True,
he said.
This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, Footnote 1For the concessive μέν cf. 546 E, 529 D, Soph. 225 C. but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter Footnote 2The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz’ emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage. are esteemed as clear and held in honor. Footnote 3The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc.
I understand,
said he, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts.
Understand then,
said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason Footnote 4λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty. itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics, Footnote 5Cf. 533 A. Phileb. 57 E. treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, Footnote 6τῷ ὄντι emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, Phaedo 80 D, Phileb. 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry. underpinnings, footings, Footnote 7Cf. Symp. 211 C
ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις
, like steps of a stair.
and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all, Footnote 8παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a. and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense Footnote 9This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience. but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas. Footnote 10The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234. I understand,
he said; not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding Footnote 11διανοίᾳ here as in 511 A is general and not technical. and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence Footnote 12νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means
have not sense
for its higher meaning Cf. Meno 99 C, Laws 962 A. about them although Footnote 13Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense. the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding Footnote 14Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed. and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason.Your interpretation is quite sufficient,
I said; and now, answering to Footnote 15For ἐπί Cf. Polit. 280 A, Gorg. 463 B. these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief Footnote 16πίστις is of course not
faith
in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly. to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture, Footnote 17εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato. and arrange them in a proportion, Footnote 18Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b. considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality.I understand,
he said; I concur and arrange them as you bid.
Book 6