Ath. Should we not then assert, as a corollary, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure or of untrue opinion, nor indeed should any kind of equality be so judged? The reason why the equal is equal, or the symmetrical symmetrical, is not at all because a man so opines, or is charmed thereby, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.
Clin. Most certainly.
Ath. We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?
Clin. Of course.
Ath. So whenever a man states that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall decisively reject his statement; and we shall regard such music as the least important of all (if indeed any music is important) and prefer that which possesses similarity in its imitation of the beautiful.
Clin. Very true.
Ath. Thus those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, as it appears, not that which is pleasant, but that which is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in the reproduction of the original in its own proper quantity and quality.
Clin. Of course.
Ath. And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would allow,—that all its productions are imitative and representative; Footnote 1Cp. Plat. Laws 655d, above. The music (songs and tunes) of dramatic compositions is specially alluded to. that much, at least, they would all admit,—poets, audience, and actors alike, would they not?
Clin. They would.
Ath. Now the man who is to judge a poem Footnote 2Or musical composition. unerringly must know in each particular case the exact nature of the poem; for if he does not know its essence,—what its intention is and what the actual original which it represents,—then he will hardly be able to decide how far it succeeds or fails in fulfilling its intention.
Clin. Hardly, to be sure.
Ath. And would a man who does not know what constitutes perfection be able to decide as to the goodness or badness of a poem? But I am not making myself quite clear: it might be clearer if I put it in this way—
Clin. In what way?
Ath. As regards objects of sight we have, of course, thousands of representations.
Clin. Yes.
Ath. How, then, if in this class of objects a man were to be ignorant of the nature of each of the bodies represented could he ever know whether it is perfectly executed? What I mean is this: whether it preserves the proper dimensions and the positions of each of the bodily parts, and has caught their exact number and the proper order in which one is placed next another, and their colors and shapes as well,—or whether all these things are wrought in a confused manner. Do you suppose that anyone could possibly decide these points if he were totally ignorant as to what animal was being represented?
Clin. How could he?