These, therefore, are the names we must assign to them: that which dilates the visual stream is white
and the opposite thereof black
Footnote 1Cf. 45 C ff. ; and the more rapid motion, being that of a different species of fire, which strikes upon the visual stream and dilates it as far as to the eyes, and penetrating and dissolving the very passages of the eyes causes a volume of fire and water to pour from them, which we call tears.
And this moving body, being itself fire, meets fire from the opposite direction; and as the one firestream is leaping out like a flash, and the other passing in and being quenched in the moisture, in the resultant mixture colors of all kinds are produced. This sensation we term dazzling
and the object which causes it bright
or brilliant.
Again, when the kind of fire which is midway between these Footnote 2i.e., between the kinds of fire which produce blackness
and brightness.
reaches to the liquid of the eyes and is mingled therewith, it is not brilliant but, owing to the blending of the fire’s ray through the moisture, it gives off a sanguine color, and we give it the name of red.
And bright
color when blended with red and white becomes yellow.
But in what proportions the colors are blended it were foolish to declare, even if one knew, seeing that in such matters one could not properly adduce any necessary ground or probable reason. Red blended with black and white makes purple
; but when these colors are mixed and more completely burned, and black is blended therewith, the result is violet.
Chestnut
comes from the blending of yellow and grey; and grey
from white and black; and ochre
from white mixed with yellow. And when white is combined with bright
and is steeped in deep black it turns into a dark blue
color; and dark blue mixed with white becomes light blue
; and chestnut with black becomes green.
As to the rest, it is fairly clear from these examples what are the mixtures with which we ought to identify them if we would preserve probability in our account. But should any inquirer make an experimental test of these facts, he would evince his ignorance of the difference between man’s nature and Gods—how that, whereas God is sufficiently wise and powerful to blend the many into one and to dissolve again the one into many, there exists not now, nor ever will exist hereafter, a child of man sufficient for either of these tasks.
Such, then, being the necessary nature of all these things, the Artificer of the most fair and good took them over at that time amongst things generated when He was engendering the self-sufficing and most perfect God; and their inherent properties he used as subservient causes, but Himself designed the Good in all that was being generated.