(ii) We must next discuss whether any man can be called unrestrained
without qualification, or whether it must always be in relation to certain particular things, and if so, to what sort of things. Now it is plain that men are self-restrained and enduring, unrestrained and soft, in regard to Pleasures and Pains.
But the things that give pleasure are of two kinds: some are necessary, Footnote 1See 4.5, first note. others are desirable in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary sources of pleasures are those connected with the body: I mean such as the functions of nutrition and sex, in fact those bodily functions which we have indicated Footnote 2See Bk. 3.10 as the sphere of Profligacy and Temperance. The other sources of pleasure are not necessary, but are desirable in themselves: I mean for example victory, honor, wealth, and the other good and pleasant things of the same sort. Now those who against the right principle within them exceed in regard to the latter class of pleasant things, we do not call unrestrained simply, but with a qualification—unrestrained as to money, gain, honor or anger Footnote 3Cf. 1.7: θυμός, spirit,
aims at victory, and so is brought into this discussion of pleasures and desires
( 4.5); but in chap. 6 it is contrasted with desire, and its indulgence in the form of anger is seen to be painful rather than pleasant (6.4). —not merely unrestrained
; because we regard them as distinct from the unrestrained in the strict sense, and only so called by analogy, like our familiar example Footnote 4This seems to be the meaning of the imperfect tenses. An inscription records that a boxer named Ἄνθρωπος won at Olympia in B.C. and the Greek commentators say that he is referred to here. His name would appear to have been used in the Peripatetic school as an example of the analogical use of words. of Man the Olympic winner,
whose special definition is not very different Footnote 5i.e., it requires the addition of three words. Strictly speaking, however, it is impossible to define an individual; moreover, the Olympic victor (a) was a man not merely by analogy but as a member of the species, and (b) was named Man not even by analogy but only homonymously. But a humorous illustration need not be precise. from the general definition of man,
though nevertheless he is really quite distinct from men in general. Footnote 6Perhaps Man had some personal peculiarity which somewhat belied his name. (That such persons are only called unrestrained by analogy is proved by our blaming unrestraint, whether unqualified or with reference to some particular bodily pleasure, as a vice and not merely an error, whereas we do not regard those unrestrained in regard to money, etc. as guilty of vice.)
But of those who exceed in relation to the bodily enjoyments with regard to which we speak of men as temperate or profligate, he who pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids the extremes Footnote 7Probably this should be amended to moderate bodily pains,
cf. 4.4. of bodily pains such as hunger, heat, cold, and the various pains of touch and taste, not from choice but against his own choice and reason, is described as unrestrained not with a qualification—unrestrained as regards these pleasures and pains—as is one who yields to anger, but just simply as unrestrained.
(A proof that unrestrained
unqualified denotes unrestraint as regards bodily pleasures and pains, is that we speak of men as soft
who yield to these, but not those who yield to anger or the like.) And hence we class the unrestrained man with the profligate (and the self-restrained with the temperate) Footnote 8This parenthesis may be an interpolation. , but not those who yield to anger or the like, because Unrestraint and Profligacy are related to the same pleasures and pains. But as a matter of fact, although they are related to the same things, they are not related to them in the same way; the profligate acts from choice, the unrestrained man does not. Hence we should pronounce a man who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains when he feels only weak desires or none at all, to be more profligate than one who does so owing to intense desires; for what would the former do if he possessed the ardent desires of youth, and felt violent pain when debarred from the necessary
pleasures?
And inasmuch as some desires and pleasures relate to things that are noble and good in kind (for some pleasant things are desirable by nature, others the opposite, while others again are neutral—compare the classification we gave above Footnote 9See 4.2: a third class is now added, pleasures bad in themselves and not only in excess; and the necessary
pleasures are now classed as intermediate,
neither good nor bad in themselves, though good as a means of life, and bad in excess. ) : for instance money, gain, victory, honor: and inasmuch as in relation to all these naturally desirable things, as well as to the neutral ones, men are not blamed merely for regarding or desiring or liking them, but for doing so in a certain way, namely to excess (hence those Footnote 10This subject is left without its verb, which apparently would be are not wicked, nor yet unrestrained in the proper sense.
Though this clause here begins as a parenthesis, it is resumed below at well then
as a fresh sentence, which really, however, constitutes the apodosis of the protasis that began at the beginning of the section, And inasmuch.
who yield to or pursue, contrary to principle, anything naturally noble and good, for example those who care too much for honor, or for their children and their parents—for parents and children are good things and people are praised who care for them, but nevertheless it is possible even in their case to go to excess, by vying even with the gods like Niobe, Footnote 11Niobe vaunted her children as more beautiful than those of Leto. or as Satyrus did, Footnote 12The Greek commentators tell stories of a certain Satyrus who, when his father died, committed suicide for grief. But Heliodorus appears to have read ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν πατέρα without περί, or like Satyrus the Filial invoking his father as a god
: there were kings of Bosphorus named Satyrus in the 4th century, and one may have borne the surname Philopator.
who was nicknamed the filial for his devotion to his father, for he was thought to carry it to the point of infatuation—) : well then, there cannot be any actual Vice in relation to these things, because, as has been said, each of them is in itself desirable by nature, although excessive devotion to them is bad and to be avoided.
And similarly there cannot be Unrestraint either, since that is not merely to be avoided, but actually blameworthy; though people do use the term in these matters with a qualification— unrestraint in
whatever it may be—because the affection does resemble Unrestraint proper; just as they speak of someone as a bad doctor or bad actor whom they would not call simply bad.
As therefore we do not call bad doctors and actors bad men, because neither kind of incapacity is actually a vice, but only resembles Vice by analogy, so in the former case it is clear that only self-restraint and lack of restraint in regard to the same things as are the objects of Temperance and Profligacy are to be deemed Self-restraint and Unrestraint proper, and that these terms are applied to anger only by analogy; and so we add a qualification, unrestrained in anger,
just as we say unrestrained in the pursuit of honor
or gain.