Ath. and as they watch, they pass on their perceptions to the organs of memory,—that is, they report to the elder wardens all that goes on in the State,— while the old men, who are likened to the reason because of their eminent wisdom in many matters of importance, act as counsellors, and make use of the young men as ministers and colleagues also in their counsels, so that both these classes by their co-operation really effect the salvation of the whole State. Is this the way, or ought we to contrive some other? Should the State, do you think, have all its members equal instead of having some more highly trained and educated?
Clin. Nay, my good sir, that were impossible.
Ath. We must proceed, then, to expound a type of education that is higher than the one previously described.
Clin. I suppose so.
Ath. Will the type which we hinted at just now Footnote 1Plat. Laws 962e, Plat. Laws 963b ff. prove to be that which we require?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. Did we not say Footnote 2Cp. Plat. Laws 903c, Plat. Laws 903d, Plat. Laws 961e. that he who is a first-class craftsman or warden, in any department, must not only be able to pay regard to the many, but must be able also to press towards the One Footnote 3Cp. Plat. Rep. 537b ff., where the dialectic
method is described as a kind of induction (συναγωγή) whereby the mind ascends from the many
particulars to the one
universal concept or idea
: a comprehensive view (σύνοψις) of the whole is what marks the dialectician (ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός). so as to discern it and, on discerning it, to survey and organize all the rest with a single eye to it?
Clin. Quite right.
Ath. Can any man get an accurate vision and view of any object better than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar to the one unifying form?
Clin. Probably not.
Ath. It is certain, my friend, rather than probable, that no man can possibly have a clearer method than this.
Clin. I believe you, Stranger, and I assent; so let us employ this method in our subsequent discourse.
Ath. Naturally we must compel the wardens also of our divine polity to observe accurately, in the first place, what that identical element is which pervades all the four virtues,
and which,—since it exists as a unity in courage, temperance, justice and wisdom,— may justly be called, as we assert, by the single name of virtue.
This element, my friends, we must now (if we please) hold very tight, and not let go until we have adequately explained the essential nature of the object to be aimed at—whether, that is, it exists by nature as a unity, or as a whole, or as both, or in some other way. Else, if this eludes us, can we possibly suppose that we shall adequately grasp the nature of virtue, when we are unable to state whether it is many or four or one?
Accordingly, if we follow our own counsel, we shall contrive somehow, by hook or by crook, that this knowledge shall exist in our State. Should we decide, however, to pass it over entirely—pass it over we must.
Clin. Nay, Stranger, in the name of the Stranger’s God, we must by no means pass over a matter such as this, since what you say seems to us most true. But how is this to be contrived?