Soc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?
Alc. Quite so.
Soc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?
Alc. No, upon my word, I should think not.
Soc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.
Alc. No, indeed.
Soc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?
Alc. I do not think he would.
Soc. For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else’s mother, but only his own.
Alc. That is so.
Soc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.
Alc. Apparently.
Soc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.
Alc. It seems to be.
Soc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.
Alc. What may that be, Socrates?
Soc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?
Alc. I think so.