Come then, and join me in the endeavor to persuade the world and explain what is this experience of theirs, which they call being overcome by pleasure,
and which they give as the reason why they fail to do what is best though they have knowledge of it. For perhaps if we said to them: What you assert, good people, is not correct, but quite untrue—they might ask us: Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure
what on earth is it, and what do you call it? Tell us that.
Why, Socrates, must we consider the opinion of the mass of mankind, who say just what occurs to them?
I fancy, I replied, that this will be a step towards discovering how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. So if you think fit to abide by the arrangement we made a while ago—that I should lead in the direction which seems best for elucidating the matter—you must now follow; but if you would rather not, to suit your wishes I will let it pass.
No, he said, your plan is quite right: go on to the end as you began.
Once more then, I proceeded, suppose they should ask us: Then what do you call this thing which we described as being overcome by pleasures
? The answer I should give them would be this: Please attend; Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you not say that this thing occurs, good people, in the common case of a man being overpowered by the pleasantness of food or drink or sexual acts, and doing what he does though he knows it to be wicked? They would admit it. Then you and I would ask them again: In what sense do you call such deeds wicked? Is it that they produce those pleasures and are themselves pleasant at the moment, or that later on they cause diseases and poverty, and have many more such ills in store for us? Or, even though they have none of these things in store for a later day, and cause us only enjoyment, would they still be evil just because, forsooth, they cause enjoyment in some way or other? Can we suppose, Protagoras, that they will make any other answer than that these things are evil, not according to the operation of the actual pleasure of the moment, but owing to the later results in disease and those other ills?
I think, said Protagoras, that most people would answer thus.
Then in causing diseases they cause pains? And in causing poverty they cause pains? They would admit this, I imagine.
Protagoras agreed.