Phaedo. Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning
nor dragging in
any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure,
absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of
things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in
a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs
the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man,
Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?
That is true as true can be, Socrates,
said Simmias.
Then,
said he,
all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the
other something like this:
There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our
argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and
the soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what
we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason
of its need of sustenance;
and moreover, if
diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills
us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and
foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for
us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and
factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we
are compelled to gain money
for the sake of
the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we
have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit
of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our
studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our
beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know
anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold
the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone.
And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the
wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamored of, but not while we live.