But it seems to me that I am so eager to know that I cannot wait for you while you delay; for I believe I have just now found a way out. Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight? For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight,
don’t you think that we should put a stop to his impudence?
To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems that the nature of the beautiful is now well stated.
Soc.But what then? Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they are pleasing through hearing and sight, or that they have some other form of beauty?
Hipp.Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the man unnoticed.
Soc.No, by dog, Hippias—not past the man before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense and pretending that I was talking sense when I was not.
Hipp.What man is that?
Soc.Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things carelessly without investigation than to say that I know what I do not know.
Hipp.But certainly I also, now that you have mentioned it, think that this about the laws is something different.
Soc.Not too fast, Hippias; for very likely we have fallen into the same perplexity about the beautiful in which we were a while ago, although we think we have found another way out.
Hipp.What do you mean by that, Socrates?
Soc.I will tell you what presents itself to me, if perhaps there may be some sense in it.
For perhaps these matters of laws and customs might be shown to be not outside of the perception which we have through hearing and sight; but let us stick to the statement that that which is pleasing through the senses is beautiful, without interjecting the matter of the laws. But if this man of whom I speak, or anyone else whosoever, should ask us: Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of the pleasing that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses
—those concerned with food and drink and sexual love and all such things—is not beautiful? Or do you say that such things are not even pleasing and that there is no pleasure at all in them, nor in anything else except sight and hearing?
What shall we say, Hippias?
Certainly, by all means, Socrates, we shall say that there are very great pleasures in the other things also.