Socrates. I don’t like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?
Euthyphro. Why you don’t suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?
Socrates. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?
Euthyphro. What else than honor and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?
Socrates. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?
Euthyphro. I think it is precious, above all things.
Socrates. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?
Euthyphro. Yes, I remember.
Socrates. Then don’t you see that now you say that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.
Euthyphro. So it seems.
Socrates. Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if anyone does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.
Euthyphro. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.