Ath. Further, things increase when combined and decrease when separated in all cases where the regular constitution Footnote 1i.e. as solid, liquid, or gaseous substance. of each persists; but if this does not remain, then both these conditions cause them to perish. And what is the condition which must occur
in everything to bring about generation? Obviously whenever a starting-principle receiving increase comes to the second change, and from this to the next, and on coming to the third admits of perception by percipients. Footnote 2This account of the derivation of the sense-world from the starting-principle (ἀρχή) is obscure. It is generally interpreted as a
Have we now, my friends, mentioned all the forms of motion, capable of numerical classification, Footnote 3The 8 kinds of motion here indicated are—(1) circular motion round a fixed center; (2) locomotion (gliding or rolling); (3) combination; (4) separation; (5) increase; (6) decrease; (7) becoming; (8) perishing. The remaining two kinds (as described below) are—(9) other-affecting motion (or secondary causation); and (10) self-and-other-affecting motion (or primary causation).
save only two?geometrical allegory,
the stages of development being from point to line, from line to surface, from surface to solid,—this last only being perceptible by the senses (cp. Aristot. Soul 404 b 18 ff.). Everything comes into being by this process of change and alteration; and a thing is really existent whenever it remains fixed, but when it changes into another constitution it is utterly destroyed.
Clin. What two?
Ath. Those, my good sir, for the sake of which, one may say, the whole of our present enquiry was undertaken.
Clin. Explain more clearly.
Ath. It was undertaken, was it not, for the sake of soul?
Clin. Certainly.
Ath. As one of the two let us count that motion which is always able to move other things, but unable to move itself; and that motion which always is able to move both itself and other things,—by way of combination and separation, of increase and decrease, of generation and corruption,—let us count as another separate unit in the total number of motions.
Clin. Be it so.
Ath. Thus we shall reckon as ninth on the list that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another; while that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of action and passion, and is termed the real change and motion of all that really exists,—it, I presume, we shall call the tenth.
Clin. Most certainly.
Ath. Of our total of ten motions, which shall we most correctly adjudge to be the most powerful of all and excelling in effectiveness?
Clin. We are bound to affirm that the motion which is able to move itself excels infinitely, and that all the rest come after it.
Ath. Well said. Must we, then, alter one or two of the wrong statements we have now made?
Clin. Which do you mean?
Ath. Our statement about the tenth seems wrong.
Clin. How?
Ath. Logically it is first in point of origin and power; and the next one is second to it, although we absurdly called it ninth a moment ago.
Clin. What do you mean?
Ath. This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible.