This more powerful and wiser soul, then, was found to be better and to have more power to do both good and disgraceful acts in every kind of action was it not?
Hipp.Yes.
Soc.Whenever, then, it does disgraceful acts, it does them voluntarily, by reason of power and art; and these, either one or both of them, are attributes of justice.
Hipp.So it seems.
Soc.And doing injustice is doing evil acts, and not doing injustice is doing good acts.
Hipp.Yes.
Soc.Will not, then, the more powerful and better soul, when it does injustice, do it voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?
Hipp.Apparently.
Soc.Is not, then, a good man he who has a good soul, and a bad man he who has a bad one?
Hipp.Yes.
Soc.It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good soul.
Hipp.But surely he has.
Soc.Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man.
Hipp.I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that.
Soc.Nor I with myself, Hippias; but that appears at the moment to be the inevitable result of our argument; however, as I was saying all along, in respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same opinion; and that I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising; but if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us also, if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our straying.