Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of Choice. Footnote 1The writer here examines the operation of the Will, which is regarded as essentially an act of choosing between alternatives of conduct. The technical term employed, choice
or preference,
has appeared in the formal definition of virtue (2.6.15). In the present passage, cf. 2.9, it is viewed as directed to means: at the moment of action we select from among the alternative acts possible (or expressing it more loosely, among the various things here and now obtainable by our action) the one which we think will conduce to the end we wish. Elsewhere however (3.1.15 and 6.12.8) it is used of the selection of ends, and it is almost equivalent to purpose
; while at 6.13.8 it includes both ends and means (see also 7.9.1). The writer returns to the subject in Bk. 6.2. For this appears to be intimately connected with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.
Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be said to be done by choice.
Some identify Choice with (1) Desire, or (2) Passion, or (3) Wish, or (4) some form of Opinion. These views however appear to be mistaken.
(1) The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel desire, and also passion.
Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire.
Again, desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to desire. Footnote 2i.e., you cannot feel two contradictory desires at once (though you can of course desire two incompatible things: you may want to eat your cake and have it; but you cannot strictly speaking at the same time both desire to eat the cake and desire not to eat it). But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it. And desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not. Footnote 3But as good or bad.
(2) Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion seem very far from being done of deliberate choice.
(3) Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality.
Also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actor Footnote 4Greek dramas were produced in competitions (and it is noteworthy that in the Old Comedy at Athens the play itself dramatized a contest or debate). or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act.
Again, we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy; we wish to be happy, and that is the word we use in this connection, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy; since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control.
(4) Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal, Footnote 5Cf. 3.3 and note. or impossible, just as much as about what is within our power. Also we distinguish opinion by its truth or falsehood, not by its being good or bad, but choice is distinguished rather as being good or bad.
Probably therefore nobody actually identifies choice with opinion in general. But neither is it the same as some particular opinion. Footnote 6i.e., an opinion or belief that so-and-so is good, and is within our power to obtain. For it is our choice of good or evil that determines our character, not our opinion about good or evil.
And we choose to take or avoid some good or evil thing, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is advantageous, or how it is so: Footnote 7Perhaps to be emended how it is to be achieved.
we do not exactly form an opinion to take or avoid a thing.
Also we praise a choice rather for choosing the right thing, but an opinion for opining in the right way. And we choose only things that we absolutely know to be good, we opine things we do not quite certainly know to be true.
Nor do the same persons appear to excel both at choosing and at forming opinions: some people seem to form opinions better, but yet to choose the wrong things from wickedness.
That choice is preceded or accompanied by the formation of an opinion is immaterial, for that is not the point we are considering, but whether choice is the same thing as some form of opinion.
What then are the genus and differentia of Choice, inasmuch as it is not any of the things above mentioned? It manifestly belongs to the genus voluntary action; but not every voluntary act is chosen.
Perhaps we may define it as voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice involves reasoning and some process of thought. Indeed previous deliberation seems to be implied by the very term proaireton, which denotes something chosen before other things.