Soc. So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.
Alc. I believe that is so.
Soc. And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Then in saying that the rescue of one’s friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.
Alc. I believe what you say is true, Socrates.
Soc. So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.
Alc. Apparently.
Soc. Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And are not those who do well happy?
Alc. Of course.
Soc. And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?
Alc. Certainly.
Soc. And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. So doing well is good?
Alc. Of course.
Soc. And welfare is noble?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.
Alc. Apparently.
Soc. Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.
Alc. We must.
Soc. Well then, are good things expedient or not?
Alc. Expedient.
Soc. And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?
Alc. I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.
Soc. And that those who do noble things must do good things?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. And that good things are expedient?
Alc. Yes.
Soc. Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.
Alc. So it seems.
Soc. Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?
Alc. I seem to be, apparently.
Soc. So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, Footnote 1Peparethus is a small island off the coast of Thessaly. imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?
Alc. But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.
Soc. And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?
Alc. I am, quite.
Soc. Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?