἄπορον cf. 378 A. will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue. So it seems, he said. Come then, consider, said I, if we can find a way out. We did agree that different natures should have differing pursuits and that the nature of men and women differ. And yet now we affirm that these differing natures should have the same pursuits. That is the indictment. It is.

What a grandγενναία: often as here ironical in Plato. Cf. 231 B, where interpreters misunderstand it. But the new L. and S. is correct. thing, Glaucon, said I, is the power of the art of contradictionἀντιλογικῆς: one of several designations for the eristic which Isocrates maliciously confounds with dialectic while Plato is careful to distinguish them. Cf. E. S. Thompson, , Excursus V., pp. 272 ff. and the introduction to E.H. Gifford’s , p. 42. Among the marks of eristic are the pusuit of merely verbal oppositions as here and 278 A, 301 B, 164 C; the neglect to distinguish and divide, 17 A, 265 E, 266 A, B; the failure to distinguish the hypothesis from its consequences, 101 E, 135-136.! Why so? Because, said I, many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practising eristic, not dialectic on one another. Yes, this does happen to many, he said; but does this observation apply to us too at present? Absolutely, said I; at any rate I am afraid that we are unawaresἄκοντες is almost unconscious. Cf. 14 C. slipping into contentiousness. In what way? The principle that natures not the same ought not to share in the same pursuits we are following up most manfully and eristicallyGreek style often couples thus two adverbs, the second defining more specifically the first, and, as here and often in Plato and Aristophanes, with humorous or paradoxical effect. Cf. Aristophanes 800 εὖ καὶ μιαρῶς. So Shakespeare well and chirurgeonly. in the literal and verbal sense but we did not delay to consider at all what particular kind of diversity and identityCf. 256 A-B for the relativity of same and other. 292 C describes in different language the correct method. of nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same. No, we didn’t consider that, he said. Wherefore, by the same token, I said, we might ask ourselves whether the natures of baldFor this humorously trivial illustration cf. Mill, . chap. viii. p. 190: I have taken no account of difference of sex. I consider it to be as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height, or in the color of the hair; and Mill’s disciple Leslie Stephen, , i. 291: We may at least grant that the burden of proof should be upon those who would disfranchise all red-haired men. and long-haired men are the same and not, rather, contrary. And, after agreeing that they were opposed, we might, if the bald cobbled, forbid the long-haired to do so, or vice versa. That would be ridiculous, he said. Would it be so, said I, for any other reason than that we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that was pertinentCf. 190 D εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ, 345 B. to the pursuits themselves? We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who have a physician’sAdam makes difficulties, but Cf. 963 A νοῦν . . . κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικόν. The translation follows Hermann despite the objection that this reading forestalls the next sentence. Cf. Campbell ad loc. and Apelt, ., 1903, p. 344. mind have the same nature. Don’t you think so? I do. But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures? Certainly, I suppose. Similarly, then, said I, if it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits. And rightly, said he.

Then, is it not the next thing to bid our opponent tell us precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the woman’s nature differs from the man’s? That would be at any rate fair. Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say what you were saying a while ago, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on a sudden,Plato anticipates the objection that the Socratic dialectic surprises assent. Cf. more fully 487 B, and for a comic version 295 A if I could go off for a little by myself in solitude I would tell you the answer more precisely than precision itself. but that with time for reflection there is no difficulty. He might say that. Shall we, then, beg the raiser of such objections to follow us, if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no pursuit connected with the administration of a state that is peculiar to woman? By all means. Come then, we shall say to him, answer our question. Was this the basis of your distinction between the man naturally gifted for anything and the one not so gifted—that the one learned easily, the other with difficulty; that the one with slight instruction could discoverCf. 286 E, where this is said to be the object of teaching. much for himself in the matter studied, but the other, after much instruction and drill, could not even remember what he had learned; and that the bodily faculties of the one adequately servedCf. 326 B, 498 B, 410 C, Isocrates xv. 180, Xenophon ii. 1. 28. his mind, while, for the other, the body was a hindrance? Were there any other points than these by which you distinguish the well endowed man in every subject and the poorly endowed? No one, said he, will be able to name any others. Do you know, then, of anything practised by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female on all these points?On the alleged superiority of men even in women’s occupations cf. the amusing diatribe of the old bachelor in George Eliot’s , chap. xxi.: I tell you there isn’t a thing under the sun that needs to be done at all but what a man can do better than women, unless it’s bearing children, and they do that in a poor makeshift way, and the remarks on women as cooks of the bachelor Nietzsche, , 234. But Xenophon iii. 9. 11 takes the ordinary view. On the character of women generally Cf. 781 and Aristotle in Zeller trans. ii. 215. Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes and the boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to most laughter? You are right, he said, that the one sexCf. 392 C ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος. is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say. Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all— yet for all the woman is weaker than the man. Assuredly. Shall we, then, assign them all to men and nothing to women? How could we? We shall rather, I take it, say that one woman has the nature of a physician and another not, and one is by nature musical, and another unmusical? Surely.

Can we, then, deny that one woman is naturally athletic and warlike and another unwarlike and averse to gymnastics? I think not. And again, one a lover, another a hater, of wisdom? And one high-spirited, and the other lacking spirit? That also is true. Then it is likewise true that one woman has the qualities of a guardian and another not. Were not these the natural qualities of the men also whom we selected for guardians? They were. The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger. Apparently. Women of this kind, then, must be selected to cohabit with men of this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature. By all means. And to the same natures must we not assign the same pursuits? The same. We come round,Cf. 517 C. then, to our previous statement, and agree that it does not run counter to nature to assign music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians. By all means. Our legislation, then, was not impracticable or utopian,Cf. on 450 D. since the law we proposed accorded with nature. Rather, the other way of doing things, prevalent today, proves, as it seems, unnatural. Apparently. The object of our inquiry was the possibility and the desirabilityCf. Introduction p. xvii. of what we were proposing. It was. That it is possible has been admitted. Yes. The next point to be agreed upon is that it is the best way. Obviously. For the production of a guardian, then, education will not be one thing for our men and another for our women, especially since the nature which we hand over to it is the same. There will be no difference. How are you minded, now, in this matter? In what? In the matter of supposing some men to be better and some worse,This is only a more complicated case of the point of style noted on 349 D. Cf. 386 A, 247 A. or do you think them all alike? By no means. In the city, then, that we are founding, which do you think will prove the better men, the guardians receiving the education which we have described or the cobblers educated by the art of cobblingCf. on 421 A. We should not press this incidental phrase to prove that Plato would not educate all the citizens, as he in fact does in the and by implication in the .? An absurd question, he said. I understand, said I; and are not these the best of all the citizens? By far. And will not these women be the best of all the women? They, too, by far. Is there anything better for a state than the generation in it of the best possible womenCf. Morley, , p. 103: It has been rather the fashion to laugh at the Marquise de Châtelet, for no better reason than that she, being a woman, studied Newton. . . . There is probably nothing which would lead to so rapid and marked an improvement in the world as a large increase of the number of women in it with the will and the capacity to master Newton as thoroughly as she did. and men? There is not.

And this, music and gymnastics applied as we described will effect. Surely. Then the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the state. That is so. The women of the guardians, then, must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment,Cf. Rousseau, , Couvertes de l’honnêteté publique. and must take their part with the men in war and the other duties of civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to the men because of their weakness as a class. But the man who ridicules unclad women, exercising because it is best that they should, plucks the unripeCf. Pindar, fr. 209 Schroeder, ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπειν. Plato varies the quotation to suit his purpose. fruit of laughter and does not know, it appears, the end of his laughter nor what he would be at. For the fairest thing that is said or ever will be said is this, that the helpful is fairThis is one of the chief texts for the alleged utilitarianism of Plato, a question too complicated to be settled by anything less than a comparative study of the , , , , (IX) and . ὠφέλιμον suggests benefit rather than utility. Cf. Introduction to second volume of this translation, and on 339 A-B. and the harmful foul. Assuredly. In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox and have not been quite sweptCf. Aeschylus , in fine. away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial. It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping. You will not think it a greatFor this form of exaggeration Cf. on 414 C, 339 B. one, I said, when you have seen the one that follows. Say on then and show me, said he. This, said I, and all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law. What? That these women shall all be commonOn the whole topic cf. Introduction p. xxxiv, Lucian, 18 οὐκ εἰδότες ὅπως ὁ ἱερὸς ἐκεῖνος ἠξίου κοινὰς ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς γυναῖκας, Epictetus fr. 53, p. 21, Rousseau, , v: je ne parle point de cette prétendue communauté de femmes dont le reproche tant répété prouve que ceux qui le lui font ne l’ont jamais lu. But Rousseau dissents violently from what he calls cette promiscuité civile qui confond partout les deux sexes dans les mêmes emplois. Cf. further the denunciations of the Christian fathers passim, who are outdone by De Quincey’s Otaheitian carnival of licentious appetite, connected with a contempt of human life which is excessive even for paganism. Most of the obvious parallels between Plato and Aristophanes’ follow as a matter of course from the very notion of communal marriage and supply no evidence for the dating of a supposed earlier edition of the whole or a part of the . In any case the ideas of the might have come to Aristophanes in conversation before publication; and the Greeks knew enough of the facts collected in such books as Westermarck’s , not to be taken altogether by surprise by Plato’s speculations. Cf. Herodotus iv. 104, and Aristotle 1262 a 20. Cf. further Adam’s exhaustive discussion in the appendix to this book, Grube, The Marriage Laws in Plato’s , , 1927, pp. 95 ff., Teichmüller, , i. p. 19 n., and the more recent literature collected in Praechter-Ueberweg, 12th ed. i. p. 207, Pöhlmann, , ii. p. 578, Pohlenz, , pp. 225-228, C. Robert, lvii. pp. 351 ff. to all the men, and that none shall cohabit with any privately; and that the children shall be common, and that no parent shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent. This is a far bigger paradox than the other, and provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its utility.A distinct suggestion of the topics of the useful and the possible in Aristotle’s . I presume, said I, that there would be no debate about its utility, no denial that the community of women and children would be the greatest good, supposing it possible. But I take it that its possibility or the contrary would be the chief topic of contention. Both, he said, would be right sharply debated. You mean, said I, that I have to meet a coalition of arguments. But I expected to escape from one of them, and that if you agreed that the thing was beneficial, it would remain for me to speak only of its feasibility. You have not escaped detection, he said, in your attempted flight, but you must render an account of both.

I must pay the penalty, I said, yet do me this much grace: Permit me to take a holiday, just as men of lazy minds are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they walk alone.Cf. Isocrates ii. 47, on those who in solitude do not deliberate but imagine what they wish, and Chesterton’s saying, All feeble spirits live in the future, because it is a soft job; cf. further on day-dreams, Schmidt, , ii. p. 71, and Lucian’s Πλοῖον ἢ εὐχαί. Plato’s description anticipates the most recent psychology in everything except the term autistic thinking. Such persons, without waiting to discover how their desires may be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the labor of deliberating about possibilities and impossibilities, assume their wish fulfilled, and proceed to work out the details in imagination, and take pleasure in portraying what they will do when it is realized, thus making still more idle a mind that is idle without that.ἄλλως: Cf. 495 B. I too now succumb to this weaknessCf. Blaydes on Aristophanes 727. and desire to postponeCf. Herodotus ix. 8. He returns to the postponed topic in 466 D, but again digresses and does not take it up definitely till 471 C or rather 473 C-D. The reason is that the third wave of paradox is also the condition of the possibility of realization. Cf. Introduction p. xvii. and examine later the question of feasibility, but will at present assume that, and will, with your permission, inquire how the rulers will work out the details in practice, and try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the state and its guardians than the effective operation of our plan. This is what I would try to consider first together with you, and thereafter the other topic, if you allow it. I do allow it, he said: proceed with the inquiry. I think, then, said I, that the rulers, if they are to deserve that name, and their helpers likewise, will, the one, be willing to accept orders,Cf. on 340 A-B. and the other, to give them, in some things obeying our laws, and imitatingThat is to say, they are to imitate or conform to our principles in the details which we leave to them. So in the , 770 B, 846 C, 876 E, and the secondary divinities in the , 69 C. Cf. 301 A, and Aristotle 1261 b 2 μιμεῖται. them in others which we leave to their discretion. Presumably. You, then, the lawgiver, I said, have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature.Cf. 456 B. Plato has already explained that he means of like nature in respect to capacity for government. There is no contradiction of the doctrine of the , 310 A (Cf. 773 A-B) that the mating should blend opposite temperaments. Those elements are already mixed in the selection of the guardians. Cf. 375 B-C, 410 D-E and , p. 62, n. 481. And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private possessions of that kind, will dwell together, and being commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence? Not by the necessities of geometry, he said, but by those of love,The phrase is imitated by Plutarch, . 1122 D φυσικαῖς, οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς ἑλκόμενος ἀνάγκαις. which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude. They are, indeed, I said; but next, Glaucon, disorder and promiscuity in these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it. It would not be right, he said. Obviously, then, we must arrange marriages, sacramental so far as may be. And the most sacred marriages would be those that were most beneficial.

By all means. How, then, would the greatest benefit result? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting-dogs and a number of pedigree cocks.Cf. 789 B-C. Have you ever considered something about their unions and procreations? What?The riddling question to which the response is what? is a mannerism derived from tragedy, which becomes very frequent in the later style of the , and . he said. In the first place, I said, among these themselves, although they are a select breed, do not some prove better than the rest? They do. Do you then breed from all indiscriminately, or are you careful to breed from the bestThis commonplace of stirpiculture or eugenics, as it is now called, begins with Theognis 184, and has thus far got no further.? From the best. And, again, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest, or, so far as may be, from those in their prime? From those in their prime. And if they are not thus bred, you expect, do you not, that your birds and hounds will greatly degenerate? I do, he said. And what of horses and other animals? I said; is it otherwise with them? It would be strange if it were, said he. Gracious, said I, dear friend, how imperative, then, is our need of the highest skill in our rulers, if the principle holds also for mankind. Well, it does, he said, but what of it? This, said I, that they will have to employ many of those drugsA recurrence to the metaphor of 389 B, as we are reminded below in D. of which we were speaking. We thought that an inferior physician sufficed for bodies that do not need drugs but yield to diet and regimen. But when it is necessary to prescribe drugs we know that a more enterprising and venturesome physician is required. True; but what is the pertinency? This, said I: it seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefitCf. 389 B, 414 C, and 663 D ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι of their subjects. We said, I believe, that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine. And that was right, he said. In our marriages, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of right. How so? It follows from our former admissions, I said, that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flockCf. on 343 A-B and 267 B-C, 268 B. αὖ below merely marks the second consideration, harmony, the first being eugenics. is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension. Most true, he said.

We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns suitable to the marriages that then take place. But the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of the citizens as nearly as may be the same,Plato apparently forgets that this legislation applies only to the guardians. The statement that ancient civilization was free from the shadow of Malthusianism requires qualification by this and many other passages. Cf. 372 C and 740 D-E. The ancients in fact took it for granted. taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small. Right, he said. Certain ingenious lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may blame chance and not the rulers. Yes, indeed, he said. And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must bestow honors and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible. Right. And the children thus born will be taken over by the officials appointed for this, men or women or both, since, I take it, the official posts too are common to women and men. The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or créche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret,Opinions differ whether this is euphemism for exposure. On the frequency or infrequency of this practice cf. Professor La Rue Van Hook’s article in T.A.P.A. vol. li, and that of H. Bolkestein, . vol. xvii. (1922) pp. 222-239. so that no one will know what has become of them. That is the condition, he said, of preserving the purity of the guardians’ breed. They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but employing every deviceCf. on 414 B and Aristotle 1262 a 14 ff. to prevent anyone from recognizing her own infant. And they will provide others who have milk if the mothers are insufficient. But they will take care that the mothers themselves shall not suckle too long, and the trouble of wakeful nights and similar burdens they will devolve upon the nurses, wet and dry. You are making maternity a soft jobAnother favorite idea and expression. Cf. 459 C, 648 C, 713 D, 720 C, 779 A, 903 E, Isocrates iv. 36, Xenophon iii. 13. 5. for the women of the guardians. It ought to be, said I, but let us pursue our design. We said that the offspring should come from parents in their prime. True. Do you agree that the period of the prime may be fairly estimated at twenty years for a woman and thirty for a man? How do you reckon it?Cf. on 458 C. he said. The women, I said, beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the stateHalf humorous legal language. Cf. Aristotle 1335 b 28 λειτουργεῖν . . . πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν, and Lucan’s urbi pater est, urbique maritus (. ii. 388). The dates for marriage are given a little differently in the , 785 B, 833 C-D, men 30-35, women 16-20. On the whole question and Aristotle’s opinion cf. Newman, Introduction to Aristotle p. 183; cf. also Grube, 1927, pp. 95 ff., The Marriage Laws in Plato’s . to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five.

That is, he said, the maturity and prime for both of body and mind. Then, if anyone older or younger than the prescribed age meddles with procreation for the state, we shall say that his error is an impiety and an injustice, since he is begetting for the city a child whose birth, if it escapes discovery, will not be attended by the sacrifices and the prayers which the priests and priestesses and the entire city prefer at the ceremonial marriages, that ever better offspring may spring from good siresCf. Horace, iv. 4. 29. and from fathers helpful to the state sons more helpful still. But this child will be born in darkness and conceived in foul incontinence. Right, he said. And the same rule will apply, I said, if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a base-born, uncertified, and unhallowed child. Most rightly, he said. But when, I take it, the men and the women have passed the age of lawful procreation, we shall leave the men free to form such relations with whomsoever they please, exceptCf. 838 A and 924 E. daughter and mother and their direct descendants and ascendants, and likewise the women, save with son and father, and so on, first admonishing them preferably not even to bring to lightCf. Newman, op. cit. p. 187. anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring. All that sounds reasonable, he said; but how are they to distinguish one another’s fathers and daughters, and the other degrees of kin that you have just mentioned? They won’t, said I, except that a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father.Cf. Wundt, , p. 89: A native of Hawaii, for example, calls by the name of father . . . every man of an age such that he could be his father. Cf. Aristophanes . 636-637. And, similarly, he will call their offspring his grandchildrenCf. 363 D and 899 E, 927 B. and they will call his group grandfathers and grandmothers. And all children born in the period in which their fathers and mothers were procreating will regard one another as brothers and sisters. This will suffice for the prohibitions of intercourse of which we just now spoke. But the law will allow brothers and sisters to cohabit if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle approves. Quite right, said he. This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?

It is, indeed, he said. Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprintsWe may perhaps infer from the more explicit reference in 193 C that Plato is thinking of the recognition by footprints in Aeschylus .205-210. of the good and do not suit those of the evil? By all means, he said. Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one? We do not. Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths? By all means, he said. But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants? Of course. And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as mine and not mine, and similarly with regard to the word alien?Cf. 423 B, Aristotle 1261 b 16 ff., Plato’s and the Unity of Plato’s Thought, . ix. (1914) p. 358, 664 A, 739 C-E, Julian (Teubner) ii. 459, Teichmüller, , vol. i. p. 19, Mill, , iii. 345: In an improving state of the human mind the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest, which, if perfect, would make him never think of or desire any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included; Spinoza, paraphrased by Hoffding, . i. p. 325: It would be best, since they seek a common good, if all could be like one mind and one body. Rabelais I. lvii. parodies Plato: Si quelqu’un ou quelqu’une disoit beuvons, tous beuvoient etc. Aristotle’s criticism, though using some of Plato’s phrases, does not mention his name at this point but speaks of τίνες, 1261 b 7.Precisely so. That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression mine and not mine of the same things in the same way. Much the best. And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man.Cf. 829 A. For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for integrationI so translate to bring out the analogy between Plato and e.g. Sherrington. For to the soul Cf. , n. 328, 673 A, 45 D, 584 C, 33, 34, 43 B-C. Poschenrieder, , p. 67, compares the De locis in homine, vi. p. 278 Littré. with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure. The same, he said, and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism. That is the kind of a state, then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole. Inevitably, he said, if it is well governed. It is time, I said, to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies the qualities agreed upon in our argument.For these further confirmations of an established thesis cf. on 442-443. We must, he said.

Well, then, there are to be found in other cities rulers and the people as in it, are there not? There are. Will not all these address one another as fellow-citizens? Of course. But in addition to citizens, what does the people in other states call its rulers. In most cities, masters. In democratic cities, just this, rulers. But what of the people in our city. In addition to citizens, what do they call their rulers? Saviors and helpers, he said. And what term do these apply to the people? Payers of their wage and supporters. And how do the rulers in other states denominate the populace? Slaves, he said. And how do the rulers describe one another? Co-rulers, he said. And ours? Co-guardians. Can you tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of their co-rulers as belonging and others as outsiders? Yes, many would. And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that belongs as his own, doesn’t he, and of the outsider as not his own? That is so. But what of your guardians. Could any of them think or speak of his co-guardian as an outsider? By no means, he said; for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these. Excellent, said I; but tell me this further, will it be merely the namesτὰ ὀνόματα μόνον may be thought to anticipate Aristotle’s objections. of this kinship that you have prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the names in all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and obedience for parents, if they look for the favorCf. 554 D ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον. of either gods or men, since any other behaviour would be neither just nor pious? Shall these be the unanimous oracular voices that they hear from all the people, or shall some other kind of teaching besetCf. the reliance on a unanimous public opinion in the , 838 C-D. the ears of your children from their birth, both concerningπερὶ . . . περί: for the preposition repeated in a different sense cf. Isocrates iv. 34, ix, 3, and Shakespeare, , III. i. As here by Caesar and by you cut off. what is due to those who are pointed out as their fathers and to their other kin? These, he said; for it would be absurd for them merely to pronounce with their lips the names of kinship without the deeds. Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke: It is mine that does well; it is mine that does ill. That is most true, he said.

And did we not say that this conviction and way of speechδόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος: Cf. 265 C, 797 C. brings with it a community in pleasures and pains? And rightly, too. Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common. Quite so. And is not the cause of this, besides the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians? It will certainly be the chief cause, he said. But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts. And we were right in so agreeing. Then it is the greatest blessing for a state of which the community of women and children among the helpers has been shown to be the cause. Quite so, he said. And this is consistent with what we said before. For we said,Cf. 416-417. I believe, that these helpers must not possess houses of their own or land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. That was the condition of their being true guardians. Right, he said. Is it not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting the city by referring mine not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of individuals? They should all rather, we said, share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain. By all means, he said. Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish,For a similar list Cf. 842 D. Aristotle, 1263 b 20 f., objects that it is not lack of unity but wickedness that causes these evils. one may say,Softens the strong word οἰχήσεται. from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common? So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin. They will necessarily be quit of these, he said. And again, there could not rightly arise among them any law-suit for assault or bodily injury. For as between age-fellowsCf. A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 364, Aeschines iii. 255, Xenophon . 4. 5, 880 A. we shall say that self-defence is honorable and just, thereby compelling them to keep their bodies in condition. Right, he said.