It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions; or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to Footnote 1αἰτιάσαιτο: this merely varies the idiom αἰτίαν ἔχειν, predicate of, say of. Cf. 599 E. It was a common boast of the Athenians that the fine air of Athens produced a corresponding subtlety of wit. Cf. Euripides Medea 829-830, Isocrates vii. 74, Roberts, The Ancient Boeotians, pp. 59, 76. the region where we dwell,
or the love of money Footnote 2φιλοχρήματον is a virtual synonym of ἐπιθυμητικόν. Cf. 580 E and Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians Footnote 3In Laws 747 C, Plato tells that for this or some other cause the mathematical education of the Phoenicians and Egyptians, which he commends, developed in them πανουργία rather than σοφία. and the population of Egypt.
One certainly might,
he replied. This is the fact then,
said I, and there is no difficulty in recognizing it.
Certainly not.
But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul Footnote 4The questions debated by psychologists from Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1102 a 31) to the present day is still a matter of rhetoric, poetry, and point of view rather than of strict science. For some purposes we must treat the
faculties
of the mind as distinct entities, for others we must revert to the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Arnold’s Lines on Butler’s Sermons
and my remarks in The Assault on Humanism. Plato himself is well aware of this, and in different dialogues emphasizes the aspect that suits his purpose. There is no contradiction between this passage and Phaedo 68 C, 82 C, and Republic x. 611-12. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 42-43. that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly.I think so too,
he said. Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way.
How?
It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites Footnote 5The first formulation of the law of contradiction. Cf. Phaedo 102 E, Theaetetus 188 A, Soph. 220 B, 602 E. Sophistical objections are anticipated here and below (436 E) by attaching to it nearly all the qualifying distinctions of the categories which Aristotle wearily observes are necessary
πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις
(De interp. 17 a 36-37). Cf. Met. 1005 b 22 πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας
, and Rhet. ii. 24. Plato invokes the principle against Heraclitism and other philosophies of relativity and the sophistries that grew out of them or played with their formulas. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 50 ff., 53, 58, 68. Aristotle follows Plato in this, pronouncing it πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή
(Met. 1005 b 18). in the same respect Footnote 6κατὰ ταὐτόν = in the same part or aspect of itself; πρὸς ταὐτόν = in relation to the same (other) thing. Cf. Sophist 230 B ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας
. in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find Footnote 7For this method of reasoning cf. 478 D, 609 B, Laws 896 C, Charmides 168 B-C, Gorgias 496 C, Philebus 11 D-E. these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was Footnote 8ἦν = was all along and is.
not the same thing functioning but a plurality.Very well.
Consider, then, what I am saying.
Say on,
he replied. Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest Footnote 9The maxim is applied to the antithesis of rest and motion, so prominent in the dialectics of the day. Cf. Sophist 249 C-D, Parmenides 156 D and passim. and in motion?
By no means.
Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part Footnote 10Cf. Theaetetus 181 E. of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so?
It is.
Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate Footnote 11The argumentative γε is controversial. For the illustration of the top cf. Spencer, First Principle, 170, who analyzes
certain oscillations described by the expressive though inelegant word
and their final dissipation when the top appears stationary in the equilibrium mobile. stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases Footnote 12The meaning is plain, the alleged rest and motion do not relate to the same parts of the objects. But the syntax of τὰ τοιαῦτα is difficult. Obvious remedies are to expunge the words or to read τῶν τοιούτων, the cacophony of which in the context Plato perhaps rejected at the cost of leaving his syntax to our conjectures. were not in relation to the same parts of the objects, but we would say that there was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still Footnote 13Cf. Aristotle Met. 1022 a 23 wobbling
ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθὸ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθὸ ἕστηκεν
, etc, since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle; but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest.And that would be right,
he said.
Book 4