Phaedo. For we found
that it is possible,
on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any
other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been
forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or
unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born
knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are
said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be
recollection.
That is certainly
true, Socrates.
Which then do you
choose, Simmias? Were we born
with the
knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired
knowledge before our birth?
I cannot
choose at this moment, Socrates.
How
about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a
man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?
Certainly he can, Socrates.
And do you think that everybody can give an
account of the matters about which we have just been talking?
I wish they might,
said Simmias;
but on the contrary I fear that tomorrow, at this time, there will be no
longer any man living who is able to do so properly.
Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these
things?
By no
means.
Then they recollect the
things they once learned?
Necessarily.
When did
our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human
beings.
Certainly
not.
Then
previously.
Yes.
Then, Simmias, the
souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and
they had intelligence.
Unless,
Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time
still remains.
Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose
them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose
them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to
suggest?
None whatever,
Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense.
Then, Simmias,
said he, is this the state
of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good,
and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these,
which we find existed previously and are
now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference
that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born;
and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the
case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also
existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our
souls?