Soc. Those which we mentioned before. I think the proverb we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good
is an excellent one.
Pro. Surely.
Soc. Well then, in God’s name; I think this is the gist of our discussion.
Pro. What is it?
Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations good
and pleasant
are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one,
but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus?
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us?
Pro. What?
Soc. That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect.
Pro. In what respect?
Soc. That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that?
Pro. We did.
Soc. And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one?
Pro. By no means.
Soc. And if we made any mistake at that time, let any one now take up the question again. Assuming that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether anyone would wish to have or acquire anything whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure, be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge whatsoever of what he has felt, and not even the slightest memory of the feeling. And let him ask in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone would wish to have wisdom without any, even the slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom.
Pro. That is impossible, Socrates; it is useless to ask the same question over and over again.