Soc. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?
Alc. Yes, only those.
Soc. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?
Alc. By far.
Soc. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?
Alc. No, indeed.
Soc. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?
Alc. I am afraid so.
Soc. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city’s affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.
Alc. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides Footnote 1A musician of Ceos (who was perhaps also a Pythagorean philosopher) who taught in Athens. and Anaxagoras Footnote 2An Ionian philosopher who lived in Athens c. 480-430 B.C. ; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon Footnote 3An Athenian musician and sophist. for that very purpose.
Soc. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one’s knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.
Alc. I agree.
Soc. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?
Alc. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?
Soc. Well, Cleinias, your brother.
Alc. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?
Soc. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?
Alc. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.