I must admit,
said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man. Footnote 1The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. Apology 22 A-B, Ion 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the
wise
men must be true. Theaetetus 152 B, Phaedrus 260 A, Laws 888 E, Euthydemus 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. Protagoras 347 E, Meno 71 D, Lysis 214-215, Hippias Minor 365 D. But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit Footnote 2Owing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum
was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal Satire 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, De spec. leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus
because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere,
Cicero De fin. iii. 18. to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not?Yes.
But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind.
True,
said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due.
Something else in very deed,
he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil.
I see,
said I; you mean that Footnote 3Adam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because. he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means?
Quite so.
But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due?
By all means,
he said, what is due Footnote 4In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker. and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil.
It was a riddling Footnote 5Cf. Lysis 214 D, Charmides 162 A, Theaetetus 152 C, 194 C, Alc. II. 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is
inspired
, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, Tim. 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato. definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due.
What else do you suppose?
said he. In heaven’s name!
said I, suppose Footnote 6Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B ff., Thompson on Meno 72 B. someone had questioned him thus:
Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.
Footnote 7Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination: Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big?
What do you take it would have been his answer?Obviously,
he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks.
And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?
Seasoning to meats.
Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice.
If we are to follow the previous examples, Footnote 8Similarly Protagoras 312 A. Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies.
To do good to friends and evil to enemies, Footnote 9Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the Republic infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (Memorabilia ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 85, Aeschylus Choeph. 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles Ajax, p. xxxix, Thumser, Staats-Altertumer, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on Meno 71 E. then, is justice in his meaning?
I think so.
Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health?
The physician.
And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea?
The pilot.
Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies?
In making war and as an ally, I should say.
Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them.
True.
And so to those who are not at sea the pilot.
Yes.
Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?
Book 1